Overview of the Document
Document title:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Common name:
ICCPR
Abbreviation:
ICCPR
Article concerned:
Article 14, paragraph 2
Original text:
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
Adopting body:
United Nations General Assembly
Year adopted:
1966
Year of entry into force:
1976
Relationship with Japan:
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1979.
Type of document:
International human rights treaty
Source of acquisition:
Confirmed through the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights（OHCHR）and publicly available materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Format published:
Original text , summary, and explanation of its relationship to this case
Original source document:
Skip to PDF contentAbout the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is an international human rights treaty formally titled the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”
The Covenant guarantees civil and political rights, including freedom of thought and expression, liberty of the person, due process, fair trial, and political participation.
The Covenant was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.
Japan ratified the Covenant in 1979.
Accordingly, as of 2011, when this case occurred, Japan was under a treaty obligation to comply with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Facts Confirmed by This Document
This document is the text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights itself.
Article 14 of the Covenant provides for equality before courts and tribunals, the right to a fair trial, minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, and the presumption of innocence.
Article 14, paragraph 2, addressed in this article, is the provision concerning the presumption of innocence.
This paragraph provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
What is important here is that the presumption of innocence is not merely a matter of moral consideration or criminal trial practice. It is expressly guaranteed as a right under an international human rights treaty.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a treaty ratified by Japan.
Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan provides that treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.
Accordingly, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is a treaty-based human rights guarantee that must be faithfully observed within Japan in relation to Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan.
This provision applies to persons “charged with a criminal offence.”
Therefore, throughout the process of arrest, detention, referral to prosecutors, indictment, trial, and judgment, until criminal responsibility is proved according to law, the person concerned is presumed innocent.
This presumption of innocence does not lose its significance in examining the treatment by public authorities before judgment, even if a guilty judgment later becomes final.
This is because Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant governs treatment before a guilty judgment becomes final.
Accordingly, in this case, apart from the fact that a guilty judgment later became final, the issue is what kind of public expression of intent the Sukagawa City Council made before judgment.
Specifically, the first recommendation for resignation, adopted before indictment while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session, and the second recommendation for resignation, adopted after indictment but before the first hearing and before judgment, after the person concerned had left the chamber, must be examined in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Important Entries
What is particularly important in this document is that Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly guarantees the presumption of innocence.
This paragraph recognizes that every person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
This provision does not merely set out an attitude that judges should adopt when writing judgments.
It provides the basis for the principle that, until criminal responsibility is proved according to law, State organs and public authorities must not treat the person as if he or she were guilty.
This point is explained specifically by General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Committee.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 explains the presumption of innocence by stating that the burden of proving criminal responsibility lies with the prosecution, that guilt must not be presumed until proved beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused must receive the benefit of the doubt, and that persons charged with criminal acts must be treated in accordance with this principle.
The paragraph further states that all public authorities must refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
Accordingly, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, when read together with General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30, is understood as a norm that concerns not only courts, but public authorities as a whole.
The public authorities referred to here should be examined as including not only national organs, but also local public entities and local assemblies.
A local assembly is the deliberative organ of a local public entity, composed of members elected by residents, and is positioned as a public deliberative organ under Article 89, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Local Autonomy Act.
Therefore, if a local assembly makes a public expression of intent before judgment that assumes criminal responsibility, this raises an issue in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant also governs treatment before judgment, separately from whether the person later receives a guilty judgment.
The presumption of innocence does not disappear retroactively after a guilty judgment becomes final.
Accordingly, even if a guilty judgment later becomes final, the fact that a public authority treated the person as if he or she were guilty before judgment is not thereby justified in relation to the presumption of innocence.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
The second recommendation for resignation was adopted after indictment, but before the first hearing and before judgment, after the person concerned had left the chamber.
If these resolutions were public expressions of intent premised on guilt before judgment, they raise serious issues in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Furthermore, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant cannot be easily avoided by explanations based on domestic law.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties（VCLT）provides that treaties must be performed in good faith.
Article 27 of the same Convention provides that a party may not invoke its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
Accordingly, the fact that a recommendation for resignation has no legal binding force, that it is an internal decision of a local assembly, or that there is no automatic remedy under the domestic system does not mean that issues under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant need not be examined.
Questions Raised by This Document
1. Is Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant merely an ideal, or is it a treaty-based right?
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
This is not merely an ideal or a matter of moral consideration.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is an international human rights treaty ratified by Japan.
Accordingly, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is a treaty-based human rights guarantee that Japan must faithfully observe.
As of 2011, Japan had already ratified the Covenant.
Therefore, at the time the first and second recommendations for resignation were adopted, the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant was already a norm that had to be respected in Japan.
2. Is the presumption of innocence a principle that concerns only courts?
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant provides for the presumption of innocence.
The provision itself states that every person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 explains this presumption of innocence by stating that all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
Accordingly, the presumption of innocence is not a principle that concerns judges alone.
Administrative organs, legislative organs, local public entities, local assemblies, and other bodies in public positions must not treat a person as if guilt were assumed before judgment.
In this case, the Sukagawa City Council adopted recommendations for resignation before judgment.
A local assembly is not a private organization. It is the deliberative organ of a local public entity.
Accordingly, the recommendations for resignation by the Sukagawa City Council must also be examined in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
3. If a guilty judgment later becomes final, is the treatment before judgment justified?
In this case, a guilty judgment later became final.
However, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant concerns treatment until guilt is proved according to law.
The presumption of innocence is a principle that requires the person not to be treated as if guilty before a guilty judgment becomes final.
Therefore, even if a guilty judgment later becomes final, the treatment by public authorities at an earlier stage is not automatically justified.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
The second recommendation for resignation was adopted before the first hearing and before judgment.
These resolutions must be examined separately from the fact that a guilty judgment later became final, in order to determine whether they constituted public assumptions of guilt before judgment.
4. Does the lack of legal binding force of a recommendation for resignation negate the issue under the presumption of innocence?
A recommendation for resignation is generally explained as not having the legal effect of immediately depriving the council member concerned of his or her status.
However, in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, the issue is not limited to whether the act has legal binding force.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 states that all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
In Gridin v. Russian Federation, referred to in that paragraph, the issue was not a legally binding disposition, but statements by persons connected with public authorities in relation to the presumption of innocence.
Accordingly, the formal fact that a recommendation for resignation has no legal binding force does not by itself negate the issue under the presumption of innocence.
The core issue is whether a public authority made statements, expressions, resolutions, or engaged in treatment before judgment that prejudged the outcome of the trial.
In this case, the Sukagawa City Council adopted recommendations for resignation before judgment.
Therefore, even if the recommendations for resignation were non-binding political expressions of intent, if their content constituted a public expression of intent premised on guilt before judgment, they raise issues in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
5. If a person is in custody, may that person be treated as close to guilty?
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
This principle is not lost even if the person is in custody.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30 states that the length of pre-trial detention should never be taken as an indication of guilt or of its degree.
It also states that the denial of bail does not affect the presumption of innocence.
This shows that detention, denial of bail, or being held in custody does not justify treating the person as if guilty.
In this case, the first recommendation for resignation was adopted while the person concerned was in detention.
Accordingly, the fact that the person was in custody should instead be regarded as a circumstance in which opportunities for defense and explanation were restricted, and cannot justify treatment close to guilt.
6. Does Japan’s non-ratification of the First Optional Protocol mean that Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant need not be observed?
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights itself in 1979.
On the other hand, Japan has not ratified the First Optional Protocol, which provides for the individual communications procedure.
However, the fact that Japan has not ratified the First Optional Protocol means only that individuals cannot use the procedure to submit communications to the Human Rights Committee.
It does not mean that Japan has no obligation to comply with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
Because Japan has ratified the Covenant itself, Japan has a treaty obligation to faithfully observe the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2.
Accordingly, the question whether an individual communications procedure is available must be distinguished from the question whether Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant should have been observed in this case.
7. Can issues under the Covenant be avoided merely by explanations based on the domestic system?
In this case, possible explanations may include that a recommendation for resignation has no legal binding force, that it is a political expression of intent by a local assembly, or that there is no automatic duty to process the matter under the petition system.
However, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is a norm under an international human rights treaty ratified by Japan.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
Accordingly, explanations based solely on the domestic system do not eliminate the need to examine the relationship with Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
In this case, even if the recommendations for resignation had no legal binding force under domestic law, the fact that a public authority made public expressions of intent premised on guilt before judgment raises an issue in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Standards
International Human Rights Treaties
Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision states that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. It is the central norm of this article.
Article 14, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision establishes the right to a fair trial. The issue is how public assumptions of guilt before judgment relate to the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 14, paragraph 3（g）of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision establishes the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. It is important in examining how the person’s explanation at the all-council-members conference was treated in relation to the second recommendation for resignation.
Article 2, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
This provision establishes the right to an effective remedy for violations of rights under the Covenant. Where violation of the presumption of innocence is at issue, the question is what remedy should be provided domestically.
General Comments
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 30:
This paragraph states that, concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proving criminal responsibility lies with the prosecution, guilt must not be presumed until proved, and all public authorities should refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.
General Comment No. 32, paragraph 41:
This paragraph concerns the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. It is important in relation to the issue of how the person’s explanation at the all-council-members conference was treated as a basis for the second recommendation for resignation.
General Comment No. 31:
This General Comment addresses the obligation to provide remedies for violations of rights under the Covenant. It becomes relevant where review and correction are sought concerning past public assumptions of guilt.
Related Cases
Gridin v. Russian Federation:
This is a case in which pre-judgment statements by officials connected with public authorities, treating the applicant as guilty, were examined in relation to the presumption of innocence. It shows that even statements by public authority officials, rather than legally binding dispositions, may raise issues in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
Cagas, Butin and Astillero v. Philippines:
This is an important reference case for understanding the relationship between denial of bail and the presumption of innocence. It shows that denial of bail or detention at the pre-trial stage does not permit treating the person as if guilty.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
This provision states that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. It is important in relation to the duty to faithfully implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
This provision states that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. The issue is whether the absence of legal binding force of a recommendation for resignation, or the fact that the matter concerns the internal handling of a local assembly, can justify leaving issues under the Covenant unexamined.
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns due process. It is important in relation to the fact that the first recommendation for resignation was adopted before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the right to a fair trial by an impartial court. It is necessary to examine how public assumptions of guilt before judgment relate to the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 76, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the vesting of judicial power. The determination of criminal responsibility is, in principle, a matter for the courts.
Article 76, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the independence of judges. It is necessary to examine how public assumptions of guilt before judgment relate to the fairness and independence of the trial.
Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision requires that treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations be faithfully observed. It is important in relation to the domestic significance of the Covenant and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision establishes the duty of public officials to respect and uphold the Constitution. The issue is how local council members and organs of local public entities should respect constitutional and treaty-based human rights guarantees.
Article 89, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Local Autonomy Act:
These provisions position a local assembly as a deliberative organ composed of members elected by residents, and provide for the powers of the assembly and the faithful performance of duties by council members. They are important in examining whether a local assembly should respect the presumption of innocence as a public authority.
Relationship to This Case
The issue in this case is not only whether a guilty judgment later became final.
Nor is it only whether the recommendations for resignation had legal binding force.
What is important in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
In this case, the person concerned was arrested on October 19, 2011 and was subsequently detained.
The first recommendation for resignation was adopted on October 26, 2011.
At that time, the person concerned had not yet been indicted, was in detention, and was absent from the plenary session.
Nevertheless, the Sukagawa City Council adopted a recommendation for resignation on the basis of arrest for alleged drunk driving.
The minutes and related materials concerning the first recommendation for resignation are addressed in a separate article.
There, it is confirmed that, before indictment, while the person concerned was in detention and absent from the plenary session, the Sukagawa City Council adopted a recommendation for resignation, and that the resolution was not merely a procedural record, but a public expression of intent seeking resignation from council membership on the premise of arrest for alleged drunk driving.
Accordingly, the first recommendation for resignation raises a serious issue as a pre-judgment public assumption of guilt in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
The second recommendation for resignation was adopted on December 1, 2011.
At that time, the person concerned had already been indicted, but the first hearing had not yet been held and no judgment had been rendered.
The second recommendation for resignation is also addressed in a separate article through the minutes and related materials.
There, it is confirmed that, before judgment, the Sukagawa City Council again adopted a recommendation for resignation, and that this resolution was made as a public expression of intent seeking resignation from council membership, while taking into account the person’s explanation and exchanges at the all-council-members conference.
Accordingly, the second recommendation for resignation also raises an issue in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, as a public expression of intent premised on guilt before judgment.
What is important here is that the fact that a guilty judgment later became final does not automatically justify public assumptions of guilt made before judgment.
The presumption of innocence is a principle that governs the treatment by public authorities before a guilty judgment becomes final.
Therefore, even if a guilty judgment later became final, the fact that a public authority made a public expression of intent premised on guilt before judgment remains an issue in relation to Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.
Whether the recommendations for resignation actually influenced the conclusion of the criminal trial is a separate issue to be examined.
However, the existence or absence of such influence is a different issue from whether the right to be presumed innocent before judgment was respected.
In this case, internal council materials from 2025 record an opinion to the effect that the recommendations “did not seem to affect the finalization of the sentence.”
However, from the standpoint of Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, the problem is not limited to whether the recommendations actually affected the finalization of the sentence.
The very fact that a local assembly, as a public authority, made expressions of intent before judgment that were premised on guilt is itself an issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
Furthermore, the responses of the Sukagawa City Council and Sukagawa City after 2025, when review and correction of these issues were requested, are also at issue.
If, despite the issue concerning the presumption of innocence being raised, no substantive review or correction was carried out, this also raises issues in relation to the effective remedy required by Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Covenant and General Comment No. 31.
Accordingly, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is not only the central norm for examining the first and second recommendations for resignation in this case. It is also a starting-point norm for examining the later requests for correction, petitions, legal consultations, and the responses of the City and the Council.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya
Related normative articles:
Related timeline entries:
October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.
October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.
October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation
October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation
November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.
November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
January 16, 2012,
Conviction
January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding
February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation
March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation