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Updated on July 19, 2026

Introduction

On October 26 and December 1, 2011, the Sukagawa City Council adopted recommendations for resignation directed at Council Member Toshio Tsumuraya.

The first recommendation for resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in detention before indictment and while questioning and the investigation were still continuing.

The second recommendation for resignation was adopted after indictment, but before the first trial hearing and before the guilty judgment.

These two resolutions were not isolated events.

Following Toshio Tsumuraya’s arrest, media reports appeared while his detention and questioning continued. On October 26, 2011, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the first recommendation for resignation.

At that point, the alleged accident time of approximately 7:40 p.m., later adopted in the indictment and the judgment, had not yet appeared in Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements.

On the day of the arrest and in the police-recorded statements, the alleged accident time was approximately 7:50 p.m.

However, this was not a time that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered and stated on the basis of his own experiential memory.

The police-recorded statement dated October 20, 2011 states that he learned the time and location of the accident from a police officer.

During the on-site inspection conducted on October 24, Toshio Tsumuraya also stated that he did not remember where he had actually begun driving or the route he had travelled.

While he remained unable to remember those matters, roads described as those that could currently be taken between the city hall parking lot and the accident scene were recorded, and the distance was measured at approximately 11.5 kilometres.

Toshio Tsumuraya’s detention and questioning continued after the first recommendation for resignation.

In the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011, the calls made to a designated-driver service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., an incoming call from the same service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and estimated travel times between the relevant locations were combined.

On that basis, it was reasoned that, if the vehicle had passed the alternating one-way traffic point at approximately 7:30 p.m. and reached the accident scene approximately ten minutes later, the collision with the guardrail would have occurred at approximately 7:40 p.m.

There is no record that Toshio Tsumuraya recovered his memory of the time of the accident.

Accordingly, this was not a process in which Toshio Tsumuraya recovered his memory and voluntarily changed his statement concerning the accident time from approximately 7:50 p.m. to approximately 7:40 p.m.

While he remained unable to remember the time of the accident, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was developed by calculating backwards from investigative information presented after his arrest, third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle, and estimated travel times.

Seven days later, on November 9, 2011, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was adopted as part of the facts charged in the indictment.

The judgment pronounced on January 16, 2012 likewise adopted the same time of approximately 7:40 p.m. as part of the “Facts Constituting the Offence.”

Accordingly, the account of the incident was not fixed from the time of the arrest through Toshio Tsumuraya’s consistent experiential memory.

While his memory did not return, an account including the route travelled, driving distance, intention to drive, and time of the accident was progressively developed by combining information presented after his arrest, Toshio Tsumuraya’s inferences, the route established during the on-site inspection, mobile telephone call records, third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle, and estimated travel times.

At the same time, Toshio Tsumuraya’s detention and questioning continued, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, and the second recommendation for resignation was adopted before the first trial hearing.

These events cannot automatically be separated on the assumption that the first and second recommendations for resignation were external matters unrelated to the investigation and criminal proceedings.

Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee states that the duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial applies not only to courts, but to all public authorities, including local legislative bodies.

Accordingly, the present case requires an independent examination of whether the formal public demands made by a public authority for Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation before judgment complied with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.

That question exists separately from whether the recommendations for resignation actually influenced the investigation, indictment, or judgment.

In addition, the manner in which the statements, facts charged, evidentiary structure, position taken at trial, and judgment were formed in circumstances where a public authority had already made pre-judgment assessments must be examined in relation to the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.

This page provides an integrated examination of the primary materials published in the individual evidence articles. It brings together the criminal proceedings, media reports, formation of statements, and response of the Sukagawa City Council during the period from the arrest to the second recommendation for resignation.

The original documents, overviews, and detailed examinations of the individual materials can be found in the corresponding evidence articles.

The following sections organise the developments from the arrest to the second recommendation for resignation in chronological order and examine the relationships and overall structure that are difficult to understand when each event is considered in isolation.

Position of This Page

This page is not an evidence article introducing a single document.

This page is an integrated verification article that places arrest, media reports, written statements, on-site inspection, indictment, release on bail, and the City Council’s response in chronological order, and organizes the relationship among these events.

The individual evidence articles organize the contents of each document, the facts confirmed by each document, important entries, and the questions arising from them.

By contrast, this page examines those materials across the board and organizes connections in the sequence of events that are difficult to see from any single document alone.

Timeline

October 18, 2011: Accident

The accident in question was stated to have occurred.

In the initial investigative materials and newspaper reports, the time of the accident was treated as approximately 7:50 p.m.

This differs from the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. later adopted in the indictment and the judgment.

October 19, 2011: Voluntary Appearance and Arrest

Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station.

He was subsequently arrested at 1:09 p.m. on suspicion of violating the Road Traffic Act.

In the police-recorded statement prepared on the same day, the time of the accident was stated to be approximately 7:50 p.m.

October 20, 2011: Newspaper Report

Newspapers reported that Toshio Tsumuraya admitted that he had consumed alcohol and had been involved in the accident, but denied having driven under the influence of alcohol.

At the stage immediately following his arrest, the reports did not state that Toshio Tsumuraya had admitted drunk driving.

The police-recorded statement dated the same day states that Toshio Tsumuraya did not identify the time and location of the accident from his own memory, but learned them from a police officer.

It also states that he had no memory of the period from drinking at the restaurant until he was awakened by a police officer at the accident scene.

Accordingly, the initial accident time of approximately 7:50 p.m. was not stated on the basis of Toshio Tsumuraya’s own experiential memory.

October 21, 2011: Referral to Prosecutors and Newspaper Report

Toshio Tsumuraya was referred by the police to the public prosecutor.

Referral to the public prosecutor is a procedural stage at which the police transfer the arrested suspect and the case to the prosecutor. It does not mean that the evidence necessary to prove guilt or the facts to be charged have been completed at that point.

Newspapers reported that Toshio Tsumuraya had begun to broadly admit the allegation.

The reporting therefore changed from stating that he denied the allegation on the previous day to stating that he had broadly admitted it on the following day.

At this point, Toshio Tsumuraya had not been indicted, and the criminal trial had not begun.

October 22, 2011: Police Statement

A police-recorded statement was prepared.

The statement contains explanations that Toshio Tsumuraya left the restaurant, walked to the city hall parking lot, began driving the vehicle parked there, and travelled in the direction of the accident scene.

However, these explanations were not based on Toshio Tsumuraya having remembered his actual conduct.

They were expressed by using inferential language such as “I think” and “I believe,” on the basis of matters including his mobile telephone call records, the location where the vehicle had been parked, the designated-driver service he usually used, his ordinary route home, and his usual conduct.

Accordingly, it can be confirmed that statements concerning conduct absent from Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory were formed through inferences combining information identified after his arrest with his ordinary habits and daily conduct.

October 24, 2011 — On-Site Inspection

An on-site inspection was conducted.

The inspection was conducted from 1:40 p.m. to 2:05 p.m.

Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he did not remember the actual route he had driven from the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot to the accident scene.

Under those circumstances, the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot was treated as the point of departure, the accident scene as the destination, and the roads that could be used “at the present time” between those two points were recorded.

The distance along that route was measured as approximately 11.5 kilometres.

Accordingly, the approximately 11.5-kilometer distance was not reconstructed by Tsumuraya from his memory of the route he had actually driven on the day of the accident.

It was the distance of a route established during the investigation on the basis of the locations of the assumed departure point and the accident scene.

Even after the on-site inspection, the accident time recorded in the inspection report remained approximately 7:50 p.m.

The Same Day — Council Steering Committee Meeting Before the First Recommendation for Resignation

At 2:40 p.m., approximately 35 minutes after the on-site inspection ended, a meeting of the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee began.

The committee discussed the wording of the proposed First Recommendation for Resignation concerning Council Member Toshio Tsumuraya, as well as the procedure to be followed at the plenary session.

A reference to a local newspaper that had appeared in the original draft was deleted.

However, the basic structure of the proposal was retained: on the premise that Tsumuraya had been arrested on suspicion of violating the Road Traffic Act, it sought his resignation on the grounds of political and moral responsibility, public sentiment, preservation of the authority of the City Council, and restoration of its reputation.

The committee also arranged in advance that, after the reasons for the proposal were presented at the plenary session, questioning, referral to a committee, and debate would be omitted, and the proposed recommendation would be put to a vote.

The fact that the on-site inspection and the Council Steering Committee meeting took place on the same day does not, by itself, establish that the investigative authorities and the City Council communicated or acted in coordination.

It does, however, establish that on the same day that the investigative side was creating materials concerning a route and distance while Tsumuraya did not remember the route he had actually driven, the City Council was finalising the wording and voting procedure for a recommendation seeking his resignation on the basis of his arrest.

October 25, 2011: Police Statement

A police-recorded statement was prepared.

In that statement, Toshio Tsumuraya was shown the driving-route diagram attached to the on-site inspection report prepared on the previous day.

The statement also records that Toshio Tsumuraya did not state the distance of approximately 11.5 kilometres from memory of the actual journey, but learned that distance from an explanation given by a police officer.

Accordingly, the sequence in this case was not that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered the route he had actually travelled and that the on-site inspection report was then prepared on the basis of his memory.

Rather, a route was established as investigative material while Toshio Tsumuraya remained unable to remember the route he had actually travelled. After the route diagram and distance had been shown to him, an explanation based on the established route was recorded in his statement.

The accident time in this statement also remained approximately 7:50 p.m.

October 26, 2011: First Recommendation for Resignation

The Sukagawa City Council unanimously adopted the first recommendation for resignation directed at Council Member Toshio Tsumuraya.

At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention, while questioning and the investigation were continuing.

The criminal trial had not begun, and no judicial determination concerning his criminal responsibility had been made.

At this point, the accident time of approximately 7:40 p.m., later adopted in the indictment and the judgment, had not yet appeared in Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements.

Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention and was therefore unable to attend the plenary session.

The minutes contain no entry showing that the Sukagawa City Council heard from Toshio Tsumuraya in advance or secured an opportunity for him to explain his position or respond while he was in detention.

Questions, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted, and the first recommendation for resignation was adopted by the standing vote of all council members present.

According to the minutes, the plenary session opened at 10:00 a.m. and entered recess at 10:04 a.m.

Accordingly, the proceedings concerning the first recommendation for resignation were conducted within the four-minute period between the opening of the session and the recess, while Toshio Tsumuraya was unable to attend because of his pre-indictment detention and while no opportunity for explanation or response can be confirmed.

The first recommendation for resignation was therefore not adopted after the investigation and formation of the statements had been completed and the facts to be charged had been fixed.

It was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in custody and while inferential statements and investigative materials concerning conduct absent from his memory were still being formed.

After October 26, 2011: Extension of Detention

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the period of a suspect’s detention is, in principle, ten days.

Where unavoidable circumstances exist, a judge may extend the detention period upon the request of the public prosecutor.

In this case, after the first recommendation for resignation was adopted, the public prosecutor requested an extension of detention, and the detention period was extended.

Toshio Tsumuraya was not released after the first recommendation for resignation.

His detention and questioning continued.

Accordingly, the first recommendation for resignation was not adopted after the investigation and questioning had ended. It was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya remained under the control of the investigative authorities and while his statements and the account of the incident were still being developed.

November 2, 2011: Prosecutor Statement

A prosecutor-recorded statement was prepared.

At the beginning of the statement, as in the previous statements, the time of the accident was stated to be approximately 7:50 p.m.

In the latter part of the statement, however, the calls made to a designated-driver service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., an incoming call from the same service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and estimated travel times between the relevant locations were combined.

On that basis, a sequence was constructed in which Toshio Tsumuraya allegedly left the city hall parking lot shortly after 7:20 p.m., passed the section operating under alternating one-way traffic at approximately 7:30 p.m., and reached the accident scene approximately ten minutes later.

Based on that sequence, the time at which the vehicle collided with the guardrail was treated as approximately 7:40 p.m.

There is no statement that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered the time of the accident.

Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was not identified because Toshio Tsumuraya recovered his memory and voluntarily corrected the previous time of approximately 7:50 p.m.

It was developed by calculating backwards from investigative information collected or organised after his arrest, third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle, and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.

The police-recorded statements had repeatedly used inferential language concerning the commencement of driving, the route travelled, and the purpose of driving.

By contrast, the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2 contains a more definite explanation of Toshio Tsumuraya’s intention and state of mind: that he had become unable to wait any longer for the designated-driver service and had decided to drive home himself, even though there is no statement that his memory of the actual driving had returned.

Without any recorded change in Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory, the statements changed, as investigative information was presented and questioning progressed, from inferences concerning conduct absent from his memory to more specific and definite content.

November 9, 2011: Indictment and Release on Bail

Toshio Tsumuraya was indicted for violating the Road Traffic Act.

The indictment adopted approximately 7:40 p.m. as the time of the accident.

Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m., which had been calculated backwards in the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2 from third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle and estimated travel times, was submitted to the court as part of the facts charged.

Rather than the time of approximately 7:50 p.m. that had been used from the initial stage following the arrest, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. developed in the prosecutor-recorded statement prepared during detention became the subject of the subsequent criminal proceedings.

On the same day, a decision granting bail was issued subject to conditions including his place of residence, the obligation to appear when summoned, a prohibition on acts that could be regarded as destroying evidence, and a requirement to obtain court permission for overseas travel and certain other trips. Toshio Tsumuraya was then released.

November 24, 2011 — Meeting of All Council Members

A meeting of all council members was held.

At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya had been indicted, but the first trial hearing had not yet taken place.

Tsumuraya appeared before a large number of city council members without a lawyer present.

The reasons later presented for the Second Recommendation for Resignation stated that Tsumuraya had admitted to drunk driving at this meeting.

Tsumuraya, however, stated that he intended to remain in office because he would work to restore trust through his activities as a council member, because his supporters had asked him to continue serving, and because he would decide whether to resign after the outcome of the criminal trial.

Tsumuraya thus clearly expressed his intention to wait for the determination of the criminal court before deciding whether to resign.

November 28, 2011 — Council Steering Committee Meeting Before the Second Recommendation for Resignation

On November 28, 2011, a meeting of the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee was held.

At the meeting, Tsumuraya’s statements and conduct at the November 24 meeting of all council members were evaluated as showing no willingness to comply with the First Recommendation for Resignation.

It was also stated that Tsumuraya had made remarks admitting that he had driven under the influence of alcohol, and that a second recommendation should be adopted in order to make him understand that continuing to serve as a council member could not be permitted.

At that time, however, the first trial hearing had not yet taken place, and no guilty judgment existed.

The committee arranged that, at the December 1 plenary session, Tsumuraya would first be excluded from the proceedings, the sponsors would then present the reasons for the proposal, questioning and debate would be omitted, and the proposal would be put to a vote.

It was further arranged that, if the proposal was adopted, the plenary session would be suspended, Tsumuraya would be informed in the Speaker’s office that the recommendation had been adopted, and the plenary session would then resume.

Accordingly, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was not suddenly introduced at the December 1 plenary session.

After Tsumuraya’s explanation on November 24, the reasons for again demanding his resignation and the procedure to be followed at the plenary session were specifically arranged in advance at the November 28 Council Steering Committee meeting.

December 1, 2011: Second Recommendation for Resignation

The Sukagawa City Council adopted the second recommendation for resignation directed at Council Member Toshio Tsumuraya.

The resolution was adopted seven days after Toshio Tsumuraya had stated that he would decide whether to remain in office after awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial.

At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya had already been indicted.

However, the first trial hearing had not yet been held, and no guilty judgment had been pronounced.

Toshio Tsumuraya attended the plenary session but was required to leave the chamber on the basis of Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act.

After Toshio Tsumuraya had left the chamber, the reasons for the proposal were explained.

The explanation stated that Toshio Tsumuraya intended to remain a council member because he would work to restore public trust through his council activities, his supporters’ association had requested that he continue serving as a council member, and he would decide whether to remain in office after awaiting the outcome of the trial.

Those responses were then evaluated as follows:

This is not only contrary to social justice, but also constitutes a serious disregard of the decision of the council.

The following statement was also made:

Above all, the fact that he committed drunk driving while in office is outrageous, and a person who has done such a thing should not be permitted to remain a city council member.

This explanation treated it as an established fact that Toshio Tsumuraya had committed drunk driving, even though the first trial hearing had not yet been held and no guilty judgment existed.

Questions, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted.

The resolution was adopted by the standing vote of all council members present.

Differences Between the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation

The first and second recommendations for resignation both called upon Toshio Tsumuraya to resign from his position as a city council member.

However, the two resolutions differed in terms of the stage of the criminal proceedings at which they were adopted, the circumstances in which Toshio Tsumuraya was placed, and the manner in which the city council dealt with him.

The First Recommendation for Resignation

The first recommendation for resignation was adopted on October 26, 2011.

At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention, while the police and public prosecutor continued their investigation and questioning.

Toshio Tsumuraya did not voluntarily choose to be absent from the plenary session. Because he was being held in custody, he was unable to attend it.

The minutes contain no record showing that the Sukagawa City Council had heard from Toshio Tsumuraya in advance while he was in detention, afforded him an opportunity to explain his position, or secured an opportunity for him to respond to the proposed resolution.

Questions, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted, and the resolution was adopted by the standing vote of all council members present.

The plenary session began at 10:00 a.m. and entered recess at 10:04 a.m.

Accordingly, the proceedings concerning the first recommendation for resignation were conducted within the four-minute period between the opening of the session and the recess, while Toshio Tsumuraya was unable to attend because of his pre-indictment detention and while no opportunity for explanation or response can be confirmed.

At that point, the alleged accident time of approximately 7:40 p.m., which was later adopted in the indictment and judgment, had not yet appeared in Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements.

The time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was developed in the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011, after the first recommendation for resignation, by combining investigative information, third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle, and estimated travel times, while Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory had not returned.

Accordingly, the first recommendation for resignation was not adopted after the investigation, questioning, and formation of the facts charged had been completed.

It was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in custody and while statements and an account of conduct that he did not remember were still being developed.

The Second Recommendation for Resignation

The second recommendation for resignation was adopted on December 1, 2011.

By that time, Toshio Tsumuraya had been indicted and released on bail.

However, the first trial hearing had not yet been held, and no guilty judgment had been pronounced.

At the meeting of all council members held on November 24, Toshio Tsumuraya had stated that he intended to decide whether to remain in office after the outcome of the criminal trial.

The second recommendation for resignation was adopted only seven days after that statement.

Unlike at the time of the first resolution, Toshio Tsumuraya attended the plenary session.

However, he was required to leave the chamber on the basis of Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act, and the explanation of the reasons for the proposal and the vote took place after he had left.

In explaining the reasons for the proposal, his position that he would decide whether to remain in office after the outcome of the trial was evaluated as follows:

This is not only contrary to social justice, but also constitutes a serious disregard of the decision of the council.

The proposal further stated:

Above all, the fact that he committed drunk driving while in office is outrageous, and a person who has done such a thing should not be permitted to remain a city council member.

These statements treated it as an established fact that Toshio Tsumuraya had committed drunk driving, even though the first trial hearing had not yet been held and no guilty judgment existed.

Questions, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted, and the resolution was adopted by the standing vote of all council members present.

Accordingly, even though Toshio Tsumuraya was physically present at the beginning of the plenary session, he was required to leave the chamber before the vote and had no opportunity in the plenary session to state his position or respond to the reasons advanced in support of the proposed recommendation for resignation.

Structure Common to Both Resolutions

At the time of the first resolution, Toshio Tsumuraya was unable to attend the plenary session because he was being held in pre-indictment detention.

At the time of the second resolution, he attended the plenary session but was required to leave the chamber before the vote.

Although the circumstances differed, both resolutions were therefore adopted without Toshio Tsumuraya presenting an explanation or response to the reasons advanced in the plenary session.

The first resolution was adopted before indictment, while the second was adopted before the first trial hearing and before the guilty judgment.

At neither point had Toshio Tsumuraya’s criminal responsibility been determined according to law.

Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee states that the duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial applies not only to courts, but to all public authorities, including local legislative bodies.

Accordingly, the first and second recommendations for resignation must be examined not only in terms of whether they had legally binding effect under domestic law, but also in terms of whether the Sukagawa City Council’s demand for Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation, and its treatment of the alleged drunk driving as an established fact before his criminal responsibility had been determined, complied with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.

Nor does the fact that a guilty judgment was subsequently pronounced and became final retrospectively justify the two resolutions adopted before indictment and judgment.

The presumption of innocence is a right that governs the conduct of public authorities until guilt has been proved according to law. It is not determined by the judgment that is eventually pronounced.

Structure Revealed by the Chronology

The first fact revealed by the chronology is that the specific account of the incident later set out in the indictment and the judgment was not described from the time of arrest on the basis of Toshio Tsumuraya’s consistent experiential memory.

The statement record dated October 20, 2011 states that Tsumuraya had no memory from the time after he drank at the restaurant until he was awakened by a police officer at the accident scene.

It also states that Tsumuraya did not identify the accident time of approximately 7:50 p.m. or the accident location from his own memory, but learned them from a police officer.

Accordingly, from the earliest stage after the arrest, the accident time and location were recorded in the statement on the basis of information provided by the investigative authorities, rather than Tsumuraya’s own experiential memory.

On October 21, 2011, Tsumuraya was transferred from the police to the public prosecutor.

This transfer was a procedural stage at which the arrested suspect and the case were transferred from the police to the public prosecutor. It did not mean that the evidence required to prove guilt or the facts to be charged had been completed at that point.

In fact, even after the transfer to the prosecutor, statements and investigative materials continued to be created concerning the commencement of driving, the route, the distance travelled, the intention to drive, and the accident time.

The statement record dated October 22, 2011 contains explanations concerning Tsumuraya leaving the restaurant, walking to the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot, departing in the vehicle parked there, and driving in the direction of the accident scene.

However, those explanations were not based on Tsumuraya having remembered what he had actually done.

They were expressed through inferential phrases such as “I think” and “I believe,” based on his mobile telephone call history, the location where the vehicle had been parked, the designated-driver service he ordinarily used, his usual route home, and his normal habits.

Accordingly, with respect to conduct that was not present in Tsumuraya’s memory, an inferential statement was formed by combining information confirmed after the arrest with his ordinary habits and lifestyle.

During the on-site inspection on October 24, 2011, Tsumuraya again stated that he did not remember where he had begun driving or the actual route he had driven from the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot to the accident scene.

Under those circumstances, the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot was treated as the point of departure, the accident scene as the destination, and the roads that could be used “at the present time” between those two points were recorded. The distance was measured as approximately 11.5 kilometres.

The approximately 11.5-kilometer distance was not reconstructed by Tsumuraya from his experiential memory of the route he had actually driven on the day of the accident.

It was the distance of a route established during the investigation on the basis of the locations of the assumed departure point and the accident scene.

The on-site inspection was conducted from 1:40 p.m. to 2:05 p.m.

At 2:40 p.m., approximately 35 minutes later, the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee began its meeting.

At that meeting, the committee arranged the wording of the proposed First Recommendation for Resignation and the procedure under which, after the reasons for the proposal were presented, questioning, referral to a committee, and debate would be omitted before the proposal was put to a vote.

The fact that the on-site inspection and the Council Steering Committee meeting took place on the same day does not, by itself, establish that the investigative authorities and the City Council communicated or acted in coordination.

It does, however, mean that on the same day that the investigative side was creating materials concerning a route and distance while Tsumuraya did not remember the route he had actually driven, the City Council was finalising the wording and voting procedure for a recommendation seeking his resignation on the basis of his arrest. This is important to an examination of the chronological structure of the case.

In the statement record dated October 25, 2011, Tsumuraya was shown the driving-route diagram attached to the on-site inspection report created the previous day.

The record also states that Tsumuraya did not provide the approximately 11.5-kilometer distance from memory of his actual driving, but learned that distance from a police officer.

Accordingly, the on-site inspection report was not created after Tsumuraya remembered the route he had actually driven and reconstructed it from memory.

Rather, while Tsumuraya did not remember the actual route, a route was established as an investigative record; the route diagram and distance were then shown to him; and a statement based on that established route was subsequently recorded.

On the following day, October 26, 2011, the Sukagawa City Council unanimously adopted the First Recommendation for Resignation while Tsumuraya remained in pre-indictment detention and the investigation and questioning were continuing.

At that point, the accident time of approximately 7:40 p.m. later adopted in the indictment and the judgment had not yet appeared in Tsumuraya’s statement records.

The First Recommendation for Resignation was not adopted after the investigation had ended and the facts to be charged had been finalised.

It was adopted while Tsumuraya remained in custody and while inferential statements and investigative materials concerning conduct outside his memory were still being formed and the account of the incident was continuing to become more specific.

Tsumuraya did not voluntarily absent himself from the plenary session.

Because he was being detained before indictment, he was unable to attend.

The minutes contain no indication that the Sukagawa City Council had previously heard from Tsumuraya while he was detained, had provided him with an opportunity to explain, or had secured an opportunity for him to respond.

Under those circumstances, and following the procedure arranged at the October 24 Council Steering Committee meeting, questioning, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted, and the recommendation was adopted by the standing vote of every council member present during the four minutes between the opening of the session and the recess.

Tsumuraya was not released after the First Recommendation for Resignation.

His detention was extended, and his custody and questioning continued.

The statement record taken by the public prosecutor on November 2, 2011 states that Tsumuraya had been shown multiple investigative results after his arrest and had himself reviewed the outgoing and incoming call history on his mobile telephone.

At the beginning of that record, the accident time was still stated as approximately 7:50 p.m.

Later in the record, however, the calls placed to the designated-driver service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., the incoming call from the service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and the estimated travel times between the relevant locations were combined.

On that basis, a sequence was constructed in which Tsumuraya departed from the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot shortly after 7:20 p.m., passed the alternating one-way traffic point at approximately 7:30 p.m., and arrived at the accident scene approximately ten minutes later.

On the basis of that constructed sequence, the time at which the vehicle struck the guardrail was treated as approximately 7:40 p.m.

The record does not state that Tsumuraya remembered the accident time.

Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was not established because Tsumuraya recovered his memory and voluntarily corrected the earlier time of approximately 7:50 p.m.

It was made specific through reverse calculation by combining investigative information gathered or organised after the arrest, third-party information concerning the vehicle’s movement, and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.

The police-stage statement records repeatedly used inferential language concerning the commencement of driving, the route, and the purpose of driving.

By contrast, the November 2 statement record taken by the public prosecutor contains a more specific and definite account of Tsumuraya’s intention and state of mind: that he became unwilling to wait any longer for the designated-driver service and decided to drive home himself.

This more definite account appears even though the record does not state that Tsumuraya’s memory of the actual driving had returned.

Thus, without any recorded change in Tsumuraya’s memory, his statements changed, as investigative information was presented and questioning progressed, from inferences concerning conduct he did not remember to more specific and definite descriptions.

On November 9, 2011, Tsumuraya was indicted on the allegation that he had driven the vehicle at approximately 7:40 p.m.

Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m., reverse-calculated in the November 2 statement record from third-party information concerning the vehicle’s movement and estimated travel times, was submitted to the court as part of the charged facts in the indictment.

The judgment of January 16, 2012 likewise adopted approximately 7:40 p.m. as part of the “facts constituting the offence.”

The accident time in this case was not changed from approximately 7:50 p.m. to approximately 7:40 p.m. because Tsumuraya’s experiential memory returned.

While Tsumuraya remained unable to remember the accident time, approximately 7:40 p.m. was reverse-calculated from investigative information, third-party information concerning the vehicle’s movement, and estimated travel times, and that time was then successively carried into the statement record taken by the public prosecutor, the indictment, and the judgment.

The judgment’s list of evidence includes Tsumuraya’s statements at trial and his investigative-stage statement records, as well as the statement records of three third parties taken by judicial police officers and the statement records of two third parties taken by a public prosecutor.

The judgment does not show what each of the five third parties stated or which fact each statement record was used to establish.

Nor does the judgment alone establish whether the information in the November 2 prosecutor-recorded statement that the vehicle had been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m. came from any one of those five statement records.

It is nevertheless a fact that none of the five third parties was examined as a witness and that no cross-examination by the defence took place.

The contents of the five third-party statements were therefore used as evidence supporting the guilty finding without being directly tested through witness examination and cross-examination in court.

Of those five persons, the two whose statements were taken by a public prosecutor were members of the Sukagawa City Council at the time and had voted in favour of both the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation.

Those two persons therefore participated, outside the criminal proceedings, in recommendations demanding Tsumuraya’s resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined, while inside the criminal proceedings their statement records formed part of the prosecution evidence incorporated into the evidentiary structure supporting the guilty judgment.

This fact does not, by itself, establish a direct causal relationship between the recommendations for resignation and the criminal trial.

However, the fact that statement records from members of a public authority who had supported a demand for resignation before criminal responsibility was determined became prosecution evidence in the same criminal case, and were incorporated into the evidentiary structure of the judgment without cross-examination, makes it difficult to treat the City Council’s pre-judgment public evaluation and the criminal proceedings as completely unrelated events.

On November 24, 2011, Tsumuraya stated at the meeting of all council members that he intended to decide whether to resign after the outcome of the criminal trial.

Four days later, on November 28, the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee met.

At that meeting, Tsumuraya’s explanation of November 24 was evaluated as showing no willingness to comply with the First Recommendation for Resignation and was used as a reason for adopting another recommendation.

The committee also arranged in advance that, at the December 1 plenary session, Tsumuraya would be excluded from the proceedings, the reasons for the proposal would be presented, questioning and debate would be omitted, the proposal would be put to a vote, and Tsumuraya would be informed of the result after its adoption.

Three days later, on December 1, before the first trial hearing and before any guilty judgment, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was adopted.

In the Second Recommendation for Resignation, Tsumuraya’s position that he would decide whether to resign after the outcome of the trial was described as “contrary to social justice.”

The reasons for the proposal also treated it as an established fact that Tsumuraya “had driven under the influence of alcohol” and stated that such a person should not remain a city council member.

The foregoing sequence does not establish that evidence was fabricated.

Nor do the currently available materials establish that no grounds for suspicion existed at the time of the arrest.

They do, however, establish that, although Tsumuraya continued to have no memory of the actual driving, the account of the incident—including the route, the distance travelled, the intention to drive, and the accident time—was progressively made more specific after the arrest by combining the accident time and location supplied by police officers, mobile telephone call records, Tsumuraya’s ordinary habits, his usual route home, the route established during the on-site inspection, the distance explained by a police officer, information concerning the designated-driver service, third-party information concerning the vehicle’s movement, and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.

In parallel with that process, Tsumuraya remained in custody and continued to be questioned.

Neither the First nor the Second Recommendation for Resignation was suddenly introduced at a plenary session. In each instance, the reasons for the recommendation and the procedure for voting had been arranged in advance at a Council Steering Committee meeting.

The First Recommendation for Resignation was then adopted before indictment, and the Second was adopted before the first trial hearing and before any guilty judgment.

Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

Paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 of the Human Rights Committee explains that the duty not to prejudge the outcome of a trial applies not only to courts, but to all public authorities, including local legislatures.

Accordingly, the question whether the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation themselves complied with Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 must be examined independently of whether it can be proved that they actually influenced the investigation, indictment, or judgment.

In addition, the manner in which Tsumuraya’s statements, the charged facts, the third-party statement records, his position at trial, and the judgment were formed and evaluated in the presence of a public pre-judgment assessment must be examined in relation to the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, the right to examine adverse witnesses guaranteed by Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR and Article 37(2) of the Constitution of Japan, and the guarantee of due process under Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan.

The fact that a guilty judgment was later delivered and became final does not retroactively justify the conduct of public authorities before indictment or judgment.

The presumption of innocence does not apply or cease to apply according to the judgment eventually delivered. It is a right governing the conduct of public authorities until guilt has been proved according to law.

Relationship with Media Reports

In this case, newspaper, television, and other media reports began immediately after Toshio Tsumuraya’s arrest.

A newspaper report published on October 20, 2011 stated that Toshio Tsumuraya admitted that he had consumed alcohol and had been involved in the accident, but denied having driven under the influence of alcohol.

A newspaper report published on the following day stated that he had begun to broadly admit the allegation.

Thus, within a short period, the reporting changed from stating that Toshio Tsumuraya denied drunk driving to stating that he had begun to broadly admit the allegation.

However, October 21, 2011 was merely the date on which Toshio Tsumuraya was referred by the police to the public prosecutor.

He had not yet been indicted, and the criminal trial had not begun.

At that stage, Toshio Tsumuraya still had no memory of the period from drinking at the restaurant until he was awakened by a police officer at the accident scene.

Statements and investigative materials concerning the commencement of driving, the route travelled, the distance travelled, the intention to drive, and the time of the accident continued to be developed after that date.

On October 26, the Sukagawa City Council unanimously adopted the first recommendation for resignation.

At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention, while the investigation and questioning were continuing.

He did not voluntarily choose to be absent from the plenary session.

Because he was being held in custody, he was unable to attend it.

At that point, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m., later adopted in the indictment and the judgment, had not yet appeared in Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements.

Media reporting and a recommendation for resignation adopted by a local legislative body are acts of a different legal nature.

Media organisations do not occupy the same legal position as the Sukagawa City Council, which is a public authority.

By contrast, a recommendation for resignation adopted by the Sukagawa City Council is a formal expression of the will of a public body acting as a legislative assembly.

Accordingly, this case requires examination not only of the contents of the media reports, but also, as a separate matter, of the fact that a public authority formally demanded Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined.

Toshio Tsumuraya remained in custody and continued to be questioned after the first recommendation for resignation.

In the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was calculated backwards from third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle and estimated travel times, even though there is no statement that Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory had returned.

Seven days later, on November 9, that time was adopted as part of the facts charged in the indictment.

On November 24, Toshio Tsumuraya stated at a conference of all council members that he intended to decide whether to remain in office after the outcome of the criminal trial.

Nevertheless, seven days later, on December 1, the second recommendation for resignation was adopted before the first trial hearing and before any guilty judgment had been pronounced.

The reasons presented for the second recommendation described Toshio Tsumuraya’s position that he would await the outcome of the trial as conduct “contrary to social justice.”

They further stated that his commission of drunk driving while in office was “outrageous” and that a person who had committed such an act should not remain a city council member.

Those reasons treated it as an established fact that Toshio Tsumuraya had committed drunk driving, even though the first trial hearing had not yet been held and no guilty judgment existed.

Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee states that the duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a criminal trial applies not only to courts, but to all public authorities, including local legislative bodies.

Accordingly, whether the first and second recommendations for resignation complied with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 must be examined independently of whether interaction between the media reports and the resolutions, or any concrete influence on the criminal proceedings, can be proved.

The fact that recommendations for resignation are generally regarded as having no legally binding force under domestic law does not resolve this issue.

The issue is not whether the resolutions immediately deprived Toshio Tsumuraya of his status as a city council member.

The issue is that a public authority demanded his resignation and treated the alleged criminal conduct as established before his criminal responsibility had been determined according to law.

The media reported Toshio Tsumuraya’s arrest, his referral to the public prosecutor, and the adoption of recommendations for resignation by the Sukagawa City Council.

However, it cannot be said that equal public attention was given to the fact that no guilty judgment had yet been pronounced, that pre-indictment detention made it impossible for Toshio Tsumuraya to attend the plenary session concerning the first resolution, that the statements and account of the incident were still being developed, or that public authorities had a duty not to prejudge the outcome of the criminal trial.

Where arrest, referral to prosecutors, and recommendations for resignation are publicly reported without equivalent attention being given to the presumption of innocence, the process by which statements were formed, and the absence of an opportunity to respond, there is a risk that a social assessment based on the assumption that Toshio Tsumuraya was already guilty may be formed and expanded.

The materials currently available do not establish that the newspaper, television, or other media reports, or the recommendations for resignation, directly influenced the prosecutor’s questioning, the decision to indict, or the court’s judgment.

However, the inability to establish such direct influence does not mean that the compatibility of a public authority’s pre-judgment treatment of Toshio Tsumuraya with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR need not be examined.

Two separate issues must be distinguished.

The first is whether the public authority itself violated the presumption of innocence by making an official statement that prejudged the outcome of the criminal proceedings.

The second is whether the media reporting, the official resolutions, and the resulting social assessment concretely affected the formation of Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements, the facts charged, the position taken at trial, or the judgment.

The first issue concerns the conduct of the public authority itself and does not depend upon proof that the resolutions actually influenced the criminal proceedings.

The second concerns the additional question of whether the criminal proceedings remained fair in circumstances where official pre-judgment assessments and a broader social assumption of guilt existed.

Accordingly, the media reporting, the Sukagawa City Council’s formal expressions of its will, the detention, the questioning, the formation of the statements, and the criminal trial should not automatically be treated as entirely unrelated events.

Their different legal characteristics must be distinguished, while their relationship within the same chronology must also be examined.

Questions Arising from This Timeline

1. Was It Necessary to Adopt a Recommendation for Resignation While Toshio Tsumuraya Was Being Held in Pre-Indictment Detention?

When the first recommendation for resignation was adopted on October 26, 2011, Toshio Tsumuraya had not yet been indicted.

The criminal trial had not begun, and no judicial determination concerning his criminal responsibility had been made.

Toshio Tsumuraya remained in custody and continued to be questioned. The account of the incident, including the route travelled, his alleged intention to drive, and the time of the accident, was still being developed.

Was it necessary for the Sukagawa City Council, as a public authority, to demand Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation at that stage without awaiting determination through the criminal proceedings?

How did the Sukagawa City Council examine the relationship between its demand for resignation and the presumption of innocence while Toshio Tsumuraya’s criminal responsibility remained undetermined?

2. Was It Permissible to Adopt the Resolution While Pre-Indictment Detention Made It Impossible for Toshio Tsumuraya to Attend the Plenary Session?

At the time of the first recommendation for resignation, Toshio Tsumuraya did not voluntarily choose to be absent from the plenary session.

He was unable to attend because he was being held in pre-indictment detention.

The minutes contain no record showing that the Sukagawa City Council heard from Toshio Tsumuraya in advance while he was in detention, afforded him an opportunity to explain his position, or secured an opportunity for him to respond.

Questions, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted, and the resolution was adopted by the standing vote of all council members present.

According to the minutes, the plenary session opened at 10:00 a.m. and entered recess at 10:04 a.m.

Was it consistent with the requirements of due process to adopt a resolution capable of seriously affecting Toshio Tsumuraya’s political status, reputation, and social standing while detention made it impossible for him to attend and while no opportunity for explanation or response can be confirmed?

3. At What Stage in the Formation of the Statements and the Account of the Incident Was the First Recommendation for Resignation Adopted?

The first recommendation for resignation was not adopted after the investigation and questioning had been completed.

At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya had not yet been indicted. His detention was subsequently extended, and his custody and questioning continued.

During the on-site inspection conducted on October 24, 2011, a route from the city hall parking lot to the accident scene was established and measured at approximately 11.5 kilometres while Toshio Tsumuraya remained unable to remember the route he had actually travelled.

On the following day, the route diagram and the distance were shown to Toshio Tsumuraya.

The first recommendation for resignation was adopted the next day.

Moreover, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m., later adopted in the indictment and judgment, had not yet appeared in Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements.

In light of this chronology, was the first recommendation for resignation adopted not after the investigation and formation of the statements had been completed, but while investigative materials and inferential explanations concerning conduct absent from Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory were still being developed?

4. On What Basis Was the Accident Time of Approximately 7:40 p.m. Developed?

In the initial investigative materials, the on-site inspection report, and the police-recorded statements, the time of the accident was stated to be approximately 7:50 p.m.

However, even this time of approximately 7:50 p.m. was not identified by Toshio Tsumuraya from his own memory.

The police-recorded statement dated October 20, 2011 states that Toshio Tsumuraya learned the time and location of the accident from a police officer.

In the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, the calls made to a designated-driver service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., an incoming call from the same service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and estimated travel times between the relevant locations were combined.

The time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was then calculated backwards from that sequence.

There is no statement that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered the time of the accident.

Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was not developed because Toshio Tsumuraya recovered his memory and corrected the previous time of approximately 7:50 p.m. on the basis of his own experiential memory.

What material supported the third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle, and how accurate was that information?

What was the basis for estimating the travel time between the relevant locations at approximately ten minutes?

Was there a sufficient objective basis for adopting the time of approximately 7:40 p.m., calculated backwards in this manner, as the time of the alleged offence in the indictment and judgment?

5. Why Did the Explanation of Toshio Tsumuraya’s Intention to Drive Become Definite Even Though His Memory Had Not Returned?

The police-recorded statements repeatedly used inferential language such as “I think” and “I believe” when describing conduct that Toshio Tsumuraya did not remember.

By contrast, the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2 contains a more specific and definite explanation of Toshio Tsumuraya’s intention and state of mind: that he had become unable to wait any longer for the designated-driver service and had decided to drive home himself.

However, there is no statement that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered the actual driving or that his state of memory had changed.

Why did the explanation of his intention and state of mind change from inferential to definite even though his experiential memory had not returned?

Did this change arise from Toshio Tsumuraya’s own memory, or was it developed by combining investigative information presented during questioning?

6. Was the Negative Evaluation of Toshio Tsumuraya’s Decision to Await the Outcome of the Criminal Trial Compatible with the Presumption of Innocence?

On November 24, 2011, Toshio Tsumuraya stated at a conference of all council members that he intended to decide whether to remain in office after the outcome of the criminal trial.

At that point, the first trial hearing had not yet been held, and no guilty judgment had been pronounced.

Criminal responsibility should ordinarily be determined through criminal proceedings on the basis of evidence.

From the perspective of respecting the presumption of innocence and the judicial process, Toshio Tsumuraya’s decision to await the outcome of the criminal trial before deciding whether to remain in office cannot in itself be regarded as unreasonable.

Nevertheless, seven days later, the reasons presented for the second recommendation for resignation described his response, including his intention to await the outcome of the trial, as conduct “contrary to social justice.”

Was it compatible with the presumption of innocence for a public authority to evaluate negatively, before judgment, Toshio Tsumuraya’s decision to await the outcome of the criminal trial?

7. Did the Sukagawa City Council Prejudge the Determination to Be Made in the Criminal Trial?

Before the first trial hearing and before any guilty judgment had been pronounced, the reasons presented for the second recommendation for resignation stated:

Above all, the fact that he committed drunk driving while in office is outrageous, and a person who has done such a thing should not be permitted to remain a city council member.

This statement treated Toshio Tsumuraya’s commission of drunk driving not as an allegation or charged fact, but as an established fact.

The existence of criminal responsibility is a matter that should be determined by a court on the basis of lawfully examined evidence.

Did a local legislative body without authority to determine criminal responsibility prejudge the criminal court’s determination by declaring before the first trial hearing that the alleged offence had occurred and demanding resignation on that basis?

Does the fact that a recommendation for resignation is regarded as having no legally binding force under domestic law also eliminate the problem created by declaring criminal conduct to be established before judgment?

8. How Should the Use of the Five Third-Party Written Statements Without Witness Examination or Cross-Examination Be Evaluated?

The judgment’s list of evidence includes police-recorded statements from three third parties and prosecutor-recorded statements from two other third parties.

However, none of the five third parties was examined as a witness, and no cross-examination by Toshio Tsumuraya’s side took place.

Accordingly, the five third parties did not personally present their accounts in court, and the accuracy of their accounts, their memory and perception, the circumstances in which their statements were made, and their credibility were not tested through cross-examination.

Nevertheless, their written statements were incorporated into the evidentiary structure supporting the finding of guilt.

Moreover, the two third parties whose statements were recorded by the public prosecutor were members of the Sukagawa City Council at the relevant time and voted in favour of both the first and second recommendations for resignation.

Outside the criminal proceedings, those two persons voted in favour of resolutions demanding Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined. Within the criminal proceedings, their written statements were used as prosecution evidence.

How can the use of those written statements without witness examination or cross-examination be explained in relation to the right to examine witnesses guaranteed by Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan and Article 14, paragraph 3(e) of the ICCPR?

9. How Can the Two Recommendations for Resignation Be Explained Under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 30?

Japan has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR guarantees the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee states that all public authorities must refrain from prejudging the outcome of a criminal trial.

The Sukagawa City Council is a public authority.

The first recommendation for resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention and before any judicial determination concerning his criminal responsibility had been made.

The second recommendation for resignation was adopted before the first trial hearing and before any guilty judgment had been pronounced. Its stated reasons treated Toshio Tsumuraya’s commission of drunk driving as an established fact.

This issue does not depend solely on whether the recommendations for resignation can be proved to have concretely influenced the investigation, indictment, or judgment.

The separate question is whether the act of a public authority declaring criminal conduct to be established and demanding Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined complied with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.

Can the fact that a guilty judgment was later pronounced and became final retrospectively legalise the conduct of a public authority that occurred before indictment and judgment?

If the presumption of innocence is a right governing the conduct of public authorities until guilt has been proved according to law, how can the two recommendations for resignation adopted by the Sukagawa City Council be explained under the ICCPR?

Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Standards

Domestic Law

Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 31 provides that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.

In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya was unable to attend the plenary session because he was being held in pre-indictment detention. No prior hearing, opportunity to explain his position, or opportunity to respond can be confirmed from the minutes.

These circumstances raise an issue in relation to the underlying principle of due process.

In relation to the second recommendation for resignation, it is also necessary to examine the procedural fairness of explaining the reasons for the proposal and conducting the vote after Toshio Tsumuraya had been required to leave the chamber.

Article 32 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 32 provides that no person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.

Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he intended to decide whether to remain in office after awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial.

Nevertheless, the response of awaiting determination through the criminal proceedings was itself described by a public authority as “contrary to social justice.”

It must therefore be examined whether that evaluation was consistent with respect for the right to obtain a judicial determination through the courts.

Article 37, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 37, paragraph 1 guarantees every criminal defendant the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.

Before indictment and before the first trial hearing, the Sukagawa City Council demanded Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation.

In the reasons presented for the second recommendation for resignation, the alleged drunk driving was treated as an established fact before any guilty judgment had been pronounced.

It is therefore necessary to examine how Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements, the facts charged, the evidentiary structure, the position taken at trial, and the judgment were formed in circumstances where such pre-judgment public assessments had already been made.

However, the existence of those public assessments must be distinguished from proof that they actually influenced the court’s determination.

Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 37, paragraph 2 guarantees a criminal defendant a full opportunity to examine all witnesses.

The judgment’s list of evidence includes police-recorded statements from three third parties and prosecutor-recorded statements from two other third parties.

However, none of those five third parties was examined as a witness, and no cross-examination by the defence for Toshio Tsumuraya took place.

This raises the question of the legal basis on which the written statements were admitted as evidence and how an opportunity to challenge their accuracy and credibility was secured.

Article 76, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 76, paragraph 3 provides that all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by the Constitution and the laws.

The Sukagawa City Council had no authority to determine Toshio Tsumuraya’s criminal responsibility.

Its treatment of the alleged criminal conduct as established before the first trial hearing raises the question of whether its formal public statement prejudged a determination reserved for the criminal court.

However, a separate factual basis would be required to conclude that this public statement actually influenced the judges’ determination.

Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 98, paragraph 2 requires the treaties concluded by Japan and established rules of international law to be faithfully observed.

The protections guaranteed by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Japan has ratified, cannot be reduced solely by reference to domestic institutional arrangements or the internal practices of a local legislative body.

Accordingly, the recommendations for resignation adopted by the Sukagawa City Council must be examined for compatibility with the ICCPR protections of the presumption of innocence and a fair trial, independently of whether the resolutions had legally binding force under domestic law.

Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan

Article 99 imposes upon ministers of state, members of the Diet, judges, and other public officials an obligation to respect and uphold the Constitution.

Members of local legislative bodies are also public officials subject to that obligation.

It must therefore be examined whether treating alleged criminal conduct as established and demanding resignation before Toshio Tsumuraya’s criminal responsibility had been determined was consistent with the obligation to respect and uphold the presumption of innocence, due process, and the right to a judicial determination.

Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act

Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act provides that the chairperson and members of a local assembly may not participate in deliberations concerning matters in which they have a personal interest.

The proviso to that article permits the person concerned to attend the meeting and speak when the assembly gives its consent.

In relation to the second recommendation for resignation, Toshio Tsumuraya was required to leave the chamber on the basis of Article 117.

This raises the question of whether exclusion from participation in the vote necessarily required the denial of any opportunity to explain his position or respond to the reasons advanced for the proposal.

It must also be examined whether the possibility of permitting his attendance and statement under the proviso to Article 117 was considered.

Article 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 317 provides that facts shall be found on the basis of evidence.

In this case, while Toshio Tsumuraya’s experiential memory had not returned, an account including the route travelled, the intention to drive, and the time of the accident was progressively developed by combining investigative information, Toshio Tsumuraya’s inferences, the route established during the on-site inspection, mobile telephone call records, third-party information concerning the alleged sighting of the vehicle, and estimated travel times.

It is therefore necessary to distinguish the individual items of information and examine what facts each item was capable of proving and with what degree of reliability.

Article 320, Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 320, paragraph 1 establishes the general rule excluding written material offered in place of testimony given at a trial hearing.

In this case, written statements from five third parties were used as evidence even though the declarants did not testify in court and no cross-examination took place.

It is therefore necessary to identify the provision and requirements under which each written statement was admitted as evidence.

Article 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 321 provides circumstances in which a written statement prepared outside the courtroom may be admitted as evidence when specified requirements are satisfied.

The judgment’s list of evidence does not identify which requirements under Article 321, if any, were applied to the written statements of the five third parties.

Accordingly, the fact that no witness examination or cross-examination took place does not, by itself, establish that the written statements were legally inadmissible.

However, the legal basis for their admission and the absence of an opportunity to examine the declarants are separate matters that must both be examined.

Article 326 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 326 provides that a document or object may be admitted as evidence where both the public prosecutor and the defendant consent and the court considers its admission appropriate.

The judgment alone does not establish whether the defence for Toshio Tsumuraya consented to the admission of the five third-party written statements or whether they were admitted under another provision.

Even where formal consent to admission was given, the existence of such consent is not identical to the existence of a substantive opportunity to cross-examine the declarants.

Article 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 336 provides that a judgment of acquittal must be pronounced where there is no proof of the offence charged.

This provision reflects the basic structure of criminal proceedings under which the defendant is not required to prove innocence; the prosecution must prove the alleged offence through evidence.

In this case, it must be examined whether an account formed from inferences, investigative information, third-party written statements, and estimated travel times concerning conduct absent from Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory constituted sufficient proof of the alleged offence.

International Human Rights Treaty: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR

Article 14, paragraph 1 guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law in the determination of a criminal charge.

In this case, it is necessary to examine how Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements, the facts charged, the admission and assessment of evidence, the position taken at trial, and the judgment were formed in circumstances where a local legislative body had already made pre-judgment public assessments.

Whether the recommendations for resignation actually influenced the criminal proceedings is an additional question to be examined in relation to the right to a fair trial.

Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR

Article 14, paragraph 2 guarantees the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

The first recommendation for resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention and before any judicial determination concerning his criminal responsibility had been made.

The second recommendation for resignation was adopted before the first trial hearing and before any guilty judgment had been pronounced. The reasons presented for that resolution treated the alleged drunk driving as an established fact.

Accordingly, independently of whether the resolutions can be proved to have concretely influenced the criminal proceedings, it must be examined whether the resolutions and the reasons advanced for them were themselves compatible with the presumption of innocence.

Article 14, Paragraph 3(e) of the ICCPR

Article 14, paragraph 3(e) guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.

The judgment’s list of evidence includes written statements from five third parties, while none of the five declarants was examined as a witness and no cross-examination by the defence for Toshio Tsumuraya took place.

It must therefore be examined how the right to examine adverse witnesses was secured when those written statements were incorporated into the evidentiary structure supporting the finding of guilt.

Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 25

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 25 states that the requirement of independence and impartiality includes the absence of direct or indirect influence, pressure, intimidation, or interference from any side and for any reason.

The available materials do not, by themselves, establish that the recommendations for resignation adopted by the Sukagawa City Council actually influenced the investigation, indictment, or judgment.

However, the existence of pre-indictment and pre-trial public assessments by a public authority must be taken into account when examining whether the criminal proceedings were conducted free from direct or indirect influence.

Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 30

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 states that all public authorities must refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial and from making public statements affirming the guilt of an accused person.

It also states that the media should avoid news coverage that undermines the presumption of innocence.

The Sukagawa City Council, as a local legislative body, is a public authority subject to this standard.

The reasons presented for the second recommendation for resignation treated Toshio Tsumuraya’s commission of drunk driving as an established fact before the first trial hearing.

That public statement must therefore be examined for compatibility with the standard set out in General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.

The fact that a recommendation for resignation is regarded as having no legally binding force under domestic law does not mean that a public authority is permitted to treat an accused person as guilty before judgment.

Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 39

General Comment No. 32, paragraph 39 explains that Article 14, paragraph 3(e) guarantees the right to examine or have examined adverse witnesses and gives the defendant and defence counsel the same legal power to compel and examine witnesses as is available to the prosecution.

Although this right is not unlimited, the defendant must be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question an adverse witness at some stage of the proceedings.

In this case, written statements from five third parties were used, while none of the declarants was examined as a witness and no cross-examination took place.

It must therefore be examined whether Toshio Tsumuraya was afforded an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge the accuracy and credibility of those third-party statements.

Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation

Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)

Article 26 provides that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith.

Because Japan has ratified the ICCPR, the State must perform its obligations under the Covenant in good faith through the conduct of public authorities, including national institutions, local governments, courts, and local legislative bodies.

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)

Article 27 provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

Accordingly, the absence of legally binding force under domestic law, the characterisation of a recommendation for resignation as an internal or political expression of a local assembly, or the absence of a clearly defined domestic corrective procedure does not eliminate the obligation to examine compatibility with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)

Article 31 provides that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their context, and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose.

The protection guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR cannot be interpreted narrowly as regulating only the formal pronouncement of a guilty judgment by a court.

As General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 explains, the presumption of innocence requires all public authorities, not only courts, to refrain from prejudging the outcome of criminal proceedings.

Accordingly, the two recommendations for resignation adopted by the Sukagawa City Council must be examined not only according to their domestic legal form or legally binding effect, but also in light of the object and purpose of the ICCPR protection afforded to persons whose criminal responsibility has not yet been determined.

For detailed interpretation of these provisions, their application to this case, and their relationship with one another, see “Legal Claims and the Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.”

Relationship to This Case

The significance of the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation cannot be fully understood by viewing each recommendation as an isolated event.

In this case, while Toshio Tsumuraya continued to have no memory of the actual driving, the account of the incident—including the route, the distance travelled, the intention to drive, and the accident time—was progressively made more specific by combining information presented after his arrest, Tsumuraya’s own inferences, the route established during the on-site inspection, mobile telephone call records, third-party information concerning the vehicle’s movement, and estimated travel times.

During the on-site inspection on October 24, 2011, a route from the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot to the accident scene was established while Tsumuraya did not remember the route he had actually driven, and the distance along that route was measured as approximately 11.5 kilometres.

The inspection was conducted from 1:40 p.m. to 2:05 p.m.

At 2:40 p.m., approximately 35 minutes later, the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee began its meeting.

At that meeting, the committee arranged the wording of a recommendation seeking Tsumuraya’s resignation on the premise that he had been arrested on suspicion of violating the Road Traffic Act, as well as the procedure under which questioning, referral to a committee, and debate would be omitted before the proposal was put to a vote at the plenary session.

The fact that the on-site inspection and the Council Steering Committee meeting took place on the same day does not, by itself, establish that the investigative authorities and the City Council communicated or acted in coordination.

It does, however, mean that on the same day that the investigative side was creating materials concerning a route and distance while Tsumuraya did not remember the route he had actually driven, the City Council was finalising the wording and voting procedure for a recommendation seeking his resignation on the basis of his arrest. This is important to an examination of the chronological relationship in this case.

On October 25, Tsumuraya was shown the route diagram and the distance of approximately 11.5 kilometres.

On the following day, October 26, the Sukagawa City Council unanimously adopted the First Recommendation for Resignation.

At that time, Tsumuraya was in pre-indictment detention, and the investigation and questioning were continuing.

Tsumuraya did not voluntarily absent himself from the plenary session.

Because he was detained before indictment, he was unable to attend.

The minutes contain no indication that the Sukagawa City Council had previously heard from Tsumuraya while he was detained, had provided him with an opportunity to explain, or had secured an opportunity for him to respond.

Under those circumstances, and following the procedure arranged at the October 24 Council Steering Committee meeting, questioning, referral to a committee, and debate were omitted, and the recommendation was adopted by the standing vote of every council member present during the four minutes between the opening of the session and the recess.

Tsumuraya was not released after the First Recommendation for Resignation.

His detention was extended, and his custody and questioning continued.

The statement record taken by the public prosecutor on November 2, 2011 combined the calls placed to the designated-driver service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., the incoming call from the service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and the estimated travel times between the relevant locations.

On the basis of that sequence, the accident time was treated as approximately 7:40 p.m.

The record does not state that Tsumuraya remembered the accident time.

Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was not established because Tsumuraya recovered his memory and voluntarily corrected the earlier time of approximately 7:50 p.m.

It was made specific through reverse calculation by combining investigative information gathered or organised after the arrest, third-party information concerning the vehicle’s movement, and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.

Seven days later, on November 9, 2011, approximately 7:40 p.m. was adopted as the time alleged in the indictment.

The judgment of January 16, 2012 likewise adopted approximately 7:40 p.m. as part of the “facts constituting the offence.”

This sequence establishes that the First Recommendation for Resignation was not adopted after the investigation and the formation of the statements had ended and the facts to be charged had been finalised.

The First Recommendation for Resignation was adopted while Tsumuraya remained in custody and was being questioned, and while an account of conduct outside his memory was being made more specific through investigative materials and inference.

This chronological relationship alone does not establish that the First Recommendation for Resignation directly influenced the subsequent questioning, formation of statements, or decision to indict.

However, the absence of proof of a specific effect must be distinguished from the separate question of the legality and human-rights implications of a public authority demanding Tsumuraya’s resignation while he remained in pre-indictment detention.

Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

Paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 of the Human Rights Committee explains that all public authorities are under a duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a criminal trial.

The Sukagawa City Council is a public authority subject to that duty.

Accordingly, independently of whether it can be proved that the First Recommendation for Resignation had a specific effect on the investigation or indictment, it must be examined whether demanding Tsumuraya’s resignation before indictment, while he was unable to attend because of his detention and before any judicial determination of criminal responsibility, complied with Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32.

The Second Recommendation for Resignation was adopted on December 1, 2011.

Seven days earlier, on November 24, Tsumuraya had stated at the meeting of all council members that he intended to decide whether to resign after the outcome of the criminal trial.

Criminal responsibility should, in principle, be determined in a criminal trial on the basis of evidence.

From the standpoint of respecting the presumption of innocence and the judicial process, Tsumuraya’s position that he would decide whether to resign after the outcome of the criminal trial cannot be regarded as unreasonable.

Four days later, on November 28, the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee met.

At that meeting, Tsumuraya’s statements and conduct on November 24 were evaluated as showing no willingness to comply with the First Recommendation for Resignation.

It was also stated that Tsumuraya had made remarks admitting that he had driven under the influence of alcohol, and that a second recommendation should be adopted in order to make him understand that continuing to serve as a council member could not be permitted.

The committee then arranged in advance that, at the December 1 plenary session, Tsumuraya would be excluded from the proceedings, the reasons for the proposal would be presented, questioning and debate would be omitted, the proposal would be put to a vote, and Tsumuraya would be informed of the result after its adoption.

Accordingly, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was adopted after the reasons for again demanding his resignation and the voting procedure had been specifically arranged at the November 28 Council Steering Committee meeting on the basis of his November 24 explanation.

Nevertheless, the reasons presented for the Second Recommendation for Resignation described Tsumuraya’s position that he would wait for the outcome of the trial as “contrary to social justice.”

They also treated it as an established fact that Tsumuraya “had driven under the influence of alcohol,” even though the first trial hearing had not taken place and no guilty judgment existed.

The Second Recommendation for Resignation thus rejected Tsumuraya’s position that the criminal court should determine the matter first, and demanded his resignation on the basis of treating the alleged criminal conduct as established before the court had ruled.

Accordingly, independently of whether it can be proved that the Second Recommendation for Resignation had a specific effect on the criminal trial, it must be examined whether the recommendation and the reasons presented for it complied with Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32.

The fact that recommendations for resignation are regarded as having no legally binding force under domestic law does not resolve this issue.

The issue in this case is not whether the recommendations immediately deprived Tsumuraya of his status as a council member.

The issue is that the Sukagawa City Council, a public authority, demanded his resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined and publicly treated the alleged offence as an established fact.

Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 are not limited to acts of public authorities that carry legally enforceable consequences under domestic law.

The problem arises from a public authority prejudging the outcome of a criminal trial and treating a person whose criminal responsibility remains undetermined as if he were already guilty.

The judgment’s list of evidence includes Tsumuraya’s statements at trial and his investigative-stage statement records, as well as the statement records of three third parties taken by judicial police officers and the statement records of two third parties taken by a public prosecutor.

None of the five third parties was examined as a witness, and no cross-examination by Tsumuraya’s side took place.

Their statements were therefore not presented directly by the declarants in court, and their accuracy, memory, perception, formation, and credibility were not tested through cross-examination.

Of those five persons, the two whose statements were taken by a public prosecutor were members of the Sukagawa City Council at the time and had voted in favour of both the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation.

Outside the criminal proceedings, those two persons participated in recommendations demanding Tsumuraya’s resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined. Inside the criminal proceedings, their statement records were listed as prosecution evidence in the judgment.

This fact alone does not establish a direct causal relationship between the recommendations for resignation and the criminal trial.

However, the fact that statement records from members of a public authority who had supported a demand for resignation before criminal responsibility was determined became prosecution evidence in the same criminal case, and were incorporated into the evidentiary structure of the judgment without witness examination or cross-examination, makes it difficult to treat the City Council’s pre-judgment public evaluation and the criminal proceedings as necessarily and completely unrelated events.

This issue must be examined under Article 37(2) of the Constitution of Japan and Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR, which protect the right to examine adverse witnesses, including whether Tsumuraya was provided with an adequate opportunity to challenge the accuracy and credibility of the third-party statements.

It must also be asked whether a procedure in which statements from persons who participated in a public decision raising a question of compatibility with the presumption of innocence were used to support a guilty finding in the same criminal case, without their participation, position, or credibility being tested through cross-examination, complied with the guarantee of due process under Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan.

The manner in which the statements, the charged facts, the admissibility and evaluation of evidence, Tsumuraya’s position at trial, and the judgment were formed in the presence of a public pre-judgment assessment must also be examined in relation to the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.

Two separate issues must therefore be distinguished.

The first is whether the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation and the reasons presented for them themselves complied with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32.

The second is the additional question whether the existence of a public pre-judgment assessment had a specific effect on Tsumuraya’s statements, the charged facts, the evidentiary structure, his position at trial, and the judgment, in relation to the rights to a fair trial, due process, and examination of witnesses.

The first issue does not depend on proof of a specific effect under the second issue.

Whether a public authority prejudged the outcome of the criminal trial must be determined by examining the public act itself.

The fact that a guilty judgment was delivered on January 16, 2012 and became final on January 31 does not retroactively justify the conduct of public authorities before that judgment.

The application of the presumption of innocence does not depend on whether a guilty judgment is later delivered.

It is a right governing how public authorities must treat a person charged with a criminal offence until guilt has been proved according to law.

Accordingly, the fact that a guilty judgment later became final cannot make examination of the First Recommendation for Resignation before indictment or the Second Recommendation for Resignation before the first trial hearing unnecessary.

The issue in this case is not merely whether the two recommendations had legally binding force under domestic law.

While Tsumuraya’s experiential memory had not returned and an account of the incident was being formed during his continued detention and questioning, the wording and voting procedure for the First Recommendation for Resignation were finalised, and the First Recommendation was then adopted.

Before the first trial hearing, the reasons and voting procedure for the Second Recommendation for Resignation were also finalised, and the Second Recommendation was then adopted.

The question is whether this entire sequence was consistent with the guarantees of the presumption of innocence, due process, a fair trial, and the right to examine witnesses.

Article 98(2) of the Constitution of Japan requires the faithful observance of treaties concluded by Japan and established rules of international law.

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) does not permit a State to invoke its domestic law as justification for failure to perform a treaty.

Accordingly, it is not permissible to avoid examining compliance with Article 14 of the ICCPR merely by describing the recommendations for resignation under domestic law as non-binding political or moral expressions of opinion.

The sequence in this case demonstrates the need to examine, within the same chronological and institutional framework, the acts of a public authority before criminal responsibility was determined, the formation of statements and an account of the incident while Tsumuraya lacked memory, the prior arrangement of the reasons and voting procedures for the two recommendations at Council Steering Committee meetings, the use of third-party statement records, the absence of cross-examination, and the subsequent criminal trial, rather than treating them as mutually unrelated events.

Related Materials

Related pages

The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.

Record and Verification of the Case

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5

Evidence Documents

Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality

Contact

Related evidence articles:

2011（Heisei 23）

Sukagawa City Council Minutes—Proposal Reasons and Voting Record of the First Recommendation for Resignation

Sukagawa City Council Minutes—Proposal Reasons and Voting Record of the Second Recommendation for Resignation

Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya

Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee Minutes—Internal Deliberations Leading to the First Recommendation for Resignation While in Detention Before Indictment

Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee Minutes—Internal Deliberations Leading to the Second Recommendation for Resignation Before the First Hearing

Integrated Verification—Chronology of Criminal Proceedings, Media Reports, Changes in Statements, and the Response of the Sukagawa City Council

2012（Heisei 24）

Sukagawa City Council Minutes—Proposal Reasons and Voting Record of the Third Recommendation for Resignation

Sukagawa City Council Minutes—Proposal Reasons and Voting Record of the Fourth Recommendation for Resignation

Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee Minutes—Internal Deliberations Leading to the Third Recommendation for Resignation After the Judgment Became Final

Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee Minutes—Internal Deliberations Leading to the Fourth Recommendation for Resignation

2025（Reiwa 7）

Written Request Submitted to Sukagawa City Seeking an Investigation and Corrective Measures for Human Rights Violations

Petition Submitted to the Sukagawa City Council Seeking an Independent Review and Corrective Measures Concerning the Resignation Recommendation Resolutions

Sukagawa City Council Internal Document—Report on the Caucus Representatives’ Meeting Concerning the Petition Seeking Correction of Human Rights Violations

Sukagawa City Internal Documents: Legal Consultation Conducted After a Request for Corrective Measures Concerning Human Rights Violations

Sukagawa City Council Internal Documents: Legal Consultation Conducted After a Petition Seeking Corrective Measures for Human Rights Violations

Document Issued by Sukagawa City—Final Response to the Request for Correction of Human Rights Violations

2026（Reiwa 8）

Document Addressed to Sukagawa City and the Sukagawa City Council—Written Questions and Request Seeking Correction of the Resignation Recommendation Resolutions and Effective Remedies

Document Issued by Sukagawa City—Response Stating That the Matter Had Been Entrusted to Legal Counsel Because It Related to Pending Litigation

Document Issued by the Sukagawa City Council—Response Stating That the Council Was Not an Institution That Provides Legal Interpretations and That the Matter Had Been Entrusted to Legal Counsel

Document Addressed to Sukagawa City—Application for Relief from Human Rights Violations and Request for Clarification of the Legal Grounds and Corrective Measures

Document Addressed to the Sukagawa City Council—Application for Relief from Human Rights Violations and Request for Clarification of the Legal Grounds and Corrective Measures

Document Addressed to the Sukagawa City Council—Petition Requesting Investigation, Re-examination, Correction, and Measures to Prevent Recurrence Regarding Unlawful Human Rights Violations Caused by the Series of Resignation Recommendation Resolutions

Document Issued by Sukagawa City—Response Stating That the Legal Affairs Bureau Was the Point of Contact for the Application for Relief from Human Rights Violations and Maintaining Its Previous Response to the Request for Legal Grounds and Corrective Measures

Document Issued by the Sukagawa City Council—Response Stating That Its Position Remained as Set Out in the April 23 Response to the Application for Relief from Human Rights Violations

Related normative articles:

Normative Framework—The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism: Principles That Bind Public Authority to the Constitution and Law

Normative Framework—Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Principle of Presumption of Innocence

Normative Framework—Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Right to an Effective Remedy

Normative Framework—General Comment No. 31, Paragraph 15: The Duty to Investigate and the Problem of Failure to Provide a Remedy Itself

Normative Framework—General Comment No. 32, Paragraph 30: Prohibition on Public Authorities Prejudging the Outcome of a Trial Before Judgment

Normative Framework—Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Domestic Law and Treaty Obligations

Related timeline entries:

October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.

October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.

October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation

October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation

November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.

November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation

December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation

January 16, 2012,
Conviction

January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding

February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation

February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation

February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation

March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation

Japanese version:

統合検証―逮捕から第2回辞職勧告決議まで