Updated on July 18, 2026
Overview of the Document
Document title:
Indictment, 2011 Ken No. 300814
Date of creation:
November 9, 2011
Issuing body:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office
Addressee:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court
Case title:
Road Traffic Act Violation Case
Defendant’s occupation:
City council member
Defendant’s custody status:
Detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility
Type of document:
Indictment
Publication format:
PDF with personal information and other necessary portions redacted
Original PDF:
Skip to PDF contentFacts Confirmed by This Document
This document is an indictment submitted by the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office to the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court on November 9, 2011.
The case number is 2011 Ken No. 300814.
The indictment states the defendant’s occupation as city council member.
It also states the defendant’s custody status as detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.
In the charged facts, the defendant is alleged to have driven an ordinary passenger vehicle on a road in Sukagawa City, Fukushima Prefecture, at around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011, while under the influence of alcohol and in a condition in which there was a risk that he would be unable to drive normally due to the effect of alcohol.
The charged offense and applicable penal provisions are stated as a violation of the Road Traffic Act, Article 117-2, Item 1, and Article 65, Paragraph 1 of that Act.
At the end of this document, there is a statement dated November 9, 2011, indicating that it is a certified copy prepared by a public prosecutor’s office clerk of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office.
Accordingly, this document confirms that, at the time of indictment on November 9, 2011, the time of the accident or driving was stated in the charged facts as around 7:40 p.m.
Important Statements
The indictment alleges that Toshio Tsumuraya drove an ordinary passenger vehicle while intoxicated at approximately 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011.
However, on the day of the arrest and in the police-recorded statements, the alleged time of the accident had been stated as approximately 7:50 p.m.
The police-recorded statement dated October 20, 2011 records that the time and location of the accident were not identified by Toshio Tsumuraya from his own memory, but were learned from a police officer.
Accordingly, the original time of approximately 7:50 p.m. was likewise not a time that he recalled and stated from his own memory.
A prosecutor-recorded statement was subsequently prepared on November 2, 2011.
At the beginning of that statement, the alleged time remained approximately 7:50 p.m., as in the earlier records.
In a later part of the same statement, however, the calls made to a driving service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., an incoming call from the same service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and estimated travel times between the relevant locations were combined.
On that basis, it was reasoned that, if Toshio Tsumuraya had left the city hall parking lot shortly after 7:20 p.m., passed the alternating one-way traffic point approximately ten minutes later, and arrived at the accident scene after a further ten minutes, the collision with the guardrail would have occurred at approximately 7:40 p.m.
There is no record that Toshio Tsumuraya recovered his memory of the time of the accident.
The time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was developed by calculating backwards from investigative information presented to him after the arrest and from estimated travel times between the relevant locations.
Seven days later, on November 9, 2011, the present indictment adopted that time of approximately 7:40 p.m. as part of the facts charged.
Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. stated in the indictment was not obtained directly from Toshio Tsumuraya’s experiential memory.
It was developed by combining investigative information collected or organised after the arrest, third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling, and estimated travel times, and was then incorporated into the facts charged through the prosecutor-recorded statement.
Furthermore, before the indictment was prepared, the Sukagawa City Council had unanimously adopted the first recommendation for resignation on October 26, 2011, while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in detention before indictment and while the investigation and questioning were continuing.
At that time, the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m., later adopted in the indictment, had not yet appeared in his statements.
Accordingly, while the specific facts to be charged were still being developed, a local council acting as a public authority made a formal public demand for his resignation, after which detention, questioning, changes in his statements, and the development of the facts charged continued.
The indictment does not explain why the original time of approximately 7:50 p.m. was changed to approximately 7:40 p.m., why the original time was not maintained, or the degree of certainty attaching to the revised time.
Procedural Position in the Criminal Proceedings
An indictment is the document by which a prosecutor institutes a prosecution before a court and identifies the facts charged that will define the subject matter of the criminal trial.
The present indictment was prepared on November 9, 2011, after Toshio Tsumuraya had remained in custody following his arrest and referral to the prosecutor, including an extension of the detention period.
Following his arrest on October 19, 2011, the police-recorded statement dated October 20 stated the alleged time of the accident as approximately 7:50 p.m.
The investigation and questioning continued after he was referred to the prosecutor on October 21.
In the police-recorded statement dated October 22, while Toshio Tsumuraya still did not remember actually beginning to drive or the route travelled, conduct outside his memory was explained through inferences based on his mobile telephone call records, the location of the vehicle, his usual route home, and the route normally used by the driving service he regularly used.
During the on-site inspection conducted on October 24, while he stated that he did not remember where he had begun driving or the route actually travelled, roads described as those that could currently be taken between the city hall parking lot and the accident scene were recorded.
In the statement dated October 25, he was shown the route map prepared during that on-site inspection and was informed by a police officer that the distance was approximately 11.5 kilometres.
On the following day, October 26, 2011, the Sukagawa City Council unanimously adopted the first recommendation for resignation while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in detention before indictment and while questioning and the development of the account of the incident were continuing.
At that stage, the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m., later adopted in the indictment, had not yet appeared in his statements.
Detention and questioning continued after the first recommendation for resignation, and a prosecutor-recorded statement was prepared on November 2, 2011, following an extension of the detention period.
In that statement, the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was developed on the basis of third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m. and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.
Seven days later, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was submitted to the court as part of the facts charged in the present indictment.
Accordingly, the present indictment did not record a time that had been consistently established from the outset of the arrest.
It fixed, as part of the facts charged in the criminal trial, a time developed during detention on the basis of investigative information collected or organised after the arrest and estimated travel times.
This sequence is important in relation to the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee states that the duty to respect the presumption of innocence is not limited to courts, but applies to all public authorities, and prohibits public authorities from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
Accordingly, the Sukagawa City Council, as a local legislative body and public authority, was also required to refrain from making a public assessment premised on guilt or otherwise prejudging the outcome of the criminal proceedings before Toshio Tsumuraya had been found guilty according to law.
The first recommendation for resignation was adopted while he remained in detention before indictment, before the criminal trial had begun, and before the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. adopted in the indictment had even been developed.
The fact that a recommendation for resignation is regarded as having no legally binding effect under domestic law does not resolve this issue.
The issue in this case is not whether the resolution immediately deprived him of his status as a city council member.
The issue is that a public authority made a formal public assessment demanding his resignation while his criminal responsibility had not yet been determined.
Compatibility with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 cannot be determined solely by whether the resolution was legally binding under domestic law.
After the first recommendation for resignation, detention and questioning continued, and during that period a more specific account of the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. and the intention to drive was developed and incorporated into the facts charged in the present indictment.
The currently available materials do not establish that the first recommendation for resignation directly influenced the prosecutor’s questioning or decision to indict.
However, the fact that a pre-indictment public demand for resignation, detention, questioning, changes in the statements, and the development of the facts charged all proceeded during the same pre-indictment period must be examined in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.
In relation to the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, a public assessment of criminal responsibility made before guilt was determined cannot automatically be treated as wholly unrelated to the subsequent prosecution and criminal trial.
A decision granting bail to Toshio Tsumuraya was issued on the same day as the indictment.
On November 24, 2011, he stated at a meeting of all council members that he intended to decide whether to remain in office after the outcome of the criminal trial.
Nevertheless, seven days later, on December 1, the second recommendation for resignation was adopted before the first trial hearing.
The first hearing was held on December 26, and the judgment dated January 16, 2012 adopted the same time of approximately 7:40 p.m. stated in the indictment as part of the facts constituting the offence.
Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m., calculated backwards in the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011, was carried through the facts charged in the indictment and ultimately adopted as a fact in the judgment.
The subsequent indictment and final conviction do not retrospectively legalise the conduct of a public authority that occurred before indictment or judgment.
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR regulates the conduct of public authorities before guilt has been proved according to law, rather than assessing that conduct solely by reference to the eventual result of the criminal proceedings.
Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan also requires faithful observance of treaties concluded by Japan.
Accordingly, the criminal process leading to the present indictment must be examined not only in relation to the powers of the city council or the non-binding character of its resolutions under domestic law, but also in relation to Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30.
Questions Arising from This Document
1. Why was the defendant indicted on the basis of approximately 7:40 p.m. rather than the original time of approximately 7:50 p.m.?
At the time of the arrest and in the police-recorded statements, the alleged time of the accident was approximately 7:50 p.m.
However, this was not a time that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered and stated from his own recollection.
The police-recorded statement dated October 20, 2011 records that he learned the time and location of the accident from a police officer.
Subsequently, in the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011, the time of the accident was organised as approximately 7:40 p.m. by combining calls made to the driving service at 7:09 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., an incoming call from the same service at 7:30 p.m., third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.
There is no record that Toshio Tsumuraya recovered his memory of the time of the accident.
The time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was calculated backwards by using the alleged sighting at approximately 7:30 p.m. as the starting point and adding the estimated travel time to the accident scene.
That revised time was adopted as part of the facts charged in the present indictment.
On what basis had the time of approximately 7:50 p.m. been stated at the time of the arrest and during the police investigation?
If circumstances had emerged that made it impossible to maintain that time, what had been incorrect about it?
Conversely, if approximately 7:50 p.m. had a reasonable evidentiary basis, why did the prosecutor not indict Toshio Tsumuraya on the basis of the original time, but instead change it to approximately 7:40 p.m., a time calculated backwards from estimated travel times during detention?
2. Was the change to approximately 7:40 p.m. made to make the alleged sighting consistent with the facts charged?
The prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011 refers to investigative information that Toshio Tsumuraya’s vehicle had allegedly been seen at the alternating one-way traffic point at approximately 7:30 p.m.
The statement then estimated that it would take approximately ten minutes to travel from that point to the accident scene and developed an account in which the accident occurred at approximately 7:40 p.m.
Accordingly, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. can be viewed as having been constructed in a manner that created temporal consistency between the third-party information concerning the alleged sighting and the facts charged.
However, the indictment does not identify the basis of the alleged sighting time of approximately 7:30 p.m., the witness’s conditions of perception, the accuracy of the stated time, or the basis for the estimated travel time from that point to the accident scene.
Was the time changed to approximately 7:40 p.m. in order to construct an account of the incident consistent with the alleged sighting at approximately 7:30 p.m.?
3. Why could a time developed through inference be stated as part of the facts charged?
Toshio Tsumuraya had no memory of the period from drinking at the restaurant until he was awakened by a police officer at the accident scene.
There is no record that he recovered his memory of the time of the accident.
The time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was calculated backwards by combining mobile telephone call records, third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling, and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.
Nevertheless, the indictment states that he drove at approximately 7:40 p.m. as part of the facts charged, without explaining the inferential nature of that time or the process through which it was developed.
Was it appropriate to submit a time developed through inference during the investigation as part of the facts charged without distinguishing it from a time based on the defendant’s experiential memory or a direct record of the accident time?
4. Did the prosecutor distinguish between the defendant’s own memory and inferences based on investigative information?
The police-recorded statements repeatedly used expressions such as “I think” and “I believe” in relation to the commencement of driving, the purpose of driving, and the route allegedly travelled.
The prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011 likewise contains no record that Toshio Tsumuraya remembered actually beginning to drive or remembered the time of the accident.
However, that statement contains a more definite explanation of his intention and state of mind, stating that he became impatient while waiting for the driving service and decided to drive home himself.
When preparing the present indictment, how did the prosecutor distinguish between matters that Toshio Tsumuraya actually remembered and matters that he inferred from investigative information presented to him after the arrest?
5. How did the prosecutor treat the first recommendation for resignation adopted before indictment?
The first recommendation for resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in detention before indictment and before the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. had been developed as part of the facts charged.
His detention and questioning continued thereafter, the prosecutor-recorded statement was prepared on November 2, 2011, and the indictment was filed on November 9.
The currently available materials do not establish that the first recommendation for resignation directly influenced the prosecutor’s questioning or decision to indict.
However, it is a fact that detention and questioning continued after a local council had formally demanded his resignation before his criminal responsibility had been determined, and that during this period a more specific account of the accident time and his intention to drive was developed.
How did the prosecutor assess the existence of a pre-indictment public demand for resignation by a public authority in relation to the formation of the statements and the decision to indict?
6. How should the first recommendation for resignation be evaluated under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR?
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee states that the duty to respect the presumption of innocence applies to all public authorities and that public authorities must refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
The first recommendation for resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in detention before indictment, before the criminal trial had begun, and before the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. had been developed as part of the facts charged.
Detention and questioning continued thereafter, followed by the preparation of the prosecutor-recorded statement, the development of the facts charged, and the filing of the present indictment.
Did the pre-indictment demand for resignation by a public authority treat his criminal responsibility as already determined and amount to a public statement prejudging the outcome of the trial?
Furthermore, how did the prosecutor take account of the presumption of innocence and the fairness of the criminal process when evaluating statements and developing the facts charged in a situation where such a public statement had already been made?
7. Can a later indictment and conviction cure an earlier violation of the presumption of innocence?
Following the present indictment, a conviction was pronounced on January 16, 2012, and became final on January 31, 2012.
However, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR regulates the conduct of public authorities before guilt has been proved according to law.
Accordingly, the fact that a conviction was subsequently rendered cannot retrospectively legalise a prejudicial public demand for resignation made before indictment.
Is it permissible to rely on the later indictment and conviction as a reason not to examine independently whether the first recommendation for resignation complied with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR?
Would treating the later conviction as curing an earlier violation of the presumption of innocence deprive the right of the very period during which it is intended to operate?
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Legal Standards
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the guarantee of due process. It is necessary to examine the relationship among statements formed in custody, the setting of the charge as around 7:40 p.m., and pre-indictment public assumptions of guilt.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the right to trial by an impartial court. It is necessary to examine how the fairness of the criminal trial was secured under circumstances in which the city council, a public authority, had adopted a resignation recommendation resolution before judgment.
Article 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision concerns the form of the indictment and the statement of the charged facts. In this document, the charged facts state the time as around 7:40 p.m., and the fact that this charge was later adopted in the judgment is important.
Article 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision requires that, when there is no proof of a crime in a criminal case, the court must pronounce a judgment of acquittal. It is necessary to examine whether the charge of around 7:40 p.m. was supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
International Human Rights Treaties — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns the right to a fair trial. It is necessary to examine how the situation in which the city council, a public authority, adopted a resignation recommendation resolution before indictment related to subsequent statement formation, the setting of the charged facts, and the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns the presumption of innocence. Everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. In this case, the fact that the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment is at issue in relation to this provision.
Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns effective remedies. If problems arise in relation to the presumption of innocence or the right to a fair trial, it is necessary to examine whether an effective remedy was provided within the domestic system.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith. It is relevant to Japan’s obligation to faithfully perform the ICCPR, which Japan has ratified.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Even if, under the domestic system, a local assembly’s resignation recommendation resolution is described as a non-binding expression of intent, the question remains whether that can justify failing to examine issues arising under the ICCPR.
The detailed interpretation of each provision, its application to this case, and the interrelationship among these provisions are examined in “Legal Claims and the Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.”
Relationship to This Case
The present indictment is the document by which the prosecutor submitted to the court the facts charged that became the subject matter of the criminal trial.
However, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. stated in the indictment was not the time consistently used from the outset of the arrest.
On the day of the arrest and during the police investigation, the alleged time of the accident was approximately 7:50 p.m.
That time of approximately 7:50 p.m. was likewise not identified by Toshio Tsumuraya from his own memory, but was a matter that he learned from a police officer.
Subsequently, in the prosecutor-recorded statement dated November 2, 2011, prepared during detention, the time of approximately 7:40 p.m. was calculated backwards by combining mobile telephone call records, third-party information that the vehicle had allegedly been seen travelling at approximately 7:30 p.m., and estimated travel times between the relevant locations.
Seven days later, the present indictment adopted that inferentially developed time of approximately 7:40 p.m. as part of the facts charged.
Accordingly, the change in time in this case was not the result of Toshio Tsumuraya recovering his memory of the accident time and voluntarily correcting an earlier statement.
Rather, while he continued to have no memory of the accident time, a new time was developed by combining investigative information collected or organised after the arrest with estimated travel times, and that time was incorporated into the facts charged through the prosecutor-recorded statement.
Before the present indictment was prepared, the Sukagawa City Council had adopted the first recommendation for resignation while Toshio Tsumuraya remained in detention before indictment.
The first recommendation for resignation was adopted before the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. had been developed as part of the facts charged and before the criminal trial had begun.
Detention and questioning continued after the first recommendation for resignation, and during that period a more specific and definite account of the alleged time of approximately 7:40 p.m. and the intention to drive was developed.
The currently available materials do not establish a direct causal connection between the first recommendation for resignation and the decision to indict.
However, it can be confirmed that the public demand for resignation by a public authority, pre-indictment detention, questioning, the presentation of investigative information, changes in the statements, and the development of the facts charged proceeded during the same pre-indictment period.
This temporal relationship should not be treated as no more than a coincidental sequence of events.
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 states that the duty to respect the presumption of innocence and to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial applies to all public authorities, including local legislative bodies.
Accordingly, the first recommendation for resignation and the present indictment cannot be treated as wholly unrelated materials.
The present indictment also confirms that detention, questioning, changes in the statements, and the development of the facts charged proceeded in circumstances where a public authority had already formally demanded resignation before indictment.
In relation to the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, a public assessment of criminal responsibility made before guilt had been determined cannot automatically be separated from the subsequent prosecution and criminal trial.
The time of approximately 7:40 p.m. stated in the indictment was later adopted in the judgment dated January 16, 2012 as part of the facts constituting the offence.
Accordingly, the present indictment is not merely a document showing that a prosecution was instituted.
It is a central document for examining how an accident time not based on Toshio Tsumuraya’s memory was developed through investigative information and inference after the arrest, fixed as the subject matter of the criminal trial, and ultimately carried forward into the facts found in the judgment.
At the same time, it is also a document for examining, in relation to the presumption of innocence and the fairness of the criminal proceedings, how the statements and facts charged were developed in circumstances where a public authority had already demanded his resignation before indictment.
The subsequent indictment and conviction do not remove the need to examine whether the earlier conduct of the public authority complied with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
The presumption of innocence is not evaluated solely by reference to the eventual outcome after conviction. It regulates the conduct of public authorities until guilt has been proved according to law.
Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan also requires faithful observance of the ICCPR, a treaty concluded by Japan.
Accordingly, the present indictment must be examined as a material connecting the formation of the accident time and the facts charged with the pre-indictment public assessment, Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ICCPR, General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, the presumption of innocence, the fairness of the criminal process, and the subsequent conviction.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
2011（Heisei 23）
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya
2012（Heisei 24）
2025（Reiwa 7）
2026（Reiwa 8）
Related timeline entries:
October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.
October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.
October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation
October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation
November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.
November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
January 16, 2012,
Conviction
January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding
February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation
March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation