Updated on July 20, 2026
Overview of the Document
Document title:
Minutes of the December 2011 Regular Meeting, December 1, 2011
Date created:
December 1, 2011
Created by:
Sukagawa City Council
Source of acquisition:
Obtained from the Sukagawa City Council website
Type of document:
Minutes of a city council plenary session
Relevant period:
December 1, 2011
Format published:
PDF containing excerpts of the relevant portions from the original minutes
Original PDF:
Skip to PDF contentFacts Confirmed by This Document
This document consists of the minutes of the plenary session of the December 2011 Regular Meeting of the Sukagawa City Council, held on 1 December 2011.
At this plenary session, the second proposed resolution recommending the resignation of Council Member Toshio Tsumuraya was taken up.
This proposed resolution followed the First Recommendation for Resignation adopted on 26 October 2011.
Before the Second Recommendation for Resignation, an All-Councillors Conference was held at the Sukagawa City Council on 24 November 2011.
At that time, Toshio Tsumuraya had been indicted, but the first hearing of his criminal trial had not yet been held.
Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he intended to continue serving as a council member because he would seek to restore public trust through his council activities, his supporters had asked him to remain in office, and he would decide his future course after awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial.
Four days later, on 28 November 2011, the Sukagawa City Council Steering Committee met.
At that meeting, Toshio Tsumuraya’s words and conduct at the All-Councillors Conference were evaluated as showing no attitude of complying with the First Recommendation for Resignation.
It was also stated in substance that Toshio Tsumuraya had himself admitted drink-driving and that another resolution should be adopted in order to make him understand that his continued service as a council member could not be tolerated.
The Council Steering Committee then organised the procedure to be followed at the plenary session on 1 December.
The procedure included requiring Toshio Tsumuraya to leave the chamber under Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act, an explanation of the reasons by the proposer, omission of questions, referral to committee and debate, and a vote.
It was also organised that, if the proposed resolution was adopted, the plenary session would go into recess, Toshio Tsumuraya would be informed in the chair’s room that the resolution had been adopted, and the plenary session would then resume.
Toshio Tsumuraya was present in the chamber at the plenary session on 1 December 2011.
The chair required him to leave the chamber on the basis of Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act.
After Toshio Tsumuraya had left the chamber, Council Member-Submitted Resolution Bill No. 2, recommending his resignation, was placed on the agenda.
The proposer then explained the reasons for the proposal.
The explanation referred to the adoption of the First Recommendation for Resignation on 26 October 2011 and to the explanation given by Toshio Tsumuraya at the All-Councillors Conference on 24 November.
It was stated that, although Toshio Tsumuraya had said that he took the First Recommendation for Resignation seriously, he had not expressed an intention to resign.
It was also explained that he intended to remain a council member because he would seek to restore trust through his council activities, his supporters had asked him to continue serving, and he would decide his future course after awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial.
The proposer characterised this position as “contrary to social justice”.
The proposer further stated:
It is outrageous that he committed drink-driving while holding office, and such a person should not continue as a city council member.
After the explanation of reasons, questions, referral to committee and debate were omitted.
The vote was conducted by standing, and every council member present stood in favour.
The chair declared that all members present had stood in favour and that Council Member-Submitted Resolution Bill No. 2 had been adopted as originally proposed.
The plenary session then went into recess, and Toshio Tsumuraya was informed in the chair’s room that the resolution had been adopted.
Accordingly, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was adopted seven days after Toshio Tsumuraya had stated that he would await the outcome of the criminal trial before deciding his future course, and three days after the Council Steering Committee had organised both the reasons for the renewed resolution and the procedure for processing it.
It was adopted after Toshio Tsumuraya had been required to leave the chamber and after questions, referral to committee and debate had been omitted.
At that time, the first hearing had not yet been held, and no court had made any finding of fact or determination of guilt.
Important Entries
The most important point confirmed by this document is that the Second Recommendation for Resignation was adopted before the first hearing and before any judgment of guilt.
At the All-Councillors Conference on 24 November 2011, Toshio Tsumuraya had stated that he would await the outcome of the criminal trial before deciding his future course.
Four days later, at the Council Steering Committee meeting on 28 November, that explanation was evaluated as showing no attitude of complying with the First Recommendation for Resignation.
The Council Steering Committee also proceeded on the assessment that Toshio Tsumuraya had admitted drink-driving and organised both the grounds for another recommendation for resignation and the procedure to be followed at the plenary session.
The procedure consisted of requiring Toshio Tsumuraya to leave the chamber under Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act, an explanation of the reasons by the proposer, omission of questions, referral to committee and debate, a vote, and notification to Toshio Tsumuraya after adoption.
Three days later, on 1 December, that procedure was followed.
After Toshio Tsumuraya had left the chamber, the proposer explained the reasons, questions, referral to committee and debate were omitted, and the vote was taken.
The explanation of reasons characterised Toshio Tsumuraya’s position of awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial as “contrary to social justice”.
It also stated, before the first hearing, that he had committed drink-driving while holding office and that such a person should not continue as a city council member.
This was not merely a reference to the procedural facts that Toshio Tsumuraya had been arrested or indicted.
It treated the commission of drink-driving as an established fact before the court had examined the evidence or made any determination of guilt.
Every council member present stood in favour of the proposed resolution.
Accordingly, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was an official expression by the Sukagawa City Council which, before the first hearing, negatively evaluated Toshio Tsumuraya’s intention to await the court’s judgment and proceeded on the premise that he had committed the alleged criminal conduct.
Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act concerns whether a council member may participate in proceedings and voting on a matter relating personally to him.
That question is separate from whether the person concerned was shown the allegations and evaluations in advance and given a meaningful opportunity to explain or rebut them.
The minutes do not confirm that Toshio Tsumuraya was given an opportunity to respond to the proposer’s statements before he was required to leave the chamber.
Position in the Criminal Proceedings
Toshio Tsumuraya was indicted on 9 November 2011 for an offence under the Road Traffic Act and was released on bail on the same day.
A summons dated 14 November 2011 set the first hearing for 26 December 2011.
Accordingly, neither the All-Councillors Conference on 24 November nor the Second Recommendation for Resignation on 1 December took place after the criminal trial had begun.
No evidence had yet been examined at trial, and no court had made any finding of fact or determination of guilt.
At the All-Councillors Conference, Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he would await the outcome of the criminal trial before deciding his future course.
That explanation was subsequently evaluated as showing no attitude of complying with the First Recommendation for Resignation and was connected to the Second Recommendation for Resignation adopted seven days later.
The explanation of reasons for the Second Recommendation for Resignation stated, before the first hearing, that Toshio Tsumuraya had committed drink-driving while holding office.
Accordingly, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was an official expression by the Sukagawa City Council which treated the alleged criminal conduct as established before the criminal court had begun examining the case.
The materials currently confirmed do not establish that the resolution directly affected the court’s assessment of the evidence or the judgment.
However, whether the Second Recommendation for Resignation and the reasons given for it were compatible with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 must be examined independently of whether a specific effect on the criminal trial can be proved.
The judgment subsequently listed statement records made by three third parties to judicial police officers and statement records made by two third parties to a public prosecutor.
None of the five third parties was examined as a witness or cross-examined by the defence.
The two persons whose statements were recorded by a public prosecutor were Sukagawa City Council members who had voted in favour of both the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation.
These facts do not, by themselves, establish that any statement was false, that the statement records were legally inadmissible or that the Second Recommendation for Resignation directly affected the criminal trial.
However, the inclusion in the evidential structure of the same criminal case of statement records made by council members who had supported official resolutions seeking Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation before the determination of criminal responsibility requires examination from the perspectives of the right to a fair trial, due process and the right to examine witnesses.
Questions Raised by This Document
1. Does the fact that a recommendation for resignation has no legally binding force negate the issue under the presumption of innocence?
A recommendation for resignation is generally explained as having no immediate legal effect of depriving the targeted council member of his status.
However, this does not mean that it raises no issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
Paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 of the Human Rights Committee states that all public authorities must refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
In Gridin v. Russian Federation, which is referenced in that paragraph, the issue concerned statements made by persons connected with public authorities which treated the accused as guilty, rather than a measure that itself had legally binding force.
Accordingly, in relation to the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR, the issue is not limited to whether an act directly changes the legal status of the person concerned.
The central question is whether a public authority made a statement, expression, resolution or official treatment before judgment which treated the commission of the alleged offence as an established fact or otherwise prejudged the outcome of the trial.
In this case, the First Recommendation for Resignation was adopted on 26 October 2011 while Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention and was unable to attend the plenary session.
That resolution relied on his arrest to attribute political and moral responsibility to him and officially demanded his resignation.
The Second Recommendation for Resignation was adopted on 1 December 2011, before the first hearing and before any judgment of guilt.
Seven days earlier, Toshio Tsumuraya had stated that he would await the outcome of the criminal trial before deciding his future course.
Nevertheless, the explanation of reasons for the Second Recommendation for Resignation characterised that position as “contrary to social justice”.
It further stated that he had committed drink-driving while holding office and that such a person should not continue as a city council member.
This was not merely a reference to the procedural facts that Toshio Tsumuraya had been arrested or indicted.
It treated the commission of the alleged criminal conduct as an established fact before the criminal court had examined the evidence or made any determination of guilt.
If the absence of legally binding force were sufficient to remove such official pre-judgment treatment from the scope of Article 14, paragraph 2, public authorities could evade the presumption of innocence simply by using statements or resolutions that did not directly alter the accused person’s legal status.
That would deprive the prohibition on prejudgment by public authorities in paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 of its practical effect.
Therefore, the explanation that a recommendation for resignation is merely a non-binding political expression of intent does not establish that the Second Recommendation for Resignation was compatible with the presumption of innocence.
The Sukagawa City Council must be able to explain specifically why its official resolution, adopted before the first hearing and based on treating the alleged criminal conduct as an established fact, did not violate Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32.
2. What issues does a council resolution before judgment raise in relation to the location of judicial power and the fairness of the trial?
Article 76, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the whole judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.
Article 76, paragraph 3 further provides that all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by the Constitution and the laws.
In this case, the second recommendation for resignation was adopted after indictment, but before the first hearing and before judgment.
At that point, the examination of evidence in the criminal trial had not yet begun, and no court had made a finding of guilt.
Despite this, a public authority, namely the local council, adopted a second recommendation for resignation after considering the explanation given by Toshio Tsumuraya at the all-council-members conference.
The vote at the plenary session was conducted after Toshio Tsumuraya had left the chamber.
Such an official expression of intent before judgment raises issues in relation to the principle that the determination of criminal responsibility belongs to the judiciary, and that judges must make decisions independently without external influence.
Therefore, the second recommendation for resignation must be examined not only in relation to the presumption of innocence, but also in relation to the location of judicial power and the fairness of the trial.
3. Is waiting for the outcome of the trial before deciding whether to resign contrary to social justice?
This document records that Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he would decide his future course after waiting for the outcome of the criminal trial.
Criminal responsibility is determined through a criminal trial.
A person is presumed innocent until a guilty judgment becomes final and binding.
Therefore, if the presumption of innocence is taken seriously, his position that he would wait for the result of the criminal trial before deciding whether to resign should have been regarded as a response deserving respect.
Nevertheless, in the second recommendation for resignation, this position was evaluated as contrary to social justice and as showing serious disregard for the council’s decision.
How can it be explained, in light of the presumption of innocence, due process, and the location of judicial power, that the council negatively evaluated his position of waiting for a court judgment and used that position as a reason for adopting another recommendation for resignation?
4. Is exclusion from the chamber under Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act a separate issue from giving the person an opportunity to defend himself?
In this document, the chair requested that Toshio Tsumuraya leave the chamber on the basis of Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act.
The fact that a council member may not participate in deliberation and voting on a matter concerning himself personally is a separate issue from whether that person is given an opportunity to explain the facts, respond, and defend himself.
Was it not necessary to secure a sufficient opportunity for explanation and rebuttal before requiring him to leave the chamber, or on some other occasion?
Even if he was present at the plenary session, if the explanation of reasons, omission of questions, omission of debate, and vote were all conducted after he had left the chamber, he could not rebut or supplement the proposer’s explanation at that time.
For a recommendation for resignation that could seriously affect his political status, honor, and social reputation, at what stage and in what manner was his opportunity to defend himself or respond secured?
5. Was it appropriate to treat his explanation at the all-council-members conference as a basis for finding that he had admitted criminal conduct?
In the explanation of reasons, the proposer stated that, at the all-council-members conference held on November 24, 2011, Toshio Tsumuraya had admitted drunk driving.
However, what can be directly confirmed from these minutes is the fact that the proposer described it in that way.
In addition, at the all-council-members conference on November 24, 2011, Toshio Tsumuraya was placed in a markedly unequal situation: he was alone, without a lawyer, facing twenty-six other council members.
He was asked to explain matters related to a criminal case, including matters that could be disadvantageous to him.
Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself.
In relation to a criminal case, refusing to explain, or refraining from speaking until the outcome of the trial, should not in itself be evaluated unfavorably.
Was the situation in which he was placed one in which he could express his will freely and on equal terms?
Was it appropriate to treat an explanation made in such circumstances, which was disadvantageous to him, as a basis for finding that he had admitted criminal conduct?
Was it consistent with the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the guarantee of due process to treat that explanation as a basis for finding that he had admitted criminal conduct and then adopt a second recommendation for resignation before the first hearing?
6. Is it permissible to state, before the first hearing and before judgment, that he committed drunk driving?
In the explanation of reasons, the proposer stated that driving under the influence of alcohol while in office was outrageous.
However, at the time of this resolution, the first hearing had not yet been held.
No guilty judgment had been rendered.
The existence or non-existence of criminal responsibility is a matter to be determined by a court on the basis of evidence.
Is it consistent with the principle of the presumption of innocence for the Sukagawa City Council, a public authority, to make an assessment premised on the view that drunk driving had occurred before the first hearing and before judgment?
Does such an assessment amount to anticipating the judicial judgment of the court?
7. Are respecting the council’s decision and waiting for the outcome of the trial mutually incompatible?
In the explanation of reasons, the proposer evaluated Toshio Tsumuraya’s continued service as a council member as showing serious disregard for the council’s decision.
However, the first recommendation for resignation was not a legally binding judicial judgment.
Does the fact that he recognized the council’s expression of intent, while deciding to wait for the outcome of the criminal trial before determining his future course, immediately mean that he disregarded the council?
Respecting the council’s decision and waiting for the judgment of a court should, in principle, be capable of coexisting.
8. Is it permissible to demand resignation before judgment on the basis of public sentiment?
In the explanation of reasons, the proposer stated that the situation was impermissible even from the standpoint of public sentiment.
However, the presumption of innocence is a principle that must be respected even when public sentiment is strong.
Is it permissible for a public authority, before judgment, to make a condemnatory assessment and demand resignation on the basis of public sentiment?
Can reliance on public sentiment avoid the issue of the prohibition on prejudgment by public authorities under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32?
9. Was it appropriate to omit questions, referral to a committee, and debate?
With respect to the second recommendation for resignation, questions, referral to a committee, and debate were also omitted.
Was there sufficient consideration of the content of Toshio Tsumuraya’s statements, the status of the criminal trial, the presumption of innocence, due process, the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself, and the location of judicial power?
In addition, in the second recommendation for resignation, Toshio Tsumuraya had left the chamber and was not present during the explanation of reasons, omission of questions, omission of debate, and vote.
In light of this, does the omission of questions, referral to a committee, and debate also raise concerns from the perspective of securing his opportunity to respond?
10. Was the approval of all attending council members consistent with each council member’s duty to respect and uphold the Constitution?
The second recommendation for resignation was adopted by the standing approval of all attending council members after Toshio Tsumuraya had left the chamber.
Local council members bear a duty to respect and uphold the Constitution.
Did the attending council members consider the presumption of innocence, due process, the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself, the opportunity for the person concerned to defend himself, the fairness of the trial, and the location of judicial power?
The fact that all attending council members approved the resolution means that the Sukagawa City Council, as an institution at that time, expressed an official intent in the direction of condemning him before judgment.
How should the impact of such a resolution adopted by all attending members be evaluated in relation to his honor, social reputation, political status, and subsequent activities as a council member?
11. Did the Sukagawa City Council later examine this resolution?
This resolution has not been withdrawn.
On April 3, 2025, a petition was submitted requesting examination and correction of the resignation recommendation resolutions.
Did the Sukagawa City Council conduct an objective investigation and examination of the content, procedure, impact, and legal assessment of the second recommendation for resignation?
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Standards
Domestic Law
Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns respect for the individual, personal interests, honor, and social reputation. The issue is the impact that the recommendation for resignation had on Toshio Tsumuraya’s honor, social reputation, political status, and activities as a council member.
Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision states that the people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. The issue is the relationship between the mandate given by residents through election and the fact that the council adopted a resolution demanding the resignation of an elected council member before judgment.
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the guarantee of due process. In this case, the issue is not only whether Toshio Tsumuraya was given a sufficient opportunity to defend himself or respond, but also whether the fact that the city council, a public authority, made an assessment premised on guilt before the criminal judgment itself was consistent with due process and the purpose of the presumption of innocence.
Article 32 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the right of access to the courts. If, before judgment, a public authority makes an assessment premised on guilt, and that assessment spreads through media reporting and social evaluation, the issue is whether the person’s position to receive a fair judicial judgment in the subsequent criminal trial was sufficiently protected.
Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the right of a criminal defendant to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal. The issue is whether a fair trial was guaranteed in circumstances where a public authority’s pre-judgment view of guilt could exert external pressure on the proceedings and judgment.
Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision guarantees an accused person full opportunity to examine all witnesses.
The judgment in this case lists statement records from five third parties, but none of those persons was examined as a witness or cross-examined by the defence.
Two of them were Sukagawa City Council members who had voted in favour of both the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation.
The issue is whether Toshio Tsumuraya had a substantive opportunity to challenge the content and credibility of their statements.
Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision states that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself. The issue is the relationship between the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination and the fact that, while facing a criminal trial, Toshio Tsumuraya was asked to explain matters in a markedly unequal situation, without a lawyer, alone before twenty-six other council members, and that the content of his explanation was later treated as a reason for the recommendation for resignation.
Article 76, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision states that the whole judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law. The issue is whether the city council, which had no authority to make a final determination as to whether Toshio Tsumuraya was guilty in the criminal case, anticipated the court’s judicial judgment by making a definitive assessment before the first hearing, premised on the existence of criminal conduct.
Article 76, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the principle that judges shall exercise their authority independently and be bound only by the Constitution and the laws. If a pre-judgment official assessment spreads through media reporting and social evaluation, it must also be examined in relation to judicial independence and the fairness of the trial.
Article 93, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the fact that members of local public entity assemblies are chosen by direct popular vote. The issue is the relationship between the direct election of local council members by residents and a recommendation for resignation adopted by the council.
Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns Japan’s duty to faithfully observe treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations. The issue is Japan’s obligation to faithfully implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Japan has ratified.
Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the duty of city council members and other public officials to respect and uphold the Constitution. The issue is whether it was consistent with that duty for the city council, as a public authority, to make an assessment premised on guilt before judgment.
Article 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision states that a judgment of not guilty must be rendered when there is no proof of a crime. It is relevant to the principle of the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings.
Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act:
This provision concerns the rule that a member of the assembly of an ordinary local public entity may not participate in proceedings concerning a matter relating personally to himself or certain relatives. The issue is that requiring Toshio Tsumuraya to leave the chamber is separate from guaranteeing him an opportunity to defend himself or respond, and the procedural meaning of that separation must be examined.
Article 135 of the Local Autonomy Act:
This provision concerns the statutory disciplinary procedures for local council members and the relationship between those procedures and the practical disadvantages caused by the recommendation for resignation.
International Human Rights Treaties
Article 14, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision concerns the right to a fair trial. If, before judgment, a public authority makes an assessment premised on guilt, and that assessment spreads through media reporting and social evaluation, the issue is whether the criminal proceedings and trial conducted under that influence sufficiently guaranteed the right to a fair trial.
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. In this case, the issue is that the city council, as a public authority, made an assessment premised on guilt before the first hearing and before judgment.
Article 14, paragraph 3(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision guarantees an accused person the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him.
In this case, the judgment lists statement records from five third parties, none of whom was examined as a witness or cross-examined by the defence.
Article 14, paragraph 3 (g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision concerns the right of a person charged with a criminal offence not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. The issue is the relationship between this right and the fact that Toshio Tsumuraya was asked to provide an explanation at the all-council-members conference, and that the content of that explanation was later treated as a reason for the recommendation for resignation.
Article 2, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision concerns the obligation to ensure an effective remedy for violations of Covenant rights. The issue is the relationship between the response after a request for correction of human rights violations was submitted and the obligation to ensure an effective remedy.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
This provision states that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. It is relevant to Japan’s obligation to faithfully implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Japan has ratified.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
This provision states that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. The issue is whether the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be avoided on the ground that, under domestic law, a recommendation for resignation is a non-binding political expression of intent, that the act was done by a local council, or that the matter was internal to the council.
Paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32:
This paragraph states that all public authorities have a duty to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a criminal trial. In this case, the issue is that the Sukagawa City Council, as a public authority, made a definitive assessment before the first hearing and before judgment, premised on the view that Toshio Tsumuraya had driven under the influence of alcohol while in office.
Paragraph 39 of General Comment No. 32:
This paragraph explains that, as an application of the principle of equality of arms and the right to an effective defence, an accused person and defence counsel must be given an adequate opportunity to examine and challenge witnesses against the accused.
In this case, the issue is whether there was a substantive opportunity to challenge the statements and credibility of the five third parties, including the two council members who had voted in favour of both the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation.
Paragraph 41 of General Comment No. 32:
This paragraph concerns the right not to be compelled to make self-incriminating statements or to confess guilt, and the international standard requiring the absence of direct or indirect physical pressure and undue psychological pressure.
General Comment No. 31:
This general comment concerns effective remedies for violations of Covenant rights, the cessation of continuing violations, and appropriate corrective measures.
The detailed interpretation of each provision, its application to this case, and the relationship among these provisions are examined in the page “Legal Arguments and Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.”
Relationship to This Case
This document concerns the second of the four recommendations for resignation adopted between 2011 and 2012.
The First Recommendation for Resignation was adopted while Toshio Tsumuraya was being held in pre-indictment detention and was unable to attend the plenary session.
At the time of the Second Recommendation for Resignation, Toshio Tsumuraya was present at the plenary session but was required to leave the chamber under Article 117 of the Local Autonomy Act.
After he had left, the proposer explained the reasons, questions, referral to committee and debate were omitted, and the vote was taken.
Before the Second Recommendation for Resignation, an All-Councillors Conference was held on 24 November 2011.
At that meeting, Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he intended to continue his council activities, that his supporters had asked him to remain in office, and that he would await the outcome of the criminal trial before deciding his future course.
At that time, the first hearing had not yet been held.
Toshio Tsumuraya gave his explanation without a lawyer, in a situation in which he was one person facing twenty-six other council members and was being asked about matters connected with a pending criminal case.
Whether an explanation given in such circumstances can be treated in the same manner as an ordinary statement made in a free and equal setting requires careful examination.
Four days later, on 28 November, the Council Steering Committee evaluated Toshio Tsumuraya’s explanation as showing no attitude of complying with the First Recommendation for Resignation.
The Committee also proceeded on the assessment that he had admitted drink-driving and organised the reasons for a renewed resolution, his exclusion from the proceedings, the proposer’s explanation, omission of questions, referral to committee and debate, the vote, and notification after adoption.
Three days later, on 1 December, the Second Recommendation for Resignation was processed in accordance with that procedure.
The explanation of reasons characterised Toshio Tsumuraya’s position of awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial as “contrary to social justice”.
It further stated, before the first hearing, that he had committed drink-driving while holding office and that such a person should not continue as a city council member.
The first issue that must be determined is not whether the Second Recommendation for Resignation can be proved to have affected the criminal trial.
The first issue is whether the Sukagawa City Council, acting as a public authority, was compatible with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 when it officially treated the alleged criminal conduct as an established fact before the first hearing and before judgment.
The presumption of innocence is not protected only where it can be proved that its violation altered the outcome of the criminal trial.
The right itself includes the right not to be treated as guilty by a public authority before guilt has been established according to law.
The evidential structure of the criminal proceedings must then be examined as a separate issue.
The judgment lists statement records made by three third parties to judicial police officers and statement records made by two third parties to a public prosecutor.
None of the five third parties was examined as a witness or cross-examined by the defence.
The two persons whose statements were recorded by a public prosecutor were Sukagawa City Council members who had voted in favour of both the First and Second Recommendations for Resignation.
These facts do not, by themselves, establish that the two council members gave false statements, that the statement records were legally inadmissible or that the Second Recommendation for Resignation directly affected the criminal trial.
Nor does the absence of witness examination and cross-examination, by itself, automatically establish a violation of the right to examine witnesses.
However, statement records made by council members who had supported official resolutions seeking Toshio Tsumuraya’s resignation before the determination of criminal responsibility were included in the evidential structure of the same criminal case.
The memory, perception, process of statement-taking, involvement in the resolutions, position and credibility of those persons were not tested through witness examination and cross-examination in open court.
The formal legal basis on which each statement record was admitted, and whether the defence consented to its admission, must be distinguished from the separate question of whether Toshio Tsumuraya had a substantive opportunity to challenge the content and credibility of the adverse statements.
Accordingly, this document is important not only for examining whether the Second Recommendation for Resignation itself was compatible with the presumption of innocence.
It is also important for examining the circumstances in which Toshio Tsumuraya’s explanation was used, the council’s negative evaluation of his intention to await the judgment of the criminal court, the fairness of the subsequent criminal proceedings, due process and the right to examine witnesses.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
2011（Heisei 23）
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya
2012（Heisei 24）
2025（Reiwa 7）
2026（Reiwa 8）
Related normative articles:
Related timeline entries:
October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.
October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.
October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation
October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation
November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.
November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
January 16, 2012,
Conviction
January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding
February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation
March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation