Overview of the Document
Document title:
Indictment, 2011 Ken No. 300814
Date of creation:
November 9, 2011
Issuing body:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office
Addressee:
Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court
Case title:
Road Traffic Act Violation Case
Defendant’s occupation:
City council member
Defendant’s custody status:
Detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility
Type of document:
Indictment
Publication format:
PDF with personal information and other necessary portions redacted
Original PDF:
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Facts Confirmed by This Document
This document is an indictment submitted by the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office to the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Court on November 9, 2011.
The case number is 2011 Ken No. 300814.
The indictment states the defendant’s occupation as city council member.
It also states the defendant’s custody status as detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.
In the charged facts, the defendant is alleged to have driven an ordinary passenger vehicle on a road in Sukagawa City, Fukushima Prefecture, at around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011, while under the influence of alcohol and in a condition in which there was a risk that he would be unable to drive normally due to the effect of alcohol.
The charged offense and applicable penal provisions are stated as a violation of the Road Traffic Act, Article 117-2, Item 1, and Article 65, Paragraph 1 of that Act.
At the end of this document, there is a statement dated November 9, 2011, indicating that it is a certified copy prepared by a public prosecutor’s office clerk of the Koriyama Branch of the Fukushima District Public Prosecutors Office.
Accordingly, this document confirms that, at the time of indictment on November 9, 2011, the time of the accident or driving was stated in the charged facts as around 7:40 p.m.
Important Statements
The particularly important point in this document is that the charged facts adopt the time of around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011.
In this case, the arrest allegation and police-stage materials show that the time of the accident or driving was treated as around 7:50 p.m.
The on-site inspection report also adopted the time of around 7:50 p.m.
However, in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011, the defendant’s statement was changed to around 7:40 p.m.
Then, in this indictment dated November 9, 2011, around 7:40 p.m. was stated as the charged fact.
Thereafter, the judgment dated January 16, 2012, also adopted around 7:40 p.m. as the fact constituting the offense.
Accordingly, this document shows that the time of around 7:40 p.m. was formally submitted to the court as the prosecutor’s charged fact.
This change in time is not merely a difference of ten minutes.
The time of the accident or driving is a reference point for examining the call history with the driving service, the time at which driving began, the travel time to the accident scene, consistency with witness information, the credibility of the changed statement in the prosecutor’s interview record, and whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt existed.
Therefore, this document is important for confirming that the change from around 7:50 p.m. to around 7:40 p.m. was not limited to a statement during the investigation stage, but was fixed as the charged fact in the indictment.
This document also states the defendant’s occupation as city council member.
This point is important because it connects with the later judgment, in which the defendant’s status as a city council member was evaluated as an unfavorable sentencing circumstance.
Furthermore, this document states that the defendant was detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.
This shows that, at the time of indictment, the defendant was still in custody.
In this case, on October 26, 2011, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
Thereafter, this document confirms that the defendant was indicted on November 9, 2011.
Accordingly, this document is also important for confirming in chronological terms that the first resignation recommendation resolution had been adopted before indictment.
Procedural Position in the Criminal Proceedings
This document is an indictment created on November 9, 2011.
An indictment is a document by which the prosecutor institutes prosecution before the court, and it shows that this case moved from the investigation stage to the trial stage.
In this case, the defendant was arrested on October 19, 2011, and referred to the prosecutor on October 21.
Thereafter, as the detention period approached its limit, the prosecutor is understood to have requested an extension of detention, and a judge is understood to have granted that extension.
Then, on November 2 of the same year, the prosecutor interrogated the defendant and prepared a prosecutor’s interview record.
In that prosecutor’s interview record, a significant change occurred concerning the time of the accident or the time of driving.
Thereafter, on November 9 of the same year, this indictment was created, and around 7:40 p.m. was stated as the charged fact.
In other words, this document shows the stage at which the time of around 7:40 p.m. was no longer merely a statement made during interrogation, but was fixed by the prosecutor as the charged fact submitted to the court.
This document also states the defendant’s custody status as “detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.”
This shows that, even at the time of indictment, the defendant was still in physical custody.
Therefore, this document must be positioned within the flow of criminal procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure, including arrest, referral to the prosecutor, detention, extension of detention, prosecutor’s interrogation, indictment, and trial.
In this case, during this criminal procedure involving physical custody, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011.
The first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
Accordingly, this document is also a document for confirming chronologically that, before indictment, a public authority, the city council, had adopted a resignation recommendation resolution premised on guilt, and that the defendant was thereafter indicted while still in custody.
Questions Arising from This Document
1. Why were the charged facts stated as occurring at around 7:40 p.m.?
In this document, the charged facts state the time as around 7:40 p.m. on October 18, 2011.
However, in this case, the arrest allegation and police-stage materials show that around 7:50 p.m. was used.
The on-site inspection report also adopted the time of around 7:50 p.m.
Thereafter, in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011, the time was changed to around 7:40 p.m., and the indictment also adopted around 7:40 p.m.
Why did the prosecutor adopt around 7:40 p.m. as the charged fact?
Was the basis for that time a statement grounded in the defendant’s experiential memory?
Or was it an inferential statement formed on the basis of information presented by the investigating authorities?
This point must be examined in relation to the process of statement formation and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. How did the charge of around 7:40 p.m. connect to the factual finding in the judgment?
In this document, around 7:40 p.m. is stated as the charged fact.
Thereafter, in the judgment dated January 16, 2012, the same time of around 7:40 p.m. was adopted as the fact constituting the offense.
This indicates that the time set by the prosecutor in the indictment was ultimately adopted in the court’s factual finding.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine on what evidence the charge of around 7:40 p.m. was based, how it was maintained at trial, and how it was adopted in the judgment.
3. What significance does the fact that the defendant was detained at the time of indictment have in relation to statement formation?
This document states that the defendant was detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.
In this case, the defendant was arrested by ordinary arrest on October 19, 2011, and was interrogated while in custody.
Even on November 9, 2011, when the indictment was created, the defendant was still detained.
This shows that the formation of statements leading to the prosecutor’s interview record and the indictment occurred while the defendant was in custody.
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine under what custody conditions, interrogation circumstances, and statement formation process the charge of around 7:40 p.m. was established.
4. How should the fact that the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted during criminal proceedings involving physical custody be evaluated?
In this case, the defendant was arrested on October 19, 2011, and referred to the prosecutor on October 21.
Thereafter, through detention and extension of detention, the prosecutor interrogated the defendant on November 2, and this indictment was created on November 9.
This document states the defendant’s custody status as detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.
This shows that, at the time of indictment, the defendant was still in physical custody.
On the other hand, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011.
In other words, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment, while the defendant was in physical custody, and while the defendant was absent.
This chronology is important.
During a period when physical custody procedures under criminal procedure were ongoing and interrogations and written statements were being prepared, how should the fact that a public authority, the city council, adopted a resignation recommendation resolution on the ground of arrest for drunk driving be evaluated in relation to the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, statement formation, and the right of defense?
This issue is not limited to whether the resignation recommendation resolution actually affected the indictment or the judgment.
The fact that a public authority made an expression of intent premised on guilt before indictment itself constitutes an independent issue under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
On that basis, it is additionally necessary to examine how such public assumptions of guilt were connected to statement formation in custody, the prosecutor’s interview record, the charged fact of around 7:40 p.m., the plea in open court, and the judgment.
5. What significance does the chronology between the first resignation recommendation resolution and the indictment have?
This document is an indictment created on November 9, 2011.
By contrast, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011.
In other words, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before this indictment, before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
This chronology is important.
The fact that a public authority, the city council, adopted a resignation recommendation resolution premised on guilt before indictment itself constitutes an independent issue in relation to the presumption of innocence under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Whether there was actual influence is a separate matter to be examined additionally.
On that basis, it is necessary to examine how pre-indictment public assumptions of guilt were connected to the defendant’s statement formation, the prosecutor’s interview record, the setting of the charged facts, and the plea in open court.
6. How did the occupation entry “city council member” connect to the later sentencing judgment?
This document states the defendant’s occupation as city council member.
This entry itself is a description of the defendant’s attribute in the indictment.
However, in the later judgment, the defendant’s status as a city council member was clearly evaluated as an unfavorable sentencing circumstance.
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine how the fact that the indictment stated the defendant’s attribute as city council member, and the later judgment treated that status as significant in sentencing, was handled in relation to the fact that resignation recommendation resolutions had been adopted by that same city council before judgment.
Relevant Laws, Treaties, and International Legal Standards
Domestic Law
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the guarantee of due process. It is necessary to examine the relationship among statements formed in custody, the setting of the charge as around 7:40 p.m., and pre-indictment public assumptions of guilt.
Article 37 of the Constitution of Japan:
This article concerns the right to trial by an impartial court. It is necessary to examine how the fairness of the criminal trial was secured under circumstances in which the city council, a public authority, had adopted a resignation recommendation resolution before judgment.
Article 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision concerns the form of the indictment and the statement of the charged facts. In this document, the charged facts state the time as around 7:40 p.m., and the fact that this charge was later adopted in the judgment is important.
Article 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
This provision requires that, when there is no proof of a crime in a criminal case, the court must pronounce a judgment of acquittal. It is necessary to examine whether the charge of around 7:40 p.m. was supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
International Human Rights Treaties — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns the right to a fair trial. It is necessary to examine how the situation in which the city council, a public authority, adopted a resignation recommendation resolution before indictment related to subsequent statement formation, the setting of the charged facts, and the fairness of the criminal trial.
Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns the presumption of innocence. Everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. In this case, the fact that the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before indictment is at issue in relation to this provision.
Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR:
This provision concerns effective remedies. If problems arise in relation to the presumption of innocence or the right to a fair trial, it is necessary to examine whether an effective remedy was provided within the domestic system.
Standards Concerning Treaty Performance and Interpretation
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith. It is relevant to Japan’s obligation to faithfully perform the ICCPR, which Japan has ratified.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):
This article provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Even if, under the domestic system, a local assembly’s resignation recommendation resolution is described as a non-binding expression of intent, the question remains whether that can justify failing to examine issues arising under the ICCPR.
The detailed interpretation of each provision, its application to this case, and the interrelationship among these provisions are examined in “Legal Claims and the Structure of Constitutional and Legal Violations.”
Relationship to This Case
This document is a central document showing what charged facts the prosecutor used to indict this case on November 9, 2011.
This document confirms that, at the time of indictment, the charged fact stated the time as around 7:40 p.m.
This document also states the defendant’s custody status as detained at the Sukagawa Police Station Detention Facility.
This point is important in positioning this document within the flow of criminal procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In this case, the defendant was arrested on October 19, 2011, and referred to the prosecutor on October 21.
Thereafter, through detention and extension of detention, the prosecutor interrogated the defendant on November 2 of the same year and prepared a prosecutor’s interview record.
In that prosecutor’s interview record, a significant change occurred concerning the time of the accident or the time of driving.
Thereafter, on November 9 of the same year, this indictment was created, and around 7:40 p.m. was stated as the charged fact.
In other words, this document shows the stage in the criminal proceedings from arrest, referral to the prosecutor, detention, extension of detention, prosecutor’s interrogation, indictment, and trial, at which the time of around 7:40 p.m. was formally submitted to the court as the prosecutor’s charge.
In this case, the arrest allegation and police-stage materials treated the time of the accident or driving as around 7:50 p.m.
The on-site inspection report also adopted the time of around 7:50 p.m.
Thereafter, in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011, the time was changed to around 7:40 p.m., and in this indictment, around 7:40 p.m. was stated as the charged fact.
Then, in the judgment dated January 16, 2012, around 7:40 p.m. was also adopted as the fact constituting the offense.
Accordingly, this document is a foundational document for confirming that the change from around 7:50 p.m. to around 7:40 p.m. did not remain merely a change in written statements, but was fixed as the prosecutor’s charge and ultimately connected to the factual finding in the judgment.
An additional important point is the chronology in relation to the first resignation recommendation resolution.
The indictment in this document is dated November 9, 2011.
By contrast, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted on October 26, 2011.
In other words, the first resignation recommendation resolution was adopted before the indictment in this document, before indictment, while the defendant was detained, and while the defendant was absent.
The first point that must be confirmed here is that the fact that a public authority, the city council, made an expression of intent premised on guilt before indictment itself constitutes an independent issue under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR.
Whether there was actual influence is a separate matter to be examined additionally.
In other words, the issue in this case is not limited to whether the first resignation recommendation resolution actually affected the charged facts in the indictment or the outcome of the judgment.
The fact that the city council, a public authority, made a public expression of intent premised on guilt before indictment, while the defendant was detained and absent, itself raises an issue in relation to the presumption of innocence.
On that basis, it is additionally necessary to examine how pre-indictment public assumptions of guilt were connected to statement formation in custody, the prosecutor’s interview record, the charged fact of around 7:40 p.m., the plea in open court, and the judgment.
This document is an important document for confirming that connection.
Namely, the first resignation recommendation resolution had been adopted before indictment.
The defendant was still detained at the time of indictment.
The change to around 7:40 p.m. occurred in the prosecutor’s interview record dated November 2, 2011.
One week later, in the indictment dated November 9, 2011, around 7:40 p.m. was adopted as the charged fact.
And the later judgment also adopted around 7:40 p.m.
These circumstances should not be viewed in isolation.
They must be examined as mutually connected matters in relation to the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, statement formation in custody, the setting of the charge, and the factual finding in the judgment.
This document also states the defendant’s occupation as city council member.
In the later judgment, the defendant’s status as a city council member was clearly evaluated as an unfavorable sentencing circumstance.
On the other hand, the reasons for the judgment do not show any examination of the fact that resignation recommendation resolutions had been adopted by that same city council before indictment and before judgment.
This point also requires examination together with the indictment and the judgment.
Although this document is concise in form as an indictment, in this case it is a foundational document for confirming the stage at which the time of around 7:40 p.m. was fixed as the charged fact, the fact that the defendant was still detained, the fact that the first resignation recommendation resolution had preceded the criminal procedure involving physical custody, and the connection to the later judgment.
Related Materials
Related pages
The following core pages are currently available in Japanese only.
Record and Verification of the Case
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 1
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 2
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 3
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 4
Record and Verification of the Case, Part 5
Legal Arguments and Structure of Unconstitutionality and Illegality
Related evidence articles:
Document Distributed in Sukagawa City—Group Calling for the Resignation of Toshio Tsumuraya
Related timeline entries:
October 18, 2011:
The alleged incident was said to have occurred.
October 19, 2011:
Toshio Tsumuraya voluntarily appeared at the police station and was then arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant. This was not an arrest in flagrante delicto. Detention began.
October 24, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the First Resolution Recommending Resignation
October 26, 2011,
First Resolution Recommending Resignation
November 9, 2011:
He was indicted and was later released on bail.
November 28, 2011,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
December 1, 2011,
Second Resolution Recommending Resignation
January 16, 2012,
Conviction
January 31, 2012,
Conviction became final and binding
February 7, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 9, 2012,
Third Resolution Recommending Resignation
February 27, 2012,
Assembly Steering Committee held before the Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation
March 1, 2012,
Fourth Resolution Recommending Resignation