Overview of the Document
Document name:
Decision Granting Bail
Date of creation:
November 9, 2011
Issuing body:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court
Judge:
Yukie Yasufuku
Case name:
Road Traffic Act Violation Case
Case numbers:
2011 Mu No. 74
2011 Wa No. 177
Defendant:
Toshio Tsumuraya
Amount of bail bond:
1.5 million yen
Type of document:
Decision granting bail
Form of publication:
PDF with personal information redacted to the extent necessary
Original PDF:
Skip to PDF contentFacts Confirmed by This Document
This document is a decision granting bail, issued by the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court on November 9, 2011.
The case number is 2011 Mu No. 74, and the related criminal case number is 2011 Wa No. 177.
The case concerns a Road Traffic Act violation charged against Toshio Tsumuraya.
The document states that on November 9, 2011, the chief defense counsel, Hiroki Ando, filed a request for bail.
The court granted bail after hearing the opinion of the public prosecutor.
The judge who issued the decision granting bail was Yukie Yasufuku.
The amount of bail bond was set at 1.5 million yen.
The document states that, after release, the defendant must faithfully comply with the designated conditions, and that if he violates those conditions, bail may be revoked and the bail bond may be confiscated.
The designated conditions include residence at a specified address, court permission for any change of residence, the obligation to appear when summoned, prohibition of flight or conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence, and court permission for overseas travel or travel lasting three days or longer.
In the chronology of this case, November 9, 2011 was the date of indictment.
Therefore, this document confirms that bail was granted on the day of indictment, and that after release, the defendant remained in the position of a criminal defendant subject to the conditions designated by the court.
Important Statements
The most important point in this document is that the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court issued the decision granting bail on November 9, 2011.
The existence of this bail decision shows that, until that point, the defendant had remained in detention and had not been released from physical custody.
In this case, the defendant was arrested on October 19, 2011, and on October 26, while he was still detained, before indictment, and in his absence, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted.
The defendant was not released immediately thereafter. His physical detention continued until the date of indictment, November 9, 2011.
This document is an important document confirming that fact.
The document also states that on the same day, chief defense counsel Hiroki Ando filed a request for bail, and that the court granted bail after hearing the opinion of the public prosecutor.
The amount of bail bond was set at 1.5 million yen.
In addition, the designated conditions after release included residence at a specified address, court permission for any change of residence, the obligation to appear when summoned, prohibition of flight or conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence, and court permission for overseas travel or travel lasting three days or longer.
Therefore, this document is not merely a document showing that bail was granted.
It is a document confirming that the defendant’s physical detention continued even after the first resignation recommendation resolution, and that a decision granting bail was issued only on the day of indictment.
Position in the Criminal Proceedings
This document confirms the point at which, in the sequence of criminal proceedings consisting of arrest, referral to the public prosecutor, detention, extension of detention, interrogation, and indictment, the defendant reached the stage of being released from physical custody.
In this case, the defendant was arrested on October 19, 2011, and was referred to the public prosecutor on October 21.
Thereafter, the defendant was detained, and on October 26, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, while he was still detained, and in his absence.
At that time, the defendant was physically unable to attend the council and offer an explanation or defense.
Furthermore, his physical detention continued thereafter. On November 2, 2011, he was interrogated by the public prosecutor, a prosecutor’s statement record was prepared, and his statement was changed at that time.
Then, on November 9, 2011, he was indicted, and on the same day, this decision granting bail was issued.
Viewed in this chronology, this document confirms not only that the defendant was detained at the time of the first resignation recommendation resolution, but also that he remained in physical custody until the date of indictment.
Therefore, this document does more than support the fact that the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted in the defendant’s absence.
It confirms that the defendant remained detained, that his detention was extended, that he underwent further interrogation, and that he was not released from physical custody until indictment.
This point is important in examining the formation of statements, the opportunity to be heard, the council’s response, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
Questions Arising From This Document
1 What does it mean that indictment and bail occurred on the same day?
According to this document, Toshio Tsumuraya was indicted on November 9, 2011, and received a decision granting bail on the same day.
This means that his physical detention continued for 22 days, from his arrest on October 19 of the same year until November 9.
This period included detention, extension of detention, interrogation by the public prosecutor, and a change in the content of his statement.
Therefore, not only at the time when the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, but also during the later period of extended detention and at the time of the statement change on November 2, the defendant was still in physical custody.
If bail is understood as release from physical custody, then conversely, until that point, the defendant had continuously been deprived of physical liberty while being exposed to significant events: the resignation recommendation resolution, interrogation, and the change in his statement.
The length of this continued physical detention and the seriousness of the events that occurred during that period must not be evaluated separately from one another.
2 Can it be said that the defendant was able to speak freely at a closed all-member council meeting while under bail conditions and without defense counsel present?
Fifteen days after the decision granting bail, on November 24 of the same year, the Sukagawa City Council held an all-member council meeting and had the defendant attend.
This meeting was held behind closed doors.
Unlike a plenary session, where there are observers and an official public record, there are limits to the ability to verify afterward what the defendant actually said in a closed meeting.
According to the designated conditions shown in this document, the defendant was under an obligation to appear when summoned and was subject to the restriction that he must not “hide or flee, or engage in conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence.” If he violated these conditions, his bail could be revoked and the bail bond could be confiscated.
Under these conditions, without defense counsel present, the defendant was placed alone before numerous council members in a closed setting and asked to speak about the case. Whether this can truly be described as a situation in which he could speak freely is a serious question.
Precisely because the meeting was closed, there were no external eyes or public record to operate as a check, and it cannot be ruled out that factual pressure on the defendant may have been intensified.
A criminal defendant was asked to speak in a closed setting, without anyone present who could provide defense advice, while not knowing how his statements might later be used in criminal proceedings or political proceedings. This itself should be examined from the standpoint of procedural fairness.
In particular, it is important that statements made at this closed meeting were later incorporated into the reasons for the second resignation recommendation resolution at a public plenary session in the form that the defendant had “admitted drunk driving.”
If statements made in a closed setting by a criminal defendant under bail conditions, without defense counsel present, were used as reasons for a resignation recommendation resolution at a public plenary session without sufficient opportunity for the defendant to confirm or correct them, the issue is not merely one of giving an explanation to the council.
The issue is whether the city council used statements obtained from a criminal defendant under bail conditions as the basis for a public presumption of guilt before judgment.
This point must be examined in relation to the right of defense in criminal proceedings, the voluntariness of statements, the presumption of innocence, and the political procedures of a local council.
3 How does the defendant’s status while on bail affect the characterization of the resignation recommendation resolution?
The second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on December 1 of the same year.
At that time, the defendant was a criminal defendant on bail, and even the first trial date, December 26 of the same year, had not yet been held.
Bail is not a finding of guilt, and the presumption of innocence necessarily remains in force until a judgment becomes final.
Nevertheless, if the Sukagawa City Council demanded resignation on the premise that the defendant had “admitted drunk driving,” this cannot be understood merely as a general instance of treating a person as guilty before judgment.
It must be understood as a structure in which the deliberative organ of a local public entity, in parallel with judicial proceedings, independently fixed a presumption of guilt against a person who was under court-designated conditions as a criminal defendant.
In other words, the defendant was simultaneously subject to two different forms of constraint: the obligation to comply with conditions designated by the court, and resignation pressure from the council.
The question is how this dual procedural pressure should be evaluated in relation to the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, the right of defense, and the voluntariness of statements.
4 Did the council set the timing of the all-member council meeting with awareness that the defendant was under bail conditions?
Only 15 days passed between the bail decision on November 9 and the all-member council meeting on November 24.
During this period, it is possible that the defendant did not have sufficient time to consult with defense counsel and prepare a defense strategy regarding the facts charged.
If the council was aware that the defendant was on bail and was in a position subject to designated conditions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, then the question arises whether the council should have considered, in light of that legal status, whether to summon him at all, when to do so, and whether defense counsel should be permitted to attend.
Whether there is any indication in the meeting records or other materials that such consideration was given must be examined together with other evidence articles.
5 Could the bail condition prohibiting “conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence” have chilled the defendant’s speech in a closed setting?
Designated Condition 3 provides that the defendant must not “hide or flee, or engage in conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence.”
This language is abstract, and what qualifies as “conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence” is not necessarily clear in a precise and unambiguous way.
When a defendant placed under such an indeterminate standard speaks about the course of events or his own understanding at a closed all-member council meeting convened by a public body, a chilling effect may arise from the concern that the content of his statements could be evaluated as a violation of the bail conditions.
Furthermore, because the meeting was closed, the means of later verifying the exact content and context of the statements were limited. For the speaker, there may have been a double instability: he had to speak without knowing how his statements would be recorded or how they would later be quoted.
The possible effect of this chilling pressure on the content of the statements made at the council meeting and on the later plea or acknowledgment in court should also be examined.
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Legal Standards
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision is relevant to the guarantee of due process. It is necessary to examine its relationship to the fact that the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, and that even after the later decision granting bail, the defendant remained a pretrial criminal defendant subject to procedural constraints.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision is relevant to the right to a fair and public trial by an impartial tribunal. It is necessary to examine how the council’s response and social pressure imposed on a defendant who was still awaiting criminal trial after bail should be evaluated from the standpoint of the right to a fair trial.
Article 38 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision is relevant to the right not to be compelled to make statements against oneself and to the exclusion of confessions whose voluntariness is in doubt. The relationship between the council’s response after bail, social pressure, and the defendant’s plea or acknowledgment in court must be examined.
Article 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision allows a detained defendant, defense counsel, and others to request bail. It shows that a bail request is a procedure for releasing a criminal defendant from physical detention.
Article 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision requires that a request for bail be granted unless certain grounds for exception exist. It shows that bail is an important institutional safeguard against physical detention during criminal proceedings.
Article 90 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision allows the court to grant bail ex officio when it considers it appropriate.
Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision requires the court to hear the opinion of the public prosecutor when granting or denying bail. This document also states that the decision was made after hearing the prosecutor’s opinion.
Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision requires the court, when granting bail, to set the amount of bail bond and allows the court to impose residence restrictions and other appropriate conditions. The 1.5 million yen bail bond and the designated conditions in this document correspond to this provision.
Article 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision states that a decision granting bail may not be executed until the bail bond is paid. Bail is therefore not a simple unconditional release, but a system involving a bail bond and designated conditions.
Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision allows bail to be revoked and the bail bond to be confiscated when, among other things, the defendant fails to appear without justifiable reason after being summoned, flees, destroys or conceals evidence, or violates conditions set by the court. This corresponds to the statement in this document that violation of the designated conditions may result in revocation of bail and confiscation of the bail bond.
International Human Rights Treaty: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 9 of the ICCPR:
This provision is relevant to liberty and security of person, and to guarantees concerning arrest and detention. In this case, it is relevant to examining the sequence of physical detention from detention to bail.
Article 14, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR:
This provision is relevant to the right to a fair trial. It is necessary to examine its relationship to the fact that, even after bail, the defendant remained a criminal defendant subject to court-designated conditions and proceeded toward trial under council pressure and social pressure.
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR:
This provision is relevant to the presumption of innocence. Even after bail, and before final judgment, the defendant had the right to be presumed innocent. In this case, it is necessary to examine its relationship to the fact that the second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted after bail but before the first trial date and before judgment.
Article 14, paragraph 3(g) of the ICCPR:
This provision is relevant to the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. It is necessary to examine its relationship to the council’s response after bail, social pressure, and the defendant’s later plea or acknowledgment in court.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This provision states that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith. It is relevant to Japan’s obligation to perform the ICCPR in good faith.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This provision states that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. The question is whether issues concerning the presumption of innocence and the guarantee of a fair trial under the ICCPR can be left unexamined on the grounds of domestic institutional formality, such as the fact that the defendant was on bail or that a resignation recommendation resolution is an expression of intent without binding legal force.
The detailed interpretation of each provision, its application to this case, and the relationship among these provisions are examined in the page on legal arguments and the structure of constitutional and treaty violations.
Relationship to This Case
This document shows that on November 9, 2011, the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court granted bail to Toshio Tsumuraya.
In the chronology of this case, the same date was the date of indictment in the Road Traffic Act violation case.
The importance of this document is not limited to the fact that bail was granted.
More importantly, it confirms that until that same day, the defendant had remained detained and had been held in physical custody.
In this case, on October 26, 2011, while the defendant was still detained, before indictment, and in his absence, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted.
The defendant was not released immediately thereafter. His detention was extended, he was interrogated by the public prosecutor on November 2, he was indicted on November 9, and the decision granting bail was issued on the same day.
Therefore, this document proves that the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted when the defendant had no substantive opportunity to be heard, and that his physical detention continued until the date of indictment.
The continuation of physical detention is also important in relation to the formation of statements.
When examining statements formed under these circumstances and the subsequent response within the criminal proceedings, it must be assumed that the defendant was not in a free state, but was in physical custody.
This document is also important in relation to the presumption of innocence.
As of November 9, 2011, when the decision granting bail was issued, the defendant had merely been indicted, and no criminal judgment had yet been rendered.
The first trial date was December 26 of the same year.
Therefore, even at the time of the bail decision, the defendant was not a person whose guilt had been finally determined. He remained entitled to the protection of Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and the principle of the presumption of innocence.
This point is extremely important in examining both the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions.
After bail, on November 24, 2011, a closed all-member council meeting was held, and on December 1 of the same year, before the first trial date and before judgment, the second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted.
In this respect, this document is also important in examining the second resignation recommendation resolution.
This is because the document confirms that at the time of the all-member council meeting, the defendant was a criminal defendant on bail and was subject to the conditions designated by the court.
The defendant had posted a bail bond of 1.5 million yen and was subject to designated conditions including the obligation to appear when summoned, prohibition of flight or conduct that may be regarded as destruction or concealment of evidence, and travel restrictions.
If a person in that position attended a closed all-member council meeting without defense counsel present, and statements made there were later used as reasons for the second resignation recommendation resolution in the form that he had “admitted drunk driving,” then this cannot be treated merely as a matter of having given the defendant an opportunity to explain himself.
Rather, the issue is whether a local council used statements made by a criminal defendant under bail conditions as a basis for a public presumption of guilt and resignation pressure before judgment.
This structure shows that the issues surrounding the first resignation recommendation resolution, namely that it was adopted before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and in his absence, and the issues surrounding the second resignation recommendation resolution, namely that it was adopted while he was on bail, before the first trial date, and before judgment, must be understood as continuous and connected.
This document is an important document for confirming the relationship among the defendant’s physical detention, his legal status under bail conditions, the formation of statements, the use of statements made before the council, and the presumption of innocence in the chronology from the arrest on October 19, 2011, the first resignation recommendation resolution on October 26, the public prosecutor’s interrogation on November 2, the indictment and decision granting bail on November 9, the closed all-member council meeting on November 24, and the second resignation recommendation resolution on December 1.
Related Evidence Articles
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
2011（Heisei 23）
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya
2012（Heisei 24）
2025（Reiwa 7）
2026（Reiwa 8）
Related normative articles:
Related timeline entries:
October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.
October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.
October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation
October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation
November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.
November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
January 16, 2012,
Conviction
January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding
February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation
March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation