Fukushima District Court, Koriyama Branch Summons for Trial Hearing—First Trial Hearing Scheduled for December 26, 2011

日本語版はこちら
Japanese version

Overview of the Document

Document title:
Case No. 177 of 2011 Wa — Summons for the Trial Hearing in the Road Traffic Act Violation Case

Date of issuance:
November 14, 2011

Issuing authority:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court

Judge:
Shuichi Nezaki

Case number:
Case No. 177 of 2011 Wa

Case title:
Road Traffic Act Violation Case

Addressee:
Defendant Toshio Tsumuraya

Date and time of the trial hearing:
10:00 a.m. on December 26, 2011

Place of the trial hearing:
Courtroom 332, third floor, Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court

Source:
Document retained by the person concerned

Document type:
Summons for a trial hearing

Publication format:
PDF in which personal information and other information have been redacted to the extent necessary

Original PDF:

View Fullscreen

Facts Confirmed by This Document

The case number was Case No. 177 of 2011 Wa.

The case concerned an alleged violation of the Road Traffic Act, with Toshio Tsumuraya as the defendant.

The summons was issued on November 14, 2011, in the name of a judge of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.

The trial hearing was scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on December 26, 2011.

The designated place of the hearing was Courtroom 332 on the third floor of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court.

The defendant was ordered to appear at the designated date, time, and courtroom.

The document states that a warrant to compel the defendant’s appearance could be issued if the defendant failed to appear without a justifiable reason.

The document also instructs the defendant to present the summons when appearing before the court.

Important Statements

The document states as follows:

“You are required to appear in Courtroom 332 on the third floor of this Court, as the trial hearing will be held at 10:00 a.m. on December 26, 2011.”

This statement confirms that the first trial hearing in the criminal case was scheduled for December 26, 2011.

The document also states:

“If you fail to appear without a justifiable reason, a warrant to compel your appearance may be issued.”

This statement shows that the summons was not merely a notice of the hearing date, but an official court document legally requiring the defendant to appear at the trial hearing.

Position within the Criminal Proceedings

This document was issued after the indictment on November 9, 2011, when the court designated the first trial hearing and ordered the defendant to appear.

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the presiding judge determines the date of the trial hearing, and the defendant must be summoned to appear on that date. This document was issued pursuant to that procedure.

This document did not determine that the defendant was guilty. Nor did it prove that the facts alleged in the indictment were true or that the defendant had committed an offence.

What the document establishes is the procedural fact that trial proceedings were to commence in the Road Traffic Act violation case and that the first trial hearing had been scheduled for December 26, 2011.

Accordingly, before December 26, 2011, the trial proceedings in open court had not yet commenced.

Questions Arising from This Document

1　Was it permissible for a public authority to assess criminal responsibility before the first trial hearing?

This document confirms that the first trial hearing in the case was scheduled for December 26, 2011.

However, the Sukagawa City Council had already adopted the First Resignation Recommendation Resolution on October 26, 2011, and subsequently adopted the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution on December 1, 2011.

The First Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted before the indictment, while the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted before the first trial hearing.

This raises the question of the grounds on which a local assembly, as a public authority, assessed facts relating to the defendant’s criminal responsibility before the examination of evidence, questioning of the defendant, and presentation of arguments by the prosecution and the defence had begun in open court.

2　Were the indictment and a finding of guilt clearly distinguished?

An indictment is a procedural act by which a public prosecutor requests a court to adjudicate a criminal charge. It is not a judgment of guilt.

This document also did not find the defendant guilty. It was a procedural document that designated the date of the trial hearing and ordered the defendant to appear in relation to an indicted case.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine whether the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution, adopted before the first trial hearing, clearly distinguished between the fact that the defendant had been indicted and a conclusion that the alleged offence had been proven.

3　Was the defendant’s intention to await the outcome of the criminal trial respected?

At the meeting of all council members held on November 24, 2011, the defendant stated that he intended to decide whether to resign after awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial.

By that time, this document had already established that the first trial hearing would be held on December 26, 2011.

Nevertheless, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution on December 1, 2011, without waiting for the first trial hearing.

It is therefore necessary to examine how the necessity and reasonableness of adopting another resignation recommendation resolution before the commencement of the public trial proceedings were considered, despite the defendant’s stated intention to await the result of the trial.

4　Why was the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution adopted even though the first trial hearing had already been scheduled?

This document shows that, as of November 14, 2011, the first trial hearing had been scheduled for December 26 of that year.

There were 25 days between the adoption of the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution on December 1, 2011, and the first trial hearing.

The Sukagawa City Council therefore adopted another resignation recommendation resolution without waiting the remaining 25 days for the court’s first substantive hearing to begin.

This raises the question of whether there was any specific necessity that made it impossible to wait for the first trial hearing and whether the relationship between that alleged necessity and the presumption of innocence was considered.

Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Legal Standards

Domestic Law

Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan: This provision guarantees due process of law. This document was issued after the indictment, when the court designated the first trial hearing and ordered the defendant to appear. In this case, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the First and Second Resignation Recommendation Resolutions before the trial proceedings began. It is necessary to examine, in relation to the guarantee of due process, how a public authority’s assessment of matters relating to criminal responsibility should be evaluated when that assessment preceded the examination of evidence, the exercise of the defendant’s rights of defence, and the court’s findings of fact.

Article 37, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan: This provision guarantees the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal in all criminal cases. This document shows that the public trial proceedings were scheduled to begin on December 26, 2011. The Sukagawa City Council, however, adopted the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution on December 1, 2011, 25 days before that hearing. It is necessary to consider the significance, from the perspective of the right to a fair trial, of the public assessment and social pressure created by the council before the trial proceedings began in open court.

Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan: This provision requires Japan faithfully to observe the treaties it has concluded and established rules of international law. In this case, the issue is how the standards concerning a fair trial and the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 should have been implemented in the conduct of domestic public authorities, including the court and the local assembly.

Article 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision allows the court to summon the defendant while providing the period of notice prescribed by the Rules of Court. This document was issued on November 14, 2011, and designated December 26, 2011, as the date of the trial hearing. The provision shows that a summons serves not only to require the defendant’s appearance but also to provide time to prepare for the trial.

Article 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision permits the court to compel the defendant’s appearance where the defendant has no fixed residence, fails to comply with a summons without a justifiable reason, or is likely not to comply with a summons. The statement in this document that “a warrant to compel your appearance may be issued if you fail to appear without a justifiable reason” corresponds to this provision. It shows that the summons was not merely a notice of the hearing date, but a legal document that could lead to a coercive measure involving the defendant’s physical liberty.

Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision requires the issuance of a summons, warrant to compel appearance, or detention warrant when summoning, compelling the appearance of, or detaining a defendant. This document was an official court document issued for the purpose of summoning the defendant pursuant to that provision.

Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision requires a summons to state the defendant’s name and residence, the alleged offence, the date, time, and place at which the defendant must appear, and the possibility that a warrant to compel appearance may be issued if the defendant fails to appear without a justifiable reason. It also requires the presiding judge or commissioned judge to sign and affix a seal. This document contains the defendant’s name and residence, identifies the matter as a Road Traffic Act violation case, specifies the hearing date and courtroom, provides notice concerning compulsory appearance, and bears the judge’s name and seal. It therefore corresponds to the formal requirements applicable to a summons at the time the document was issued.

Article 65 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision requires a summons to be served. A summons does not legally require the defendant to appear merely because the court has prepared the document; it must be served on the defendant. This document confirms the date of issuance and the date of the trial hearing, but it does not by itself establish the actual date of service.

Article 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision requires the presiding judge to designate the date of the trial hearing, summon the defendant, and notify the public prosecutor, defence counsel, and assistant of that date. This document directly establishes that Judge Shuichi Nezaki designated the hearing for 10:00 a.m. on December 26, 2011, and required the defendant to appear.

Article 275 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: This provision requires the period prescribed by the Rules of Court to be provided between service of the summons on the defendant and the first trial hearing. This period is intended to ensure that the defendant has time to examine the charge, consult defence counsel, and prepare a defence. This document confirms the date of the first trial hearing, but does not state the actual date of service. The records relating to service would therefore need to be examined to determine the precise period of notice.

International Human Rights Treaty — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights（ICCPR）

Article 14, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: This provision guarantees a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law in the determination of a criminal charge. This document shows that the first public hearing in the criminal case was scheduled for December 26, 2011. The First and Second Resignation Recommendation Resolutions were adopted before that hearing began. It is therefore necessary to examine the relationship between the right to a fair trial and the public assessment and social pressure created before the commencement of the trial proceedings.

Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: This provision guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. When this document was issued, the defendant had been indicted, but had not been found guilty. Furthermore, the first trial hearing had not yet begun when the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted on December 1, 2011. The issue is whether public authorities clearly distinguished between the existence of an indictment and proof of guilt.

Article 14, paragraph 3（b）of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: This provision guarantees everyone charged with a criminal offence adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence and the right to communicate with counsel of their own choosing. The designation of the hearing date and service of a summons also determine the period during which the defendant may prepare a defence. In this case, it is necessary to examine how the adoption of the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution and the council’s other actions during that preparation period affected the defendant’s defence environment.

Article 14, paragraph 3（d）of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: This provision guarantees the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to be tried in their presence and to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own choosing. This document notified the defendant of the date and place of the hearing at which that right could be exercised. The Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted before the defendant had been given the opportunity to appear and present a defence in open court.

Paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32 of the Human Rights Committee: The presumption of innocence places the burden of proof on the prosecution, prohibits any presumption of guilt until the charge has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and requires all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial. In this case, the First Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted before the indictment, and the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted before the first trial hearing. This document is important for examining compliance with this standard because it shows that the trial proceedings had not even begun when the Second Resolution was adopted.

Standards Concerning the Performance and Interpretation of Treaties

Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties（VCLT）: This provision requires every treaty in force to be performed in good faith by the parties to it. The guarantees of a fair trial and the presumption of innocence under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are not merely abstract principles. They must be implemented in good faith through the specific conduct of public authorities, including courts and local assemblies.

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties（VCLT）: This provision prohibits a party from invoking its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. In this case, the issue is whether the absence of legal binding force of a resignation recommendation resolution under domestic law, or the fact that a local assembly is not itself a criminal court, can justify failing to examine the resolution in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the prohibition on prejudgment by public authorities stated in paragraph 30 of General Comment No. 32.

※The detailed interpretation of these provisions, their application to this case, and their relationship with one another are examined in the page titled Legal Claims and the Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.

Relationship to This Case

This document is a court-issued record confirming that the first trial hearing in the criminal case had been scheduled for December 26, 2011.

The First Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011, and the indictment followed on November 9, 2011.

This document was issued five days after the indictment, on November 14, 2011, and designated the first trial hearing for 10:00 a.m. on December 26 of that year.

A meeting of all council members was subsequently held on November 24, 2011, at which Toshio Tsumuraya stated that he intended to decide whether to resign after awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial.

Nevertheless, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution on December 1, 2011, before the first trial hearing.

The First Resignation Recommendation Resolution was therefore adopted before the indictment, while the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution was adopted 25 days before the first trial hearing.

At the time of the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution, the examination of evidence in open court, questioning of the defendant, and presentation of arguments by the prosecution and the defence had not begun.

Judge Shuichi Nezaki, who issued this document, was also the judge who delivered the guilty judgment in the case on January 16, 2012. The judgment described the alleged offence as having occurred at approximately 7:40 p.m. and imposed a sentence of one year’s imprisonment, suspended for three years, together with the court’s sentencing reasons.

This document therefore serves not only to confirm the date of the trial hearing, but also to establish the chronology connecting the indictment, designation of the first trial hearing, adoption of the Second Resignation Recommendation Resolution, commencement of the trial, and delivery of the judgment.

The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.

Record and Verification of the Case

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4

Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5

Evidence Documents

Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality

Contact

October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.

October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.

October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation

October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation

November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.

November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation

December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation

January 16, 2012,
Conviction

January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding

February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation

February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation

February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation

March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation