Overview of the Document
Document title:
Court-Submitted Document — Petition for Human Rights Relief and Corrective Measures Concerning Violations of the Presumption of Innocence, the Right to a Fair Trial, and Related Rights
Date of creation:
May 15, 2026
Prepared by:
Toshio Tsumuraya
Submitted to:
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan
President of the Sendai High Court
Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court
Petitioner:
Toshio Tsumuraya
Type of document:
Petition for human rights relief and corrective measures
Receipt and delivery information:
On page 1 of the original, a receipt stamp of the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court dated May 15, 2026, can be confirmed.
At the end of the document, postal delivery certificates addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan and the President of the Sendai High Court are attached.
According to the postal delivery certificate, the postal item addressed to the President of the Sendai High Court was delivered on May 16, 2026.
According to the postal delivery certificate, the postal item addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan was delivered on May 18, 2026.
Publication format:
PDF with personal information and other necessary portions redacted
Original PDF:
Skip to PDF contentFacts Confirmed by This Document
This document is a petition for human rights relief and corrective measures submitted by Toshio Tsumuraya on May 15, 2026, to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan, the President of the Sendai High Court, and the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.
In this document, the petitioner argues that, in the criminal proceedings in 2011, the Sukagawa City Council, a public authority, adopted resignation recommendation resolutions before the judgment became final, and that detention extension, interrogation, changes in statements, indictment, trial proceedings, and a guilty judgment proceeded thereafter, giving rise to serious human rights violations contrary to Article 14, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Articles 31, 37, and 38 of the Constitution of Japan.
This document states that the petitioner raised these issues before the courts in the written opinion dated April 28, 2025, and further sought concrete answers in the “Written Inquiry and Request Concerning the Effect of a Final Criminal Judgment Under Violations of the Presumption of Innocence and Judicial Relief” dated March 31, 2026, concerning the effect of a final criminal judgment rendered under violations of the presumption of innocence, the need for effective relief under the ICCPR, and the limits of formal handling under domestic retrial requirements.
However, this document argues that, up to the present, no substantive response, relief measure, or corrective measure has been provided regarding the important human rights issues raised by the petitioner.
For that reason, this document is structured not as a retrial request under the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor as a supplemental filing to an already-filed retrial request, but as a request seeking substantive examination and necessary relief or corrective measures from the courts pursuant to Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, Article 98, Paragraph 2 and Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and General Comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee.
This document sets out five main requests.
First, it seeks confirmation that this matter is not a retrial request under the Code of Criminal Procedure or a supplemental filing to such a request, but an effective-relief and corrective-measures petition based on Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR.
Second, it seeks substantive examination of whether the pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions adopted by the Sukagawa City Council, especially the first resolution adopted before indictment while the petitioner was detained, and the second resolution adopted before the first trial hearing, constituted public attribution of guilt treating the petitioner as if he were guilty before judgment, and whether they constituted human rights violations contrary to the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Third, it seeks substantive examination, from the perspective of Article 14, Paragraphs 1 and 3(g) of the ICCPR and Articles 31, 37, and 38 of the Constitution of Japan, of the legitimacy of the detention extension, interrogation, changes in statements, indictment, plea at trial, and guilty judgment that proceeded under circumstances in which those resolutions and the related spread of media reports existed.
Fourth, based on that examination, it seeks consideration of whether any relief or corrective measures are available within the domestic legal order, including retrial, extraordinary appeal, encouragement of review by the public prosecutor, or other possible measures, and disclosure of the results of that consideration.
Fifth, if relief or corrective action is not provided on the ground of domestic procedural limitations, it seeks a concrete explanation of why that is permissible in light of Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 27 of the VCLT, and General Comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee.
This document expressly states, as its legal position, that this petition is not a retrial request under the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor a supplemental filing to an already-filed retrial request.
The document states that, although serious human rights violations contrary to Article 14, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3(g) of the ICCPR have been made clear by concrete evidence, no effective relief has been provided up to the present. On that basis, it seeks substantive examination and necessary relief or corrective measures from the courts pursuant to Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, Article 98, Paragraph 2 and Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 27 of the VCLT, and General Comment No. 31.
The document also states that the petitioner does not limit himself to any particular procedural category under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further states that Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR obligates State parties to provide effective remedies for violations of Covenant rights, and that, because the courts are also State organs bound by that obligation, they should substantively examine what relief or corrective measures are available within the constitutional structure and domestic legal order with respect to the human rights violations in this case.
This document states that its primary subject is not the substantive innocence claim itself concerning the time of the accident, the call for substitute driver service, the breath-alcohol concentration, the possibility of driving, and related matters. Rather, separate from those substantive issues, it concerns procedural human rights violations themselves: pre-judgment public attribution of guilt, violation of the presumption of innocence, violation of the right to a fair trial, violation of the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements, and violation of the obligation to provide effective relief.
This document sets out the procedural background, including the written opinion dated April 28, 2025, the written inquiry and request dated March 31, 2026, and the absence of a substantive response to that document.
This document states that the petitioner presented a specific factual chronology including the arrest on October 19, 2011, the first resignation recommendation resolution on October 26, the extension of detention around October 30, the prosecutor’s interrogation and change in statements on November 2, the indictment on November 9, the second resignation recommendation resolution on December 1, the first trial hearing on December 26, and the guilty judgment on January 16, 2012. It further states that the petitioner clearly asked the courts whether criminal proceedings and a guilty judgment rendered under violations of the presumption of innocence could be cured by the finality of the judgment, what the legal basis would be if such violations could be cured, and, if they could not be cured, where the legitimacy of maintaining the final judgment would lie.
On that basis, this document argues that the courts have not provided a substantive response to those fundamental issues up to the present.
As underlying facts, this document states that the first resolution of October 26, 2011, was adopted at a stage when the petitioner had not yet been indicted, was detained, and was absent, and that the first resolution used language evaluating the petitioner’s conduct as “something that should never occur,” “an act that undermines public trust in the council,” “absolutely impermissible,” and as conduct for which “political and moral responsibility cannot be avoided.”
It also states that the second resolution of December 1, 2011, was adopted before the first trial hearing, and that during the proceedings, statements were made on the premise that the petitioner had “admitted drunk driving” and had “driven under the influence while in office.”
This document expressly states that, at the time of the second resolution, there was no guilty judgment against the petitioner, and even the first trial hearing had not yet been held.
Regarding violation of Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR, this document argues that Article 14, Paragraph 2 provides that anyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. It further argues that this right is not directed only at criminal courts, but prohibits public authorities as a whole from treating a person as if guilty before the judgment becomes final.
This document also refers to General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee and Gridin v. Russian Federation, and explains that when a person before judgment is treated as if guilty through statements or acts by a public authority or by statements of a public nature, such conduct violates the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
The document argues that the first resolution was adopted by the Sukagawa City Council, a public authority, at a stage when the petitioner had not yet been indicted and was detained, and that it adopted an evaluation premised on the petitioner’s responsibility and recommended resignation. It argues that this was not a mere political expression of opinion, but a pre-judgment responsibility-based evaluation by a public authority, directly conflicting with the principle of the presumption of innocence.
Regarding the second resolution, the document argues that, at a stage when no guilty judgment existed and even the first trial hearing had not yet been held, a public authority adopted an evaluation to the effect that the petitioner had “admitted drunk driving” and had “driven under the influence while in office,” which amounted to pre-judgment attribution of guilt itself.
For these reasons, this document concludes that both the first and second resolutions violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
This document also argues that the criminal proceedings conducted under the existence of those resignation recommendation resolutions violated Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR and the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Articles 31 and 37 of the Constitution.
The document states that, for a criminal trial to be fair, the suspect or defendant must be in an environment where he is not treated as guilty by external public pressure. It argues that, in this case, the first and second resolutions were made public and spread through media reports, thereby forming the environment surrounding each stage of the criminal proceedings, including extension of detention, interrogation, changes in statements, indictment, the first trial hearing, the plea at trial, and the guilty judgment.
The document argues that the courts must specifically explain whether, in the criminal proceedings in this case, where pre-judgment public attribution of guilt by a public authority existed, the guarantees of the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR, the right to a fair trial under Article 14, Paragraph 1, the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements under Article 14, Paragraph 3(g), and the guarantees under Articles 31, 37, and 38 of the Constitution of Japan were not substantively violated.
This document states that the plea at trial cannot be a reason for refusing relief, and that the mere fact that the defendant admitted the charged facts at trial cannot sustain the legitimacy of the guilty judgment.
As the reason, the document argues that, in a criminal case, statements require voluntariness, credibility, corroborating evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that this is directly related to the right not to be compelled to make self-incriminating statements, guaranteed by Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution and Article 14, Paragraph 3(g) of the ICCPR.
The document argues that before the plea at trial, there was a sequence of events consisting of the first resolution and the spread of related media reports, extension of detention, interrogation, changes in statements, the second resolution, and the spread of related media reports. It argues that whether statements and the plea at trial formed under such external and institutional pressure were voluntary has never been substantively examined.
The document frames the issue not as whether the petitioner admitted the charge at trial, but whether, in the process leading to that admission, the guarantee of voluntary self-incriminating statements functioned.
Regarding the obligation to provide effective relief under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR and independent violation by omission, this document argues that it is not sufficient merely to have a formal remedial system; relief must be accessible and effective.
In light of General Comment No. 31, Paragraphs 15 and 16, the document argues that, if the courts fail to conduct substantive examination, provide relief, or take corrective measures in response to the petitioner’s concrete claims, that omission constitutes an independent violation under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR as failure to provide relief.
The document states that this independent violation is separate from the original violations, namely violations of Article 14, Paragraph 2 and Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, and is an ongoing human rights violation.
The document argues that domestic procedural limitations cannot serve as a basis for denying the obligation to provide relief, and that courts are not permitted to handle this matter formally on the basis of retrial requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure or other domestic procedural limitations.
As grounds for this, the document cites Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, Article 27 of the VCLT, and General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 13, explaining that where domestic law or domestic practice conflicts with obligations under the ICCPR, the State party is obliged to bring domestic law and practice into conformity with the Covenant.
The document argues that circumstances such as “not falling under the retrial requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” “not being a type of petition provided for under domestic law,” or “no domestic procedure exists” do not provide reasons to avoid the obligation to provide effective relief for human rights violations under the ICCPR.
Furthermore, the document argues that judicial independence is not a reason to refuse relief. It argues that the fact that the city council and the court are separate organs, and that the court possesses judicial independence, does not justify refusing to examine the human rights violations in this case.
The document explains that obligations under the ICCPR are imposed on the State as a whole, and that General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 4 makes clear that all State organs, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, bear the obligation to comply with the ICCPR.
On that basis, the document argues that precisely because the courts are independent judicial organs, they have the authority and duty to independently examine the unfair environment formed by the city council, the media, and the investigative process, and to provide necessary relief.
In the conclusion, the document characterizes this case as a human rights violation case in which a public authority treated the petitioner as if guilty before judgment, criminal proceedings proceeded under that condition, a guilty judgment was rendered, and effective relief has still not been provided up to the present.
It further argues that omission to conduct substantive examination, provide relief, or take corrective measures in response to this petition constitutes a new independent violation contrary to Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR and Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan.
Finally, the petitioner asks the courts to receive this petition not as a retrial request or a supplemental filing to such a request, but as an effective-relief and corrective-measures petition based on Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, and to conduct substantive examination and take necessary relief or corrective measures with respect to each matter stated in Chapter 1.
The document also notes that nearly 15 years are about to pass since the occurrence of the incident in 2011, and requests a written response to this petition within 14 days after receipt.
Important Statements
The first important point in this document is that it expressly states that this petition is neither a retrial request under the Code of Criminal Procedure nor a supplemental filing to an already-filed retrial request.
This document seeks substantive examination and necessary relief or corrective measures from the courts regarding violations of the presumption of innocence, violations of the right to a fair trial, violations of the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements, and violations of the obligation to provide effective relief, as an effective-relief and corrective-measures petition based on Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, Article 98, Paragraph 2 and Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 27 of the VCLT, and General Comment No. 31.
Second, this document expressly states that its primary subject is not the substantive innocence claim itself concerning the time of the accident, the call for substitute driver service, the breath-alcohol concentration, the possibility of driving, and related matters.
The subject of this document is, separately from those substantive issues, the procedural human rights violations themselves: pre-judgment public attribution of guilt, violation of the presumption of innocence, violation of the right to a fair trial, violation of the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements, and violation of the obligation to provide effective relief.
This point positions the document not as a renewed dispute over guilt or innocence, but as a document challenging the preconditions of the criminal proceedings and the absence of judicial relief itself.
Third, this document argues that no substantive response has been provided up to the present regarding the fundamental issues raised in the written inquiry and request dated March 31, 2026.
The document positions the absence of a response itself as an independent issue in relation to the effective relief required by Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR.
Fourth, this document clearly positions the first and second resolutions as violations of the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Regarding the first resolution, the document states that it was adopted when the petitioner had not yet been indicted, was detained, and was absent, and that the Sukagawa City Council, a public authority, adopted an evaluation premised on responsibility and recommended resignation.
Regarding the second resolution, the document states that, at a stage when no guilty judgment existed and even the first trial hearing had not yet been held, a public authority adopted an evaluation to the effect that the petitioner had “admitted drunk driving” and had “driven under the influence while in office,” which amounted to pre-judgment attribution of guilt itself.
Fifth, concerning the fairness of the criminal proceedings, this document argues that the first and second resolutions were made public and spread through media reports, thereby forming the environment surrounding each stage of the criminal proceedings, including extension of detention, interrogation, changes in statements, indictment, the first trial hearing, the plea at trial, and the guilty judgment.
This point positions the resignation recommendation resolutions not as isolated political events, but as an external and institutional environment that could affect the fairness of the criminal proceedings as a whole.
Sixth, this document expressly states that the plea at trial cannot be a reason for refusing relief.
The document states that the issue is not whether the petitioner admitted the charge at trial, but whether the guarantee of a voluntary self-incriminating statement functioned in the process leading to that admission.
This point is important for examining the relationship among voluntariness of statements, external pressure, violation of the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
Seventh, this document argues that the courts’ omission to conduct substantive examination, provide relief, or take corrective measures constitutes an independent violation under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR.
The document explains that this independent violation is separate from the original violations, namely violations of Article 14, Paragraph 2 and Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, and is an ongoing human rights violation.
This point is central to this document.
In other words, the document argues not only that past violations of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial occurred, but that the continuing failure to provide relief for those violations itself constitutes a new human rights violation.
Eighth, this document argues that domestic procedural limitations cannot serve as a basis for denying the obligation to provide relief.
The document states that circumstances such as “not falling under the retrial requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” “not being a type of petition provided for under domestic law,” or “no domestic procedure exists” do not provide reasons to avoid the obligation to provide effective relief for human rights violations under the ICCPR.
This point is important in relation to Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 27 of the VCLT, and General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 13.
Ninth, this document is also important in relation to Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan.
The document contains the structure that State organs, including courts, should not treat issues concerning constitutional due process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial as merely formal domestic procedural matters, but should substantively examine them as State organs bearing the duty to respect and uphold the Constitution.
This point is important as it connects the obligation to provide relief under the ICCPR with the duty of public officials to respect and uphold the Constitution within the domestic constitutional order.
Tenth, this document argues that judicial independence is not a reason to refuse relief.
The document states that precisely because courts are independent judicial organs, they have the authority and duty to independently examine the unfair environment formed by the city council, the media, and the investigative process, and to provide necessary relief.
This point directly relates to whether courts may avoid examining violations of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial on the ground that the city council and the courts are separate organs.
Eleventh, this document requests a written response within 14 days after receipt.
This gives the document the character not merely of a statement of opinion, but of a petition asking the courts to clarify their concrete response policy.
Procedural Position in the Criminal Proceedings
This document is a petition for human rights relief and corrective measures submitted after the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the special appeal on February 6, 2026, and under circumstances in which no substantive response had allegedly been provided to the written inquiry and request dated March 31, 2026.
In this case, the written opinion addressed to the court and its attached materials were submitted on April 28, 2025.
Thereafter, the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court treated those submissions as if “a request for retrial had been made,” and handled the matter as 2025 Ta No. 1, a Road Traffic Act retrial request case.
On June 13, 2025, that court issued a request for opinion, asking the requester to submit a written opinion by July 11, 2025.
In response, the requester submitted a written opinion dated July 9, 2025, and thereafter this matter proceeded as a retrial request case.
On December 12, 2025, the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court issued a decision dismissing the retrial request.
In response, Toshio Tsumuraya filed an immediate appeal dated December 15, 2025, and submitted a Supplemental Statement of Reasons for Immediate Appeal dated January 6, 2026.
On January 8, 2026, the First Criminal Division of the Sendai High Court dismissed the immediate appeal.
Toshio Tsumuraya then prepared a Special Appeal Application dated January 11, 2026, and filed a special appeal with the Supreme Court.
On February 6, 2026, the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the special appeal.
Thereafter, Toshio Tsumuraya submitted the “Written Inquiry and Request Concerning the Effect of a Final Criminal Judgment Under Violations of the Presumption of Innocence and Judicial Relief” dated March 31, 2026.
This document was submitted on May 15, 2026, to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan, the President of the Sendai High Court, and the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court, on the ground that no substantive response had been provided to that written inquiry and request.
Accordingly, this document is a document seeking effective relief and corrective measures under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR from the courts, on the ground that even after the retrial request, immediate appeal, special appeal, and written inquiry and request, no substantive examination or relief had been realized regarding violations of the presumption of innocence, violations of the right to a fair trial, violations of the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements, and violations of the obligation to provide effective relief.
The issues in this case were not limited to a mere reconsideration of the evaluation of evidence.
This document treats as one integrated human rights violation structure the Sukagawa City Council’s resignation recommendation resolutions before the final criminal judgment, pre-judgment public attribution of guilt, violations of the presumption of innocence, violations of the right to a fair trial, the process of statement formation, the plea at trial, the legitimacy of the judgment, the absence of relief through domestic retrial proceedings, and the obligation to provide effective relief under the ICCPR.
Questions Arising from This Document
1. Was this petition treated as an effective-relief and corrective-measures petition distinct from a retrial request?
This document expressly states that it is not a retrial request under the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor a supplemental filing to an already-filed retrial request.
It seeks substantive examination and necessary relief or corrective measures from the courts as an effective-relief and corrective-measures petition based on Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR.
This raises the question whether the courts treated this petition as an independent petition for human rights relief and corrective measures, distinct from a retrial request or a supplemental filing to such a request.
2. Do the first and second resolutions violate the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR?
This document positions both the first and second resolutions as pre-judgment public attribution of guilt.
The first resolution was adopted before indictment, while the petitioner was detained and absent. The second resolution was adopted at a stage when no guilty judgment existed and even the first trial hearing had not yet been held.
The question therefore arises whether, under such circumstances, a public authority such as the city council could evaluate the petitioner on the premise of responsibility or on the premise of drunk driving without violating the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
3. Can a criminal trial be regarded as fair under circumstances involving pre-judgment public attribution of guilt?
This document argues that the first and second resolutions were made public and spread through media reports, thereby forming the environment surrounding each stage of the criminal proceedings, including extension of detention, interrogation, changes in statements, indictment, the first trial hearing, the plea at trial, and the guilty judgment.
This raises the question whether the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR and Articles 31 and 37 of the Constitution was substantively secured under circumstances involving pre-judgment public attribution of guilt.
4. Can the plea at trial be a reason to refuse relief?
This document argues that the plea at trial cannot be a reason for refusing relief.
The issue is framed not as whether the petitioner admitted the charge at trial, but whether the guarantee of voluntary self-incriminating statements functioned in the process leading to that admission.
This raises the question whether statements and a plea at trial formed under an environment of violation of the presumption of innocence and public attribution of guilt can be treated as voluntary.
5. Does the failure to provide relief itself constitute an ongoing independent human rights violation?
This document argues that if the courts fail to conduct substantive examination, provide relief, or take corrective measures in response to the petitioner’s concrete claims, that omission constitutes an independent violation under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR as failure to provide relief, as stated in General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 16.
This independent violation is described as separate from the original violations, namely violations of Article 14, Paragraph 2 and Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, and as an ongoing human rights violation.
Accordingly, the question arises whether the courts’ failure to conduct substantive examination or take corrective measures in response to this petition itself constitutes a new human rights violation.
6. Can effective relief under the ICCPR be refused on the basis of domestic procedural limitations?
This document argues that the obligation to provide effective relief under the ICCPR cannot be avoided by relying on retrial requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the absence of a procedural category provided for under domestic law, or the absence of a domestic legal procedure.
This raises the question whether the obligation to provide relief under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR can be avoided on the basis of domestic procedural limitations.
7. How should the courts respond in light of the duty to respect and uphold the Constitution under Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan?
This document cites Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan, along with Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR and Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, as a basis for the petition.
This raises the question how State organs, including courts, should respond as organs bearing the duty to respect and uphold the Constitution when faced with issues involving violations of the presumption of innocence, violations of the right to a fair trial, violations of the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements, and violations of the obligation to provide effective relief.
In particular, whether refusing to conduct substantive examination on the basis of formal domestic procedural limitations is consistent with the purpose of Article 99 of the Constitution becomes a matter for examination.
8. Is judicial independence a reason to refuse relief?
This document argues that the fact that the city council and the courts are separate organs, and that courts possess judicial independence, does not provide a basis for refusing to examine the human rights violations in this case.
Rather, it explains that precisely because courts are independent judicial organs, they have the authority and duty to independently examine the unfair environment formed by the city council, the media, and the investigative process, and to provide necessary relief.
This raises the question whether courts may avoid examining the impact on the criminal proceedings and guilty judgment by treating the city council’s violation of the presumption of innocence as a matter concerning a separate organ.
9. Was any response or corrective action taken in response to this petition?
This document requests a written response within 14 days after receipt.
Therefore, the question arises whether the courts responded to this petition, failed to respond, or conducted substantive examination, provided relief, or took corrective measures.
This point is important in examining whether the omission of judicial relief in this case is continuing.
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Legal Standards
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the guarantee of due process. In this document, the issue is whether due process was substantively secured in relation to pre-judgment public attribution of guilt, violation of the presumption of innocence, changes in statements, the plea at trial, and the legitimacy of the guilty judgment.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the right to a fair trial. In this document, the issue is whether the criminal trial that proceeded under circumstances involving pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions and the spread of related media reports can be regarded as a fair trial.
Article 38 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the right not to be compelled to make self-incriminating statements and the right not to have involuntary statements used as evidence. In this document, the issue is whether voluntariness was secured with respect to statements and the plea at trial formed under external and institutional pressure.
Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision requires Japan to faithfully observe the treaties it has concluded and established international law. In this document, the issue is whether the obligation to provide effective relief under the ICCPR can be avoided on the basis of domestic procedural limitations.
Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article establishes the duty of public officials to respect and uphold the Constitution. In this document, it is important as a basis for the view that State organs, including courts, should not treat issues concerning constitutional due process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial merely as formal domestic procedural matters, but should examine them substantively as constitutional obligations.
Article 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision concerns the prohibition on admitting involuntary confessions as evidence and the rule requiring corroboration of confessions. In this document, it is relevant in the context that the legitimacy of a guilty judgment cannot be based solely on the existence of a plea at trial or statement records.
Retrial provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This document expressly states that it is not itself a retrial request. However, it raises the issue whether effective relief for violations of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial was provided in the retrial proceedings already conducted.
Extraordinary appeal system:
This document identifies the promotion of consideration of an extraordinary appeal as one possible form of relief or corrective measure.
International Human Rights Treaties
Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR:
This provision guarantees the right to an effective remedy. It is the central basis of this document and is invoked as the basis for seeking substantive examination, relief, or corrective measures from the courts for violations of the presumption of innocence, violations of the right to a fair trial, and violations of the prohibition on compelled self-incriminating statements.
Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR:
This provision guarantees the right to a fair trial. In this document, the criminal proceedings that progressed under circumstances involving pre-judgment public attribution of guilt and the spread of media reports are challenged as inconsistent with the guarantee of a fair trial.
Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR:
This provision guarantees the presumption of innocence. In this document, the first and second resolutions are argued to violate this provision because they treated the petitioner as if guilty before judgment.
Article 14, Paragraph 3(g) of the ICCPR:
This provision guarantees the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. In this document, it is at issue in relation to statements and the plea at trial formed under external and institutional pressure.
General Comments
General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 4:
This paragraph indicates that all State organs, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, bear obligations under the ICCPR. In this document, it is important as a basis for the argument that judicial independence is not a reason to refuse relief.
General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 13:
This paragraph indicates that where domestic law or domestic practice conflicts with obligations under the ICCPR, the State party is required to bring domestic law and practice into conformity with the Covenant. In this document, it is important as a basis for the argument that domestic procedural limitations cannot deny the obligation to provide relief.
General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 15:
This paragraph indicates that remedies for violations of Covenant rights must be accessible and effective. In this document, it is used as a basis for the argument that the mere existence of a formal remedial system is not sufficient and that substantive examination and relief are required.
General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 16:
This paragraph indicates that failure to provide relief to a person whose Covenant rights have been violated may itself constitute a separate violation of Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR. In this document, it is used as the basis for the argument that the courts’ omission constitutes a new and ongoing human rights violation.
General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 30:
This paragraph indicates that all public authorities must refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial. In this document, it is important as a basis for the argument that the first and second resolutions adopted by the Sukagawa City Council violated Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Gridin v. Russian Federation:
This case is positioned as precedent indicating that treating a person before judgment as if guilty through statements or acts by a public authority, or by statements of a public nature, violates the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. In this document, the issue is whether the obligation to provide effective relief under the ICCPR can be avoided on the basis of retrial requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure or domestic procedural limitations.
The detailed interpretation of each provision, its application to this case, and the interrelationship among these provisions are examined in “Legal Claims and the Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.”
Relationship to This Case
This document is the petition for human rights relief and corrective measures submitted by Toshio Tsumuraya to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan, the President of the Sendai High Court, and the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court after the decision of the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court dismissing the special appeal and after the written inquiry and request dated March 31, 2026.
In this case, the accident in question was alleged to have occurred on October 18, 2011, and Toshio Tsumuraya was arrested the following day, October 19.
Thereafter, on October 26 of the same year, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the first resignation recommendation resolution, and on December 1 of the same year, it adopted the second resignation recommendation resolution.
Both of these were public expressions of intent by a public authority made before the criminal conviction became final.
The issue in this case is not merely the existence of the guilty judgment itself.
The issue is whether, before the guilty judgment became final, a local assembly as a public authority made public expressions of intent premised on criminal responsibility and thereby engaged in prejudicial treatment contrary to the presumption of innocence.
In addition, in this case, the issue is how public attribution of guilt and the spread of media reports affected the criminal proceedings, including arrest, detention, extension of detention, prosecutor’s interrogation, changes in statements, indictment, the first trial hearing, the plea at trial, and the guilty judgment.
This document presents these issues not as a matter of whether a retrial request should be granted or as a substantive innocence claim, but as an effective-relief and corrective-measures petition based on Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, Article 98, Paragraph 2 and Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan, Article 27 of the VCLT, and General Comment No. 31.
In that sense, this document clarifies the structure that this case is not merely a grievance over a past criminal case, but an ongoing and independent human rights violation for which relief has still not been provided.
This document confirms that the courts were asked to consider whether any relief or corrective measures are available within the domestic legal order, including retrial, extraordinary appeal, encouragement of review by the public prosecutor, or other possible measures.
This point forms an important premise for examining the final omission of judicial relief in this case and future domestic and international human rights relief petitions.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
Written Opinion to the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court—Response to the Court’s Request for Opinion（Plans to post in the future）
Related Timeline
October 18, 2011
The accident in question was alleged to have occurred.
October 19, 2011
Toshio Tsumuraya was arrested on suspicion of violating the Road Traffic Act.
October 21, 2011
Toshio Tsumuraya was referred to the public prosecutor.
October 26, 2011
The Sukagawa City Council adopted the first resignation recommendation resolution before the criminal conviction became final.
Around October 30, 2011
As the detention period approached its expiration, the prosecutor requested an extension of detention, and the judge authorized the extension.
November 2, 2011
The prosecutor conducted an interrogation, and a significant change occurred in the statement concerning the time of the accident.
November 9, 2011
Toshio Tsumuraya was indicted in the Road Traffic Act violation case and released on bail on the same day.
November 14, 2011
Judge Shuichi Nezaki of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court prepared a summons for trial date. In the document explanation attached to this document, this material is described as showing that the court accepted the indictment made under circumstances contrary to the presumption of innocence, determined the trial date, and served the summons on the requester.
December 1, 2011
The Sukagawa City Council adopted the second resignation recommendation resolution before the criminal conviction became final.
December 26, 2011
The first trial hearing was held at the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.
January 16, 2012
The guilty judgment in the Road Traffic Act violation case was pronounced by the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.
January 31, 2012
The guilty judgment of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court became final.
April 28, 2025
Toshio Tsumuraya submitted a written opinion addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the President of the Fukushima District Court, and the Head of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.
May 2, 2025
The Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court assigned the case number 2025 Ta No. 1 and treated the matter as a Road Traffic Act retrial request case. On the same date, the branch issued an administrative notice.
June 13, 2025
The Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court issued a request for opinion concerning the matter it had treated as 2025 Ta No. 1, a Road Traffic Act retrial request case.
July 9, 2025
Toshio Tsumuraya submitted a written opinion in response to the request for opinion from the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.
December 12, 2025
The Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court issued a decision dismissing the retrial request in the matter it had treated as 2025 Ta No. 1, a Road Traffic Act retrial request case.
December 15, 2025
Toshio Tsumuraya filed an immediate appeal against the decision dismissing the retrial request.
January 6, 2026
Toshio Tsumuraya submitted a Supplemental Statement of Reasons for Immediate Appeal to the Criminal Division of the Sendai High Court.
January 8, 2026
The First Criminal Division of the Sendai High Court issued a decision dismissing the immediate appeal.
January 11, 2026
Toshio Tsumuraya prepared a Special Appeal Application and filed a special appeal with the Supreme Court.
February 6, 2026
The Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court issued a decision dismissing the special appeal.
March 31, 2026
Toshio Tsumuraya submitted this document, “Written Inquiry and Request Concerning the Effect of a Final Criminal Judgment Under Violations of the Presumption of Innocence and Judicial Relief,” to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan, the President of the Sendai High Court, and the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court. On the same date, the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court stamped it as received.
April 1, 2026
According to the postal delivery certificates, the postal items addressed to the Supreme Court of Japan and the Criminal Litigation Office of the Sendai High Court were delivered.
May 15, 2026
Toshio Tsumuraya submitted this document, “Petition for Human Rights Relief and Corrective Action Concerning Violations of the Presumption of Innocence and the Right to a Fair Trial,and Related Rights,” to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan, the President of the Sendai High Court, and the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court. On the same date, the Criminal Section of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court stamped it as received.
May 16, 2026
According to the postal delivery certificate, the postal item addressed to the President of the Sendai High Court was delivered.
May 18, 2026
According to the postal delivery certificate, the postal item addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan was delivered.