Overview of the Document
Document title:
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32
Official title:
General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial
Abbreviation:
General Comment No. 32, GC32
Article concerned:
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights（ICCPR）
Paragraph addressed in this article:
Paragraph 30
Original Text:
IV. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
According to article 14, paragraph 2 everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.
The presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle.
It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.
Defendants should normally not be shackled or kept in cages during trials or otherwise presented to the court in a manner indicating that they may be dangerous criminals.
The media should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence.
Furthermore, the length of pre-trial detention should never be taken as an indication of guilt and its degree.
The denial of bail or findings of liability in civil proceedings do not affect the presumption of innocence.
Adopting body:
United Nations Human Rights Committee
Year adopted:
2007
Type of document:
Interpretative guidance on an international human rights treaty
Source of acquisition:
Obtained from the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights（OHCHR）
Format published:
Skip to PDF contentAbout General Comments
General Comments are interpretative guidance issued by treaty bodies that monitor the implementation of international human rights treaties, explaining the meaning of treaty provisions and the obligations required of States parties.
General Comments of the Human Rights Committee are not themselves provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
However, they are important international interpretative materials for understanding the interpretation and application of the Covenant.
General Comment No. 32, addressed in this article, explains how Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be understood, including equality before courts and tribunals, fair trial, guarantees in criminal proceedings, and the presumption of innocence.
Facts Confirmed by This Document
This document is a General Comment issued by the Human Rights Committee concerning Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
A General Comment, in this context, is interpretative guidance issued by the Human Rights Committee concerning the meaning of each provision of the Covenant and the obligations required of States parties.
A General Comment is not itself a provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
However, it is an important international material for understanding how the Covenant should be interpreted and applied.
General Comment No. 32, addressed in this article, is interpretative guidance concerning Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Article 14 of the Covenant provides for equality before courts and tribunals, the right to a fair trial, minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, and the presumption of innocence.
Within Article 14, paragraph 2 provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.
Paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32, addressed in this article, explains this presumption of innocence.
Paragraph 30 explains the presumption of innocence as something that is not limited merely to an internal standard of judgment within the court.
It states that the burden of proving criminal responsibility lies with the prosecution, and that where doubt remains, it must be interpreted for the benefit of the accused.
It also states that no guilt may be presumed until guilt has been proved according to law.
What is especially important is that the paragraph states that “it is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.”
This point shows that the presumption of innocence is understood as a norm that concerns not only judges and prosecutors, but also the conduct and statements of administrative organs, legislative organs, local public entities, local assemblies, and other bodies exercising public authority or holding public positions.
Accordingly, this document confirms that, before judgment, statements, resolutions, expressions, or treatment by public authorities that assume guilt may raise issues in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 also refers to Gridin v. Russian Federation and Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines as important reference cases concerning the presumption of innocence.
Gridin v. Russian Federation is important for understanding the relationship between pre-judgment statements by officials connected with public authorities that treat a person as guilty and the presumption of innocence.
Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines is important for understanding the relationship between detention before trial and the presumption of innocence.
For these reasons, this document is a central normative source for examining the first and second recommendations for resignation in this case in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Important Entries
What is particularly important in this document is that the presumption of innocence is not a principle that governs only the inner judgment of judges in criminal trials. It imposes on all public authorities a duty to avoid prejudging the outcome of a trial.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 first confirms that, under the presumption of innocence, the burden of proving criminal responsibility lies with the prosecution.
It also states that where doubt remains, it must be interpreted for the benefit of the accused, and that guilt must not be presumed until it has been proved according to law.
It further requires that persons charged with criminal acts must be treated in accordance with this principle.
The most important part in relation to this case is the part concerning public authorities.
The paragraph states that all public authorities have a duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
The phrase “prejudging the outcome of a trial” does not mean only cases in which guilt is explicitly declared.
The issue covers the broader situation in which a public authority makes statements, expressions, resolutions, or engages in treatment that anticipates, before judgment, the criminal responsibility or trial outcome that should ultimately be determined by a court.
Accordingly, this article uses the expression “prejudging the outcome of a trial” to describe this issue.
In relation to the recommendations for resignation in this case, the concrete issue is whether a public expression of intent was made before judgment in a manner that assumed guilt.
The phrase “all public authorities” is important.
The presumption of innocence is not only an issue for courts.
Nor is it only an issue concerning the wording of criminal judgments.
When a public authority, concerning a person charged with a criminal offence, makes statements, resolutions, expressions, or engages in treatment before judgment that prejudges the outcome of the trial, that conduct itself raises an issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
Gridin v. Russian Federation, referred to in General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, is important for understanding this point.
In that case, the issue was that public statements by high-ranking law enforcement officials treated the applicant as if he were guilty, and those statements were widely reported.
The Human Rights Committee examined such public statements on the premise that they raised issues in relation to the presumption of innocence.
This case shows that the presumption of innocence concerns not only judgments inside the courtroom, but also external and social assumptions of guilt by public authorities.
In the present case, the Sukagawa City Council made a public expression of intent in the form of recommendations for resignation before the judgment in the criminal trial.
Therefore, Gridin v. Russian Federation is an important reference case for examining pre-judgment prejudgment of the trial outcome by a public authority in this case.
Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines, also referred to in General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, is also important.
In that case, the relationship between denial of bail and the presumption of innocence was at issue.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 states that denial of bail does not affect the presumption of innocence.
This shows that the existence of a decision concerning detention or bail does not permit treating the person as if he were guilty.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
Accordingly, Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines is important for confirming that the guarantee of the presumption of innocence is not weakened merely because the person is in custody.
Even if a recommendation for resignation by a local assembly is only a non-binding recommendation, if that resolution was a public expression of intent before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial, it may raise an issue in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The issue here is not only whether the recommendation for resignation immediately deprived the person of council member status.
Nor is it only whether the recommendation actually influenced the conclusion of the criminal judgment.
The very fact that, before judgment, a local assembly as a public authority made a public expression of intent that prejudged the outcome of the trial is itself an issue under the requirements of the presumption of innocence expressed in General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.
In the concrete context of this case, the issue is whether the recommendations for resignation were public expressions of intent premised on guilt before judgment.
This point has central significance in examining the first and second recommendations for resignation in this case.
Questions Raised by This Document
1. Is the presumption of innocence a principle that binds only courts?
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 indicates that all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
This shows that the presumption of innocence is not a principle that concerns judges alone.
Administrative organs, legislative organs, local public entities, local assemblies, and other bodies in public positions must not treat a person as if guilt were assumed before judgment.
Accordingly, the recommendations for resignation by the Sukagawa City Council in this case cannot be dismissed simply by saying that they are unrelated to the presumption of innocence because the council is not a court.
2. How does Gridin v. Russian Federation relate to this case?
In Gridin v. Russian Federation, the issue was that public statements by high-ranking law enforcement officials treated the applicant as if he were guilty, and those statements were widely reported.
This case shows that the presumption of innocence extends not only to court judgments, but also to external assumptions of guilt by public authorities.
In this case, the Sukagawa City Council adopted recommendations for resignation before the judgment in the criminal trial.
A recommendation for resignation is not a statement by a private individual. It is a public expression of intent by a local assembly, which is a public authority.
Accordingly, Gridin v. Russian Federation is an important reference case for examining public assumptions of guilt before judgment in this case.
3. How does Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines relate to this case?
Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines is an important reference case for understanding the relationship between denial of bail and the presumption of innocence.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 states that denial of bail does not affect the presumption of innocence.
This means that the denial of bail, or the fact that a person is detained at the pre-trial stage, does not permit treating that person as if he were guilty.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
The fact that the person was in custody instead means that opportunities for defense and explanation were restricted.
Accordingly, the fact that a person is in custody does not justify a public authority making an expression of intent premised on guilt.
In this respect, Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines is important for examining the problem of the first recommendation for resignation.
4. In light of Gridin, is the existence or absence of legal binding force really the core issue?
Recommendations for resignation by local assemblies are generally explained as not having the legal effect of immediately depriving the person concerned of council member status.
However, the issue addressed by General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 is that public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial before judgment.
In Gridin v. Russian Federation, which the paragraph refers to, the issue was not a legally binding disposition, but statements by officials connected with public authorities in relation to the presumption of innocence.
Accordingly, in light of Gridin, the issue under the presumption of innocence is not limited to whether the act has legal binding force.
The core issue is whether a public authority made statements, expressions, resolutions, or engaged in treatment before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
The second recommendation for resignation was adopted after indictment, but before the first hearing and before judgment.
Accordingly, with respect to these recommendations for resignation, the issue is not only the formal point that they lacked legal binding force, but whether the Sukagawa City Council, as a public authority, made a public expression of intent before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial.
In the concrete context of this case, this appears as the issue of recommendations for resignation premised on guilt before judgment.
5. If there was no actual influence on the criminal trial, does that mean there is no problem?
In this case, an understanding has been recorded to the effect that the recommendations for resignation did not seem to affect the finalization of the sentence.
However, the issue under General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 is not limited to whether there was actual influence on the criminal judgment.
Of course, whether public assumptions of guilt by a public authority influenced the formation of statements, the plea in the courtroom, evaluation of evidence, or sentencing is an important issue that should be examined separately.
However, apart from that, the very fact that a public authority made a public expression of intent before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial is itself an issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
Therefore, the issue under the presumption of innocence does not disappear merely because actual influence on the criminal trial cannot be confirmed, or because such influence has not been proved.
6. Is a local assembly included among “public authorities”?
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 indicates that all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
A local assembly is the deliberative organ of a local public entity, composed of members elected by residents.
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Local Autonomy Act provides that an ordinary local public entity shall have an assembly as its deliberative organ, composed of members elected by residents.
Paragraph 2 of the same article provides that the assembly shall decide important matters and exercise powers such as inspection and investigation.
Paragraph 3 provides that council members must faithfully perform their duties, entrusted by residents.
Accordingly, a local assembly should be examined as a public authority in relation to the presumption of innocence under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In this case, the Sukagawa City Council adopted recommendations for resignation before the judgment in the criminal trial.
Therefore, the issue is whether the Sukagawa City Council, as a public authority, had a duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of the trial before judgment.
7. Does the problem become more serious where the person had no opportunity to explain?
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 indicates that public authorities should avoid prejudgment in relation to the presumption of innocence.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
When a local assembly, as a public authority, adopts a recommendation for resignation while the person is in custody and unable to attend, issues arise not only in relation to the presumption of innocence, but also in relation to due process and the opportunity to defend oneself.
In particular, where a public expression of intent premised on guilt is made before judgment, and the person is not given a substantial opportunity to explain, the problem becomes even more serious.
Accordingly, the first recommendation for resignation must be examined together with the problem of the presumption of innocence and the procedural circumstances of absence, custody, and the pre-indictment stage.
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Standards
International Human Rights Treaties
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision states that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. It is the central norm of this article.
Article 14, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision establishes the right to a fair trial. The issue is how public assumptions of guilt before judgment relate to the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 2, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision establishes the right to an effective remedy for violations of rights under the Covenant. Where violation of the presumption of innocence is at issue, the question is what remedy should be provided domestically.
General Comments
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30:
This paragraph states that, concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proving criminal responsibility lies with the prosecution, guilt must not be presumed until proved, and all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
General Comment No. 31:
This General Comment addresses the obligation to provide remedies for violations of rights under the Covenant. It becomes relevant where review and correction are sought concerning past public assumptions of guilt.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
This provision states that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. It is important in relation to the duty to faithfully implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
This provision states that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. The issue is whether the absence of legal binding force of a recommendation for resignation, or the fact that the matter concerns the internal handling of a local assembly, can justify leaving issues under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights unexamined.
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns due process. It is important in relation to the fact that the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the right to a fair trial by an impartial court. It is necessary to examine how public assumptions of guilt before judgment relate to the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision requires that treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations be faithfully observed. It is important in relation to the domestic significance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision establishes the duty of public officials to respect and uphold the Constitution. The issue is how local council members and organs of local public entities should respect constitutional and treaty-based human rights guarantees.
Article 89, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Local Autonomy Act:
These provisions position a local assembly as a deliberative organ composed of members elected by residents, and provide for the powers of the assembly and the faithful performance of duties by council members. They are important in examining whether a local assembly should respect the presumption of innocence as a public authority.
Relationship to This Case
The issue in this case is not only whether a guilty judgment later became final.
Nor is it only whether the recommendations for resignation had legal binding force.
What is important in relation to General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 is that, before judgment, the Sukagawa City Council, as a public authority, made public expressions of intent that prejudged the outcome of the trial.
In the concrete context of this case, the issue is that the recommendations for resignation by the Sukagawa City Council were public expressions of intent that appeared to be premised on guilt.
The first recommendation for resignation was adopted on October 26, 2011.
At that time, the person concerned had not yet been indicted, was in detention, and was absent from the plenary session.
Nevertheless, the Sukagawa City Council adopted a recommendation for resignation on the basis of arrest for alleged drunk driving.
The minutes and related materials concerning the first recommendation for resignation are addressed in a separate article.
There, it is confirmed that, before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session, the Sukagawa City Council adopted a recommendation for resignation, and that the resolution was not merely a procedural record, but a public expression of intent seeking resignation from council membership on the premise of arrest for alleged drunk driving.
Accordingly, the first recommendation for resignation raises a serious issue as a pre-judgment public assumption of guilt in relation to the norm expressed in General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, that all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
The second recommendation for resignation was adopted on December 1, 2011.
At that time, the person concerned had already been indicted, but the first hearing had not yet been held and no judgment had been rendered.
The second recommendation for resignation is also addressed in a separate article through the minutes and related materials.
There, it is confirmed that, before judgment, the Sukagawa City Council again adopted a recommendation for resignation, and that this resolution was made as a public expression of intent seeking resignation from council membership, while taking into account the person’s explanation and exchanges at the all-council-members conference.
Accordingly, the second recommendation for resignation also raises an issue in relation to General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, as an expression of intent by a public authority before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial.
What is important here is that the fact that a guilty judgment later became final does not automatically justify public assumptions of guilt made before judgment.
The presumption of innocence is a principle that governs the treatment by public authorities before a guilty judgment becomes final.
Therefore, even if a guilty judgment later became final, the fact that a public authority made a public expression of intent before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial remains an issue in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Whether the recommendations for resignation actually influenced the conclusion of the criminal trial is a separate issue to be examined.
However, the existence or absence of such influence is a different issue from the problem under the presumption of innocence that public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial before judgment.
In this case, internal council materials from 2025 record an opinion to the effect that the recommendations “did not seem to affect the finalization of the sentence.”
However, from the standpoint of General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, the problem is not limited to whether the recommendations actually affected the finalization of the sentence.
The very fact that a local assembly, as a public authority, made expressions of intent before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial is itself an issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
In the concrete context of this case, this appears as the issue of recommendations for resignation premised on guilt before judgment.
Accordingly, in this case, the first and second recommendations for resignation must be positioned as pre-judgment public assumptions of guilt in light of the norm of General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, taking into account the already confirmed contents of the resolutions, minutes, Council Steering Committee materials, and materials concerning the all-council-members conference.
Furthermore, the responses of the Sukagawa City Council and Sukagawa City after 2025, when review and correction of these issues were requested, are also at issue.
If, despite the issue concerning the presumption of innocence being raised, no substantive review or correction was carried out, this also raises issues in relation to the effective remedy required by Article 2, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and General Comment No. 31.
Accordingly, General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 is not only a norm for examining the first and second recommendations for resignation in this case. It is also a starting-point norm for examining the later requests for correction, petitions, legal consultations, and the responses of the City and the Council.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya