Overview of the Document
Document title:
Judgment in 2011 Wa No. 177, Road Traffic Act Violation Case
Date of pronouncement:
January 16, 2012
Date judgment became final:
January 31, 2012
Issuing body:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court
Judge:
Shuichi Nezaki
Case title:
Road Traffic Act Violation Case
Defendant’s occupation:
City council member
Type of document:
Criminal judgment
Publication format:
PDF with personal information and other necessary portions redacted
Original PDF:
Skip to PDF contentFacts Confirmed by This Document
This document is the judgment issued by the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court on January 16, 2012, in a Road Traffic Act violation case.
→For details on the indictment, see “Indictment by the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office — Facts Charged as Occurring at Around 7:40 p.m.”
The upper right portion of the judgment states that the judgment became final on January 31, 2012.
The case number is 2011 Wa No. 177.
The defendant’s occupation is stated as city council member.
In the main text of the judgment, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for one year.
The judgment also states that the execution of that sentence would be suspended for three years from the date on which the judgment became final.
Accordingly, this judgment is a guilty judgment imposing a sentence of one year’s imprisonment with a three-year suspended sentence.
In the facts constituting the offense, the court found that the defendant, while under the influence of alcohol and in a condition in which there was a risk that he would be unable to drive normally due to the effect of alcohol, drove an ordinary passenger vehicle on a road in Sukagawa City, Fukushima Prefecture, at around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011.
In this respect, the judgment adopts the time of around 7:40 p.m. as the time of the accident or driving.
The list of evidence includes the defendant’s statement in open court, the defendant’s statements to the prosecutor and judicial police officers, statements by related persons, investigation reports, the intoxication examination card, and on-site inspection reports.
In the judgment, some names in the statements of related persons are redacted.
A red annotation has been added to the PDF image concerning the redacted portions.
This red annotation is not part of the judgment text itself, but is an explanatory note concerning the position of the document.
In the application of law, the defendant’s conduct was found to fall under Article 117-2, Item 1, and Article 65, Paragraph 1 of the Road Traffic Act, and imprisonment was selected as the applicable punishment.
The judgment then applied Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Penal Code in light of the circumstances, suspending execution of the sentence for three years from the date on which the judgment became final.
In the circumstances specifically considered in sentencing, the judgment found that the defendant drank a considerable amount of alcohol at a restaurant with fellow city council members and, despite recognizing that he was intoxicated, drove himself home and committed the offense.
The judgment stated that the circumstances leading to the offense were extremely careless and left no room for leniency.
The defendant had cited circumstances such as being more intoxicated than usual because he was on a diet and the driving service not arriving. However, the judgment stated that drinking in accordance with one’s own physical condition was the defendant’s own responsibility, and that, regarding the driving service, the defendant had failed to correctly convey the parking location and had begun driving himself without sufficiently communicating with the service. The judgment therefore found that these circumstances could not be considered in the defendant’s favor.
The judgment further stated that the alcohol concentration detected after the offense reached 0.71 milligrams per liter of the defendant’s breath, and that the defendant was found to have been so intoxicated that he was unable to perform driving operations properly, as shown by the fact that he caused an accident by colliding with a guardrail. The judgment therefore found that the manner of the offense was also serious.
In addition, the judgment stated that the defendant, as an incumbent city council member, was in a position requiring a high level of respect for the law as a representative of the citizens, and that committing the intentional offense of drunk driving while in that position deserved strong criticism.
The judgment also stated that the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa could not be disregarded.
On the other hand, the judgment recognized circumstances that should be considered in the defendant’s favor, such as the fact that the defendant frankly admitted the facts in open court, showed an attitude of remorse, promised never to drink alcohol again, and had no prior criminal record.
After comprehensively considering these circumstances, the court determined that the defendant should be sentenced as stated in the main text of the judgment, but that, on this occasion, it was appropriate to suspend execution of the sentence.
The prosecution sought a sentence of one year’s imprisonment.
Important Statements
The particularly important point in this document is that the judgment adopts the time of around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011, as the fact constituting the offense.
In this case, the arrest allegation and police-stage materials treated the time of the accident as around 7:50 p.m.
The on-site inspection report also adopted the time of around 7:50 p.m.
However, in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011, the defendant’s statement was changed to around 7:40 p.m.
Thereafter, the indictment dated November 9 adopted the changed time of around 7:40 p.m., and this judgment also found around 7:40 p.m. to be the time of the fact constituting the offense.
This change in time is important in examining the evidentiary structure of this case.
The difference between around 7:50 p.m. and around 7:40 p.m. changes the premises concerning the call history with the driving service, the travel time to the accident scene, consistency with witness information, the time at which driving began, and the credibility of the changed statement.
Therefore, because this judgment adopted the time of around 7:40 p.m., the reason for that change and the objective basis supporting the changed time are important subjects of examination.
The next important point is that the judgment lists as evidence the defendant’s statement in open court, the defendant’s statements to the prosecutor and judicial police officers, statements by third parties, investigation reports, the intoxication examination card, and on-site inspection reports.
These pieces of evidence formed the basis for the factual findings and sentencing judgment in this case.
However, in the reasons for the judgment, the detailed relationship between each item of evidence and the findings on the identity of the driver, the time of the accident, the driving route, the circumstances of the accident, and the drinking situation is not shown.
In particular, this case raises the issue that the defendant had stated that he did not clearly remember the start of driving, the driving route, or the circumstances of the accident.
If the statements were inferential statements formed on the basis of information and materials presented by the investigating authorities, rather than statements based on the defendant’s direct memory, the question arises as to the extent to which they could be used as the basis for a guilty finding.
The judgment also found, as a circumstance specifically considered in sentencing, that the defendant drank a considerable amount of alcohol at a restaurant with fellow city council members and, despite recognizing that he was intoxicated, drove himself home and committed the offense.
However, the judgment does not specifically state which evidence was used, or how it was used, to find this drinking situation with “fellow city council members.”
The list of evidence includes statements to the prosecutor by third parties, identified as Exhibits Ko 6 and Ko 7.
As noted in the red annotation on the PDF image, the redacted portions contain the names of two Sukagawa City Council members at the time, both of whom are also said to have voted in favor of the resignation recommendation resolution in this case.
This red annotation is not part of the judgment text itself, but it is important supplementary information for examining the evidentiary structure.
If the statements of fellow city council members were listed as evidence in the judgment, and those same fellow city council members were also supporters of the resignation recommendation resolution, then the position of those statements, the evaluation of the evidence, the process leading to the resignation recommendation resolution, and the relationship with the fairness of the criminal trial must be carefully examined.
Another important point is that the judgment clearly evaluated the defendant’s status as a city council member as an unfavorable sentencing factor.
The judgment stated that the defendant, as an incumbent city council member, was in a position requiring a high level of respect for the law as a representative of the citizens, and that committing the intentional offense of drunk driving while in that position deserved strong criticism.
The judgment also stated that the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa could not be disregarded.
In this way, the court treated the defendant’s status as a city council member as an unfavorable sentencing factor.
On the other hand, the reasons for the judgment do not show any examination of the fact that the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions had already been adopted by that same city council before the judgment.
The first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
The second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before the first hearing, before the judgment, and after the defendant had left the council chamber.
Nevertheless, at least on the face of the reasons for the judgment, this judgment did not examine the impact that these pre-judgment expressions of guilt or resignation pressure by a public authority may have had on the fairness of the criminal trial, the presumption of innocence, the formation of statements, or the defendant’s plea in open court.
This point is extremely important in examining this judgment.
This judgment evaluated the fact that the defendant frankly admitted the facts in open court and showed an attitude of remorse as a favorable sentencing circumstance.
However, in this case, there was a sequence of events including the report of denial immediately after arrest, interrogation while in custody, changes in statements, the change to around 7:40 p.m. in the prosecutor’s interview record, and pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions.
Therefore, the question arises whether the defendant’s admission of the facts in open court may properly be evaluated simply as a confession and remorse without examining the process by which that statement was formed.
This document shows what the court found.
At the same time, it also shows what the court did not specifically explain.
Procedural Position in the Criminal Proceedings
This document is the judgment in the criminal trial pronounced on January 16, 2012.
In this case, the defendant was arrested on October 19, 2011, sent to the prosecutor on October 21, and thereafter the criminal proceedings continued through detention and extension of detention.
During these criminal proceedings, on October 26, 2011, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the first resignation recommendation resolution.
The first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
Accordingly, in this case, before the prosecutor’s interview record was prepared, before indictment, before trial, and before judgment, a resignation recommendation resolution by the city council, a public authority, already existed.
Thereafter, on November 2, 2011, the prosecutor interrogated the defendant and prepared a prosecutor’s interview record.
In this case, a significant change occurred in that prosecutor’s interview record concerning the time of the accident or the time of driving.
Specifically, the time that had previously been treated as around 7:50 p.m. was changed to around 7:40 p.m.
On November 9 of the same year, the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office prepared an indictment, which stated as the charged fact that the defendant drove at around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011.
In other words, the change to around 7:40 p.m. that occurred in the prosecutor’s interview record was subsequently submitted to the court as the charged fact in the indictment.
Furthermore, on December 1, 2011, the Sukagawa City Council adopted the second resignation recommendation resolution.
The second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted after indictment but before the first hearing, before judgment, and after the defendant had left the council chamber.
Accordingly, in this case, before the criminal trial proceedings began, the city council, a public authority, had again adopted a resignation recommendation resolution.
Thereafter, the first hearing was held on December 26, 2011, and this judgment was pronounced on January 16, 2012.
Accordingly, this document represents the final judgment in the criminal proceedings after arrest, referral to the prosecutor, detention, extension of detention, prosecutor’s interrogation, indictment, the second resignation recommendation resolution, and the first hearing.
In this judgment, as in the indictment, the time of around 7:40 p.m. was adopted as the fact constituting the offense.
This indicates that the change to around 7:40 p.m. that occurred in the prosecutor’s interview record of November 2, 2011, was carried through the charged fact in the indictment and ultimately adopted as the factual finding in the judgment.
This judgment also evaluated the fact that the defendant frankly admitted the facts in open court and showed an attitude of remorse as a favorable sentencing circumstance.
However, in this case, there was a sequence of events including the report of denial immediately after arrest, interrogation while in custody, changes in statements, the change of time in the prosecutor’s interview record, the first resignation recommendation resolution before indictment, and the second resignation recommendation resolution before the first hearing and before judgment.
For that reason, this judgment is not merely a document showing the existence of a guilty judgment.
It is also a document for examining how statements formed in criminal proceedings involving custody, the charged fact of around 7:40 p.m., pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions, the admission of evidence, and the sentencing judgment were ultimately connected to the judgment.
Relationship Between the Judgment and “Record and Examination of the Case, Part III”
This document does not merely show the existence of a guilty judgment.
It is a central document for confirming what facts the court found in this criminal trial, what evidence it listed, what matters it explained in the reasons for the judgment, and what matters it did not explain.
In “Record and Examination of the Case, Part III” on this site, the statements in this case are examined from the perspective that they may not have been confessions based on the defendant’s experiential memory, but rather statements constructed by inference on the basis of information presented by the investigating authorities while the defendant’s memory was missing.
This issue is not limited to the formation of statements during the investigation stage.
The shift from denial to the formation of inferential statements, the plea in open court, and the reasons for the judgment form one continuous structure.
Therefore, when examining this judgment, it is not sufficient merely to look at the list of evidence cited in the judgment.
What matters is how the judgment handled the process of statement formation, the change in the time of the accident, proof of the identity of the driver, the call history with the driving service, the consistency between breath alcohol concentration and the driving distance, the evidentiary treatment of witness information, and the existence of pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions.
This judgment adopted the time of around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011, as the fact constituting the offense.
However, in this case, the arrest allegation and police-stage materials treated the time of the accident as around 7:50 p.m.
The on-site inspection report also adopted the time of around 7:50 p.m.
Thereafter, in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011, the time was changed to around 7:40 p.m., and both the indictment and this judgment adopted around 7:40 p.m.
This change in time is not merely a difference of ten minutes.
The time of the accident is a reference point for examining the call history with the driving service, the point at which the defendant is said to have begun driving, the travel time of approximately 11.5 kilometers to the accident scene, consistency with witness information, the credibility of the changed statement in the prosecutor’s interview record, and whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt existed.
Therefore, because this judgment adopted around 7:40 p.m., the reason for that change and the objective basis for it should have been important subjects of examination.
This judgment also evaluated the fact that the defendant frankly admitted the facts in open court and showed an attitude of remorse as a favorable sentencing circumstance.
However, this case raises the issue that the defendant had stated that he did not clearly remember the start of driving, the driving route, or the circumstances of the accident, and that his statements were constructed on the basis of the accident circumstances, vehicle position, mobile phone call history, witness information, on-site inspection results, and other information presented by the investigating authorities.
When such a statement formation process exists, the question arises whether admitting the facts in open court can simply be evaluated as a confession or remorse based on experiential memory.
Furthermore, this judgment found that the defendant was so intoxicated that he was unable to perform driving operations properly.
On the other hand, in this case, the defendant is said to have driven approximately 11.5 kilometers from the area of the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot to the accident scene.
Because a high alcohol detection value, a finding that the defendant was too intoxicated to perform driving operations properly, and a finding of approximately 11.5 kilometers of driving coexist, the compatibility of these findings, the road conditions, the required time, and the course of travel require specific examination.
This judgment lists the on-site inspection reports and investigation reports in the list of evidence.
However, in the reasons for the judgment, no detailed explanation is found as to how those pieces of evidence were used to find the identity of the driver, the driving route, the time of the accident, or the circumstances of the accident.
Witness information also appears in this case within the prosecutor’s interview record as information presented to the defendant as an investigation result.
However, at least on the face of this judgment, it cannot be confirmed that the witness personally testified in open court or was subject to cross-examination by defense counsel.
This point is also important in examining the findings concerning the identity of the driver and the time of the accident.
Accordingly, the evidentiary value of this judgment does not lie only in showing the existence of a guilty judgment.
Rather, its evidentiary value lies in allowing examination of how far the court explained, in the reasons for the judgment, the process of statement formation, the change in time, consistency with objective evidence, and pre-judgment public assumptions of guilt, while adopting the time of around 7:40 p.m., evaluating the defendant’s statement in open court as a favorable circumstance, and treating the status of city council member as an unfavorable sentencing factor.
Questions Arising from This Document
1. Why did the judgment adopt the time of around 7:40 p.m.?
In this judgment, the time of around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011, was adopted as the fact constituting the offense.
However, in this case, the arrest allegation and police-stage materials treated the time of the accident or the time of driving as around 7:50 p.m.
The on-site inspection report also adopted the time of around 7:50 p.m.
Thereafter, in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011, the time was changed to around 7:40 p.m., and both the indictment and this judgment adopted around 7:40 p.m.
Does the reasoning of the judgment specifically explain on what evidence, and why, the court adopted around 7:40 p.m.?
The change from around 7:50 p.m. to around 7:40 p.m. is an important matter for examination because it relates to the call history with the driving service, the time driving began, the travel time to the accident scene, consistency with witness information, and the credibility of the changed statement.
2. How did the judgment evaluate statements that may have been formed under memory loss?
In this case, the defendant had stated that he did not clearly remember the start of driving, the driving route, or the circumstances of the accident.
In that situation, there is a possibility that the defendant constructed his statements by inference on the basis of the accident circumstances, vehicle position, mobile phone call history, witness information, on-site inspection results, and other information presented by the investigating authorities.
Such statements differ in nature from confessions based on the defendant’s experiential memory.
Although the judgment lists the defendant’s written statements and statement in open court as evidence and sentencing circumstances, to what extent did it examine the process through which those statements were formed?
3. Was it appropriate to evaluate the confession in open court simply as remorse?
This judgment evaluated the fact that the defendant frankly admitted the facts in open court and showed an attitude of remorse as a favorable sentencing circumstance.
However, as stated in Question 2, this case raises the issue of how the court evaluated statements that may have been formed under memory loss.
There was also a sequence of events in this case, including the report of denial immediately after arrest, interrogation while in custody, changes in statements, the change to around 7:40 p.m. in the prosecutor’s interview record, and pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions.
Under such circumstances, was it appropriate to evaluate the defendant’s admission of the facts in open court simply as a confession or remorse based on experiential memory?
Was it sufficient to treat the statement in open court as a favorable sentencing circumstance without examining the process of statement formation, external pressure, council resolutions, and media coverage?
4. How are the finding of approximately 11.5 kilometers of driving and the high alcohol detection value consistent with each other?
This judgment found that the alcohol concentration detected after the offense reached 0.71 milligrams per liter of the defendant’s breath, and that the defendant was so intoxicated that he could not perform driving operations properly, as shown by the fact that he caused an accident by colliding with a guardrail.
On the other hand, in this case, the defendant is said to have driven approximately 11.5 kilometers from the area of the Sukagawa City Hall parking lot to the accident scene.
How are the high alcohol detection value, the finding that the defendant was too intoxicated to perform driving operations properly, and the finding of approximately 11.5 kilometers of driving consistent with one another?
Does the reasoning of the judgment specifically explain the road conditions, travel time, driving route, and course of travel to the accident scene?
5. How was the witness information converted into evidence, and was there an opportunity for cross-examination?
In this case, witness information appears in the prosecutor’s interview record as information presented to the defendant as an investigation result.
However, at least on the face of this judgment, it cannot be confirmed that the witness personally testified in open court or was subject to cross-examination by defense counsel.
If the witness information related to the findings on the identity of the driver, the time of the accident, and the circumstances of the accident, then the manner in which that information was converted into evidence and how its credibility was tested becomes an issue.
Did the judgment sufficiently explain what evidence it relied upon, and to what extent it used witness information in making its factual findings?
6. For what factual findings were the statements of fellow city council members used?
This judgment found, as a circumstance specifically considered in sentencing, that the defendant drank a considerable amount of alcohol at a restaurant with fellow city council members.
The list of evidence also includes statements to the prosecutor by third parties, identified as Exhibits Ko 6 and Ko 7.
As noted in the red annotation mentioned above, how were the statements of fellow city council members used in finding the drinking situation, the circumstances leading to driving, the defendant’s awareness, or other facts?
Also, how was the fact that the statement providers were also supporters of the resignation recommendation resolution examined in relation to the evaluation of evidence and the fairness of the criminal trial?
7. Was the defendant’s status as a city council member treated only as an unfavorable circumstance?
This judgment stated that the defendant, as an incumbent city council member, was in a position requiring a high level of respect for the law as a representative of the citizens, and that committing the intentional offense of drunk driving while in that position deserved strong criticism.
It also stated that the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa could not be disregarded.
In this way, the court treated the defendant’s status as a city council member as an unfavorable sentencing factor.
On the other hand, the reasons for the judgment do not examine the fact that the city council had adopted the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions before the judgment.
How should it be evaluated that the judgment used the defendant’s status as a city council member as an unfavorable sentencing factor, while not examining the pre-judgment public pressure from the council concerning that same status?
8. How did the judgment treat the pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions?
In this case, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011.
This was before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
The second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on December 1, 2011.
This was before the first hearing, before judgment, and after the defendant had left the council chamber.
However, the reasons for this judgment do not show any examination of the impact that these resignation recommendation resolutions may have had on the fairness of the criminal trial, the presumption of innocence, or the formation of the defendant’s statements.
How did the court understand and evaluate the fact that the city council, a public authority, had adopted resignation recommendation resolutions before the judgment?
9. Was it permissible for the court not to examine pre-judgment public assumptions of guilt by a public authority?
Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right of every person charged with a criminal offense to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
Statements or acts by public authorities premised on guilt before judgment may raise issues in relation to the presumption of innocence.
In this case, the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions were adopted before the judgment.
How should the judgment’s failure to examine these circumstances in its reasoning be evaluated in relation to the fairness of the criminal trial and the presumption of innocence?
10. How does the judgment position the fact that it was a suspended sentence?
This judgment sentenced the defendant to one year’s imprisonment, while suspending execution of the sentence for three years from the date on which the judgment became final.
In the sentencing reasons, the court comprehensively considered both unfavorable and favorable circumstances and found that, on this occasion, it was appropriate to suspend execution of the sentence.
Accordingly, this judgment was not an actual custodial sentence requiring immediate imprisonment, but a guilty judgment with a suspended sentence.
This point is also important in examining the third resignation recommendation resolution, which described the suspended sentence judgment as an “actual prison sentence.”
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Legal Standards
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the guarantee of due process. It is necessary to examine how custody, interrogation, the formation of statements, media coverage, and council resolutions were connected in the process leading to the criminal trial.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial court. It is necessary to examine how the fairness of the criminal trial was secured under circumstances in which the city council, a public authority, had adopted resignation recommendation resolutions before judgment.
Article 76, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns judicial independence. Judges exercise their authority independently in accordance with their conscience and are bound only by the Constitution and laws. In this case, the issue is how the court treated the external circumstances of pre-judgment resignation recommendation resolutions and media coverage by the city council.
Article 99 of the Constitution of Japan:
This provision concerns the constitutional obligation of judges, local assembly members, and other public officials to respect and uphold the Constitution. If a public authority made expressions of intent premised on guilt before judgment, the question arises as to how the court and the council fulfilled their constitutional obligations.
Article 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision requires that, when there is no proof of a crime in a criminal case, the court must pronounce a judgment of acquittal. It is necessary to examine how pre-judgment assumptions of guilt by a public authority relate to the evidentiary structure of the criminal trial under the presumption of innocence.
International Human Rights Treaties — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns the right to a fair trial. It is necessary to examine how the situation in which the city council, a public authority, adopted resignation recommendation resolutions before judgment could have affected the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns the presumption of innocence. Everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. In this case, the fact that the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions were adopted before judgment is at issue in relation to this provision.
Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns effective remedies. If problems arise in relation to the presumption of innocence or the right to a fair trial, it is necessary to examine whether an effective remedy was provided within the domestic system.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith. It is relevant to Japan’s obligation to faithfully perform the ICCPR, which Japan has ratified.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Even if, under the domestic system, a local assembly’s resignation recommendation resolution is described as a non-binding expression of intent, the question remains whether that can justify failing to examine issues arising under the ICCPR.
The detailed interpretation of each provision, its application to this case, and the interrelationship among these provisions are examined in “Legal Claims and the Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.”
Relationship to This Case
This document is a central document showing what facts the court found, what evidence it relied upon, and what sentencing judgment it made in the criminal trial in this case.
This judgment sentenced the defendant to one year’s imprisonment and suspended execution of that sentence for three years from the date on which the judgment became final.
Accordingly, this judgment is a guilty judgment imposing one year’s imprisonment with a three-year suspended sentence.
The first point that must be confirmed is that the fact that a public authority made expressions of intent premised on guilt before judgment itself constitutes an independent issue under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Whether there was actual influence is a separate matter to be examined additionally.
In other words, the issue in this case is not limited to whether the resignation recommendation resolutions actually affected the outcome of the judgment or the sentencing decision.
The fact that the city council, a public authority, made public expressions of intent premised on guilt before judgment itself raises an issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
In this case, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011.
This was before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
The second resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on December 1, 2011.
This was before the first hearing, before judgment, and after the defendant had left the council chamber.
Thereafter, the first hearing was held on December 26, 2011, and this judgment was pronounced on January 16, 2012.
In other words, this judgment was pronounced after the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions had already been adopted.
The reasons for this judgment do not show any examination of the impact that the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions, media coverage, resignation pressure from the council, or pre-judgment assumptions of guilt by a public authority may have had on the fairness of the criminal trial, the presumption of innocence, or the formation of the defendant’s statements.
However, this is not merely a question of whether influence actually existed.
Because pre-judgment public assumptions of guilt existed, the question is how the court understood that situation and how it reconciled it with the presumption of innocence and the guarantee of a fair trial.
This judgment also treated the defendant’s status as a city council member as an important sentencing circumstance.
The judgment stated that the defendant, as an incumbent city council member, was in a position requiring a high level of respect for the law as a representative of the citizens, and that committing the intentional offense of drunk driving while in that position deserved strong criticism.
It further stated that the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa could not be disregarded.
Accordingly, this judgment clearly considered the defendant’s status as a city council member as an unfavorable sentencing factor.
On the other hand, the reasons for the judgment do not examine the fact that, concerning that same status as a city council member, the city council had adopted resignation recommendation resolutions before the judgment.
This indicates a structure in which the defendant’s status as a city council member was used to evaluate criminal responsibility more severely, while the council’s pre-judgment public assumptions of guilt or resignation pressure were not examined.
Another important point concerns the relationship between the third-party statements listed in the evidence and the resignation recommendation resolutions.
The list of evidence in this judgment includes statements to the prosecutor by third parties, identified as Exhibits Ko 6 and Ko 7.
As noted in the red annotation mentioned above, this judgment found, as a circumstance specifically considered in sentencing, that the defendant drank a considerable amount of alcohol at a restaurant with fellow city council members.
The judgment also treated the defendant’s status as a city council member as significant and stated that the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa could not be disregarded.
The issue here is how the statements of fellow city council members were used in relation to the drinking situation, the circumstances leading to driving, the defendant’s awareness, or the sentencing judgment concerning the defendant’s status as a city council member.
Furthermore, if the statements of city council members who voted in favor of the resignation recommendation resolutions were listed as evidence in the criminal judgment, and if the judgment at the same time considered “the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa” in sentencing, then it is necessary to examine the possibility that the social evaluation formed or expanded by the resignation recommendation resolutions may have been connected to the premises of the sentencing judgment.
However, this point is not intended to limit the issue of the presumption of innocence to a question of actual influence on sentencing.
As stated above, the fact that a public authority adopted resignation recommendation resolutions premised on guilt before judgment itself constitutes an independent issue under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
On that basis, it is additionally necessary to examine how the matter was connected to the evidentiary structure, statement formation, social evaluation, and sentencing judgment.
Of course, this judgment alone does not allow a definitive conclusion as to which specific facts Exhibits Ko 6 and Ko 7 were used to find, to what extent they were used, or whether the social evaluation created by the resignation recommendation resolutions was directly incorporated into the sentencing judgment.
However, this judgment shows an evidentiary structure that requires examination of that possibility.
Namely, the statements of fellow city council members were listed in the evidence.
Those fellow city council members are also said to have been supporters of the resignation recommendation resolutions.
The judgment evaluated the defendant’s status as a city council member unfavorably in sentencing.
The judgment stated that the shock and disappointment caused to the citizens of Sukagawa could not be disregarded.
And the city council had adopted the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions before the judgment.
These circumstances should not be viewed in isolation.
They must be examined as mutually connected matters in relation to the presumption of innocence, the fairness of the trial, the evidentiary structure, the formation of social evaluation, and sentencing.
Furthermore, this judgment adopted the time of around 7:40 p.m. as the time of the accident or driving.
Because the arrest stage and some materials in this case show that around 7:50 p.m. was used, it is necessary to examine, together with the statements, the on-site inspection report, the indictment, and other materials, how the time of the accident or driving was changed and on what evidence it was adopted in the judgment.
In addition, this judgment evaluated the fact that the defendant frankly admitted the facts in open court and showed an attitude of remorse as a favorable sentencing circumstance.
However, in this case, the changes in the defendant’s statements from the report of denial immediately after arrest, through interrogation, the prosecutor’s interview record, and the statement in open court are at issue.
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the circumstances under which the confession or admission in open court was formed.
This document shows the contents of the judgment itself.
At the same time, as a judgment pronounced after the first and second resignation recommendation resolutions, it is a foundational document for examining pre-judgment public assumptions of guilt, the presumption of innocence, the fairness of the criminal trial, statement formation, the change in the time of the accident, the position of third-party statements, the connection of social evaluation to sentencing, and the treatment of the defendant’s status as a city council member in sentencing.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya
Related normative articles:
Related timeline entries:
October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.
October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.
October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation
October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation
November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.
November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
January 16, 2012,
Conviction
January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding
February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation
March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation